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ABSTRACT AND KEYWORDS
This thesis examines Canadian provincial and territorial personal data protection
legislation as it relates to electronic health records (“EHRs”). The research categorizes
Canadian jurisdictions’ approaches to EHR regulation and three models are identified.
Using five criteria, the patient experience when interacting with each of the three models
and a combination of the models is described, analyzed and reconciled. A fictional
patient scenario is used as a tool to analyze patient interaction with the Canadian
jurisdictions and the models. It is shown that, although Canadian jurisdictions use one of
three separate modes of incorporating EHR-specific rules into legislation, the outcome of
this variation is not entirely disparate, in terms of (a) the way EHRs are defined, and (b)
the ways in which (i) consent to collection, (ii) limited use, (iii) security safeguards and
(iv) patient participation are addressed.

Key words: Electronic health records, personal data protection, digitization, health
information, privacy, interoperability, legislative harmonization, health, Canadian
electronic health record legislation
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CHAPTER 1: THE EHR AND THE CANADIAN PATIENT
1) INTRODUCTION
a) The Fictional Patient and Overview of Research Area
Joe1 lives in a city located on the provincial border between Alberta and
Saskatchewan. Joe frequently receives health care in both provinces, as nearby urban
centres offer different health services. Joe decides which jurisdiction to visit based on his
health needs. Each time he visits a health care provider in either Alberta or
Saskatchewan, health care providers access and update Joe’s electronic health record
(EHR). Generally speaking, an EHR is a digitized longitudinal collection of Joe’s
medical information. Health care providers access Joe’s EHR to obtain the most
comprehensive picture of Joe’s medical history to accurately and safely diagnose his
illnesses, prescribe treatments and provide care.
Joe’s family physician recently informed Joe he has a rare cancer requiring
immediate treatment. Joe’s physician described in detail the treatment courses available
to Joe; one treatment involves a therapy only available in British Columbia. After
listening to his physician’s suggestions and considering his options, Joe pursues
treatment in British Columbia.
Joe travels to British Columbia once monthly to undergo treatment. Prior to his
cancer treatments, Joe’s British Columbia physician accesses and reviews Joe’s EHR to
ensure she is providing care that will not detrimentally affect Joe. She updates Joe’s EHR
so Joe’s Alberta and Saskatchewan health care providers can access and use his most up
to date medical history.
Within six months, Joe’s cancer enters remission. Consequently, Joe happily
attends his daughter’s wedding in Prince Edward Island (PEI). Unfortunately, on his last
day in PEI, Joe falls on a slippery section of shoreline. Joe’s emergency room physician
electronically retrieves Joe’s EHR to obtain Joe’s full medical history and medication list
to properly treat Joe. Joe then flies home.
Personal information is valuable, and its value is increasing. Individuals who are
the source of personal information value control over their personal details because the
details make an individual unique. Users of personal information also derive value from
personal details through monetary gain or enhanced knowledge or both. Personal health

1

Joe is a fictional individual. This document does not constitute legal advice.

2
information is a particularly sensitive type of information; it contains individuals’ most
intimate details, including information about health conditions that may be stigmatized
within Canadian society. The Supreme Court of Canada has described such details as an
individual’s “biographical core of personal information”.2
The tremendous value of personal health information is particularly evident when
patients interact with health care providers.3 Each day thousands of patients share
personal health information with health care providers to obtain diagnoses, care and
treatments. Such personal health information may then be collected, disclosed or stored
by other health care providers to create a patient’s health history and inform future
treatment.
Patients may also interact and share valuable personal health information with
health care providers in multiple Canadian jurisdictions; many individuals travel, study or
require treatment in different jurisdictions and others may live in border or rural
communities in which health care is provided in the adjacent province or territory.
Patients requiring care in multiple jurisdictions can be referred to as the “transjurisdictional” patient. The trans-jurisdictional patient is best explained through the above
story about the fictional patient, Joe.

2

R v Plant, [1993] 3 SCR 281 at 293 as cited in R Gary Dickson, “Welcome to the Brave New World of
Electronic Health Records” (Paper, delivered at the Saskatchewan CBA Mid-Winter Conference, 4
February 2011) [unpublished] at 2, online: Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner
<http://www.oipc.sk.ca/Presentations/CBA%20Mid-Winter%20Conference%202011.pdf>.

3

For the purposes of this study, the term “health care provider” is used to refer generally to individuals
providing care or treatment or interacting in some fashion with patients in a health care setting and collects,
uses or discloses a patients’ personal health information. As each of the jurisdictions refer differently to this
type of individual, for example, as a trustee or custodian, “health care provider” will be used intermittently
for simplicity sake in place of these terms to describe the patient experience in each jurisdiction.

3
As was highlighted in Joe’s story, Canadian provinces are currently converting
records containing personal health information into electronic form.4 One type of
digitized health information is the EHR referred to in Joe’s situation above. One author
defined the EHR as “an electronic record that contains personal information collected
over a period of time (an individual’s life) that can be accessed by a health professional.”5
However, EHR definitions differ between EHR-related Canadian statutes and also vary
within the literature. As many academics, organizations and governments have each
defined the EHR, the result is that it has no accepted description in Canada. Thus, the
contents of an EHR can theoretically vary between provinces and territories.
EHRs are to be distinguished from personal health records (“PHRs”), which are
maintained and controlled by the patient, and electronic medical records (“EMRs”),
which function like a physician’s chart.6 It is clear the EHR addressed in personal data
protection legislation is distinct from the PHR because the EHR is a record of which an
institution has custody.7 A patient does not have custody of his or her EHR.

4

The provinces are at different stages in converting medical records to electronic form. Pan-Canadian
Health Information Privacy Group, Privacy and EHR Information Flows in Canada: Common
understandings of the Pan-Canadian Health Information Privacy Group, (Toronto: Canada Health
Infoway, 2010) at 5 [Pan-Canadian HIP].

5

Dara Lambie, “Canadian personal data protection legislation and electronic health records: transfers of
personal health information in IT outsourcing agreements” (2010) 8 Can JL & Tech 85 at 86.

6

Michelle Erin Gordon, A Framework for the Protection of Privacy in an Electronic Health Environment
(LLM, University of Toronto, 2010) [unpublished] at 12. It should be noted that at the time of writing this
thesis, there was one other Master of Laws thesis pertaining to EHR regulation, which is not cited to any
extent in this thesis as it did not add to the theoretical framework of this study. Marie Nicole Pauline
Florent, Developing a Legal Framework to Ensure the Confidentiality of the Electronic Health Record
(LLM, Queen’s University, 2006) [unpublished].

7

See James Williams & Jens H Weber-Jahnke, “The Regulation of Personal Health Record Systems in
Canada” (2010) 8:2 CJLT 241 [Williams &Weber-Jahnke, “Regulation of PHRs”] for a discussion of the
regulatory regime that applies to PHRs. The statutory definitions of EHR are institution-centred (see pages
99, 112 and 126 infra for statutory definitions of EHR in Ontario, Alberta and New Brunswick) and there is
no ability for a patient to add a record to his or her EHR, in that patients cannot add another record to their
EHRs as of right. Patients are simply afforded the ability to request corrections be made to their EHRs, as

4
Canadian provinces and territories, through the help of not-for-profit corporations
and various provincial entities8, are attempting to create pan-provincial and territorial
EHR networks. The provinces and territories are each at different stages in converting
medical records to electronic form.9
Canada Health Infoway is one of the not-for-profit corporations working with
each of Canada’s provinces and territories to enhance EHR development across Canada.10
It was Canada Health Infoway’s goal to introduce EHRs to half of the Canadian
population by 2010.11 Even though there is yet no accepted definition of EHR, academics
have indicated that Canada’s ultimate goal is to create a nationwide EHR system.12
It is predicted that once EHRs are fully implemented, patients and healthcare
providers will realize many benefits, including increased healthcare system efficiency,
enhanced record portability, and reduction in physician error. While EHRs are potentially
beneficial, the public may experience harm as a result of this new technology. Hackers
and interested but unauthorized third parties can all wreak havoc on personal data
protection if EHRs are nefariously accessed.

will be discussed later in this thesis. Patients’ ability to add another record to their medical information is a
policy area ripe with debate but is not dealt with in and is outside the scope of this thesis.
8

Such as eHealth Ontario. Online: eHealth Ontario <http://www.ehealthontario.on.ca/>.

9

Pan-Canadian HIP, supra note 4 at 7.

10

Canada Health Infoway, online: About Canada Health Infoway <https://www.infoway-inforoute.ca/langen/about-infoway>.

11

Ann Cavoukian & Peter G Rossos, “Personal Health Information: A Practical tool for Physicians
Transitioning from Paper-Based Records to Electronic Health Records” (Information and Privacy
Commissioner of Ontario, 2009) at 3.

12

Nola M Ries, “Patient Privacy in a Wired (and Wireless) World: Approaches to Consent in the Context
of Electronic Health Records” (2005-2006) 43 Alta L Rev 681 at 683; Anthony A Morris, “The electronic
health record in Canada: the first steps” (2005) 14:2 Health L Rev 14 at 18; Patricia Kosseim & Megan
Brady, “Policy by Procrastination: Secondary Use of Electronic Health Records for Health Research
Purposes” (2008) 2 McGill JL & Health 5 at 6 & 7.
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A loss of patient autonomy13 and information control also occurs when the
decision whether or not to use their health information in a certain way is taken out of
patients’ hands. EHRs can threaten autonomy if proper protections are not put in
legislation to prevent personal health data from being used in secondary ways in public
health research or by curious entities, such as insurance companies. Even in respect of
privacy uses, any inability for the patient to control the way with which the patient’s
personal health information is dealt from EHRs means EHRs may be paternalistic. With
EHRs, there is a possibility health care providers will decide the way with which health
information is dealt, which removes patient choice.
Legal scholars have begun to analyze the issues surrounding personal health
information digitization. A central issue in this debate focuses on the way EHRs will
impact the protection of personal health information. However, it has been said that
legislators are currently struggling to effectively regulate EHRs.14 At this time, Ontario,
Alberta, New Brunswick, Manitoba, Newfoundland and Labrador, and Saskatchewan,
have enacted personal data protection legislation that specifically addresses health
information, and to varying degrees, EHRs.15 These statutes16 apply to specific “public
and private bodies”.17 Quebec and British Columbia, on the other hand, have enacted the

13

For an extensive discussion of how privacy protections of personal health information contained in EHRs
affect personal autonomy see Gordon, supra note 6.

14

David Young, “Security of electronic health records: does current legislation adequately protect?” (2008)
5 Can Privacy L Rev 129 at 132.

15

Colonel Me Michel W Drapeau & Me Marc-Aurele Racicot, eds, Protection of Privacy in the Canadian
Private and Health Sectors 2011 (Toronto: Thomson Reuters Canada Limited, 2010) at x.

16

Personal Health Information Protection Act, RSO 2004, c 3 [PHIPA]; Health Information Act, RSA
2000 c H5 [HIA]; Personal Health Information Privacy and Access Act, SNB 2009, c P-7.05 [PHIPAA];
Personal Health Information Act, CCSM, c P33.5 [PHIA]; Personal Health Information Act, SNL 2008, c
P-7.01 [PHIA Newfoundland]; Health Information Protection Act, SS 1999, c H-0.02 [HIPA].

17

Lambie, supra note 5 at 88.
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Conditions governing the implementation of the second phase of the experimental
Quebec Health Record project18 (the “Conditions”) and the E-Health (Personal Health
Information Access and Protection of Privacy) Act19 (“E-Health Act”), respectively,
which specifically deal with EHRs.20
The federal government’s more general Personal Information Protection and
Electronic Documents Act21 (“PIPEDA”) may also apply in private healthcare contexts
unless a province or territory has had its relevant legislation deemed substantially similar
to PIPEDA by the federal government and, in any event, PIPEDA will apply to crossborder transfers of health information.22 Moreover, there are additional provincial and
territorial personal data protection statutes, which may apply to public sector activity.23

18

Of the Act respecting health services and social services, OC 757-2009 and OC 566-2010 [Conditions].

19

SBC 2008, c 38 [E-Health Act].

20

See for instance ibid, s 3 regarding “health information banks”.

21

SC 2000, c 5 [PIPEDA]. The Electronic Commerce Branch of the Government of Canada described the
deeming mechanism as follows:
To begin the process, a province/territory or an organization, e.g., a credit reporting agency,
can advise the Minister of Industry of the existence of provincial/territorial legislation (either
in force or to come into force at a future date), which they believe is substantially similar to
the federal law. In the case of an organization providing such notification, the Minister of
Industry will write to the Minister responsible for the relevant provincial/territorial legislation
in order to seek that Minister's views. The Minister of Industry may also act on his/her own
initiative to recommend to the Governor in Council, following consultation with the
province(s) or territory(ies) involved, to designate provincial\territorial private sector privacy
legislation as substantially similar.
Government of Canada, online: Canada Gazette < http://gazette.gc.ca/archives/p1/2002/2002-0803/html/notice-avis-eng.html#i10>.

22

The Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada’s Governor in Council has declared that British
Columbia’s Personal Information Protection Act, SBC 2003, c 63 [PIPA] and Alberta’s Personal
Information Protection Act, SA 2003, c P-6.5 [ALTA PIPA] are substantially similar to PIPEDA; however,
these statutes do not deal specifically with health information. So, Ontario’s PHIPA is the only province to
have a health-specific personal data protection statute as it relates to “health information custodians” to be
declared substantially similar to PIPEDA. Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, online:
Substantially
Similar
Legislation
–
Legal
Information
Related
to
PIPEDA
<http://www.priv.gc.ca/legislation/ss_index_e.cfm#contenttop>.

23

Lambie, supra note 5 at 88. For example, in British Columbia, the Freedom of Information and
Protection of Privacy Act, RSBC 1996, c 165 [BC FIPPA] may apply in certain circumstances.
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Canada’s piecemeal EHR regulation appears deficient in light of Canada’s goal to
create a “pan-Canadian”24, interoperable EHR system.25 Interoperability has been defined
as “[t]he ability of separate systems to exchange information”.26 According to one author,
it is a main feature of e-Health systems.27 The legal implication of interoperability is that
a harmonized legislative scheme should be in place to ensure consistent personal health
information protection across Canada.
This research study examines provincial and territorial legislation relating to EHR
regulation and categorizes Canadian jurisdictions’ approaches to EHR regulation. Three
models are identified. The patient experience when interacting with each of the three
models and a combination of the models is described, analyzed and reconciled through
analysis of the patient vignette presented above. The fictional patient named Joe is used
as a tool to analyze patient interaction with the Canadian jurisdictions. The aim of this
study is to find out what the patient experience tells us about EHR legislation
harmonization to determine whether provincial and territorial legislation should be
harmonized and if the statutes need to be made consistent. This study is intended to
establish whether unification is the preferred approach to EHR regulation.
b) Context & Purpose
In Canada, there is a demographic phenomenon situating the issues explored in
this study. Canada’s population is aging and, thus, more Canadians require health care.

24

Williams &Weber-Jahnke, “Regulation of PHRs”, supra note 7 at 241.

25

Ibid.

26

Jill Scott, “The Impact of the E-Health (Personal Health Information Access and Protection of Privacy)
Act” (2010) 23 CJALP 55 at 58.

27

Ibid.
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This creates more health records. Concurrently, personal health records are being
converted to electronic form. As a consequence of these two developments, there is
increasing discussion about the protection of electronic patient information.28
There are also societal contexts within which this study is situated. The EHR
discussion is underscored by the fundamental conflict between the protection of personal
health information and its use for societal benefit.29 This thesis is not concerned with this
fundamental conflict but will contribute to debate about the conflict by exploring
patients’ experience with personal data protection relating to EHRs. Record digitization
may change patients’ experiences with the law, as patients may be more frequently
compelled to exercise rights under personal data protection legislation to have
information withheld. However, this might make it more difficult for various entities to
compile and use patients’ personal health information for endeavors that traditionally
benefitted society, such as medical research and public health surveillance.
Patients are also increasingly mobile because of the ease with which individuals
travel via airplane. Personal travel, whether for pleasure, business or study has increased.
Consequently, individuals’ are more likely to interact with multiple health systems across
Canada’s jurisdictions. The trans-juridictional patient is, therefore, a realistic portrayal of
the way that many patients may experience the EHR once it interconnects throughout
Canada.

28
29

John Miner, “‘Obviously, I had to resign’”, The London Free Press (26 November 2010) A1.

Wilhelm Peekhaus, “Personal Medical Information: Privacy or Personal Data Protection?” (2006) 5:2
CJLT 87 at 87.

9
This study also has an economic context. In 2009, Canada’s federal government
spent $2.1 billion on Canada Health Infoway.30 Part of this amount included $500 million
from “Stephen Harper’s…stimulus package.”31 Through funding Canada Health Infoway,
the federal government contributes to EHR implementation. That being said, this federal
“funding will flow to EHR projects across the country through provincial initiatives.”32
Gordon noted that the provinces have contributed a similar amount to EHR development,
which has “br[ought] the total [EHR] investment close to $4-billion.”33 Ultimately, it is
estimated EHR implementation will cost more than $10-billion.34 EHR implementation is
jointly funded, but provincially and territorially operated. So, in a sense, joint funding
reflects the fact that the federal government and the provinces and territories have a hand
in EHR regulation, as federal, provincial and territorial legislation may apply in different
situations.
Jurisdictional, demographic, societal and economic considerations each imbue
enactment of EHR-related legislation and the public’s perception of EHR regulation. As
such, each of these components influences the analysis conducted in this research study.
It is shown in the literature discussed in Chapter Two there is a lack of secondary
sources examining whether EHR-legislation harmonization is necessary, especially from
the patient perspective. At this point, legal scholars seem to simply state that

30

Gordon, supra note 6 at 19.

31

Ibid.

32

Ibid at 84. It should be noted that the territories were not addressed in Gordon’s funding discussion. The
fact that this study includes both the territories and Quebec distinguishes this thesis from most of the
academic literature available on EHR regulation.

33
34

Ibid at 19.

Office of the Auditor General of Canada, Electronic Health Records in Canada: An Overview of Federal
and Provincial Audit Reports (Ottawa: OAG, 2010) at 6 [OAG Report].
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harmonization should occur because EHR systems will ultimately be pan-Canadian.35 But
authors do not discuss this issue from the patient perspective and they do not do a
detailed analysis of current statutes to determine whether harmonization is truly
imperative. This study elaborates upon the unification problems to which many scholars
have alluded which have not yet been reconciled.
It is surprising the patient perspective has not been explored to any great extent in
the literature on EHRs given comments made in a Canada Health Infoway publication
describing many groups affected by a pan-Canadian system that provides potentially
inconsistent personal health information protection. The Pan-Canadian Health
Information group – a group of individuals formed through the auspices of Canada
Health Infoway – gave examples of patients particularly affected by trans-jurisdictional
flow of health records36 including: individuals who reside in border communities,
individuals residing in rural areas who are required to go to other jurisdictions to receive
care because care is not available where they live, individuals who travel to hospitals in
other jurisdictions to receive specialized treatment, individuals who move or travel for
study, work or otherwise, individuals who use telehealth networks, and individuals who
receive health care from professionals who are travelling.37
So, this study elaborates on the issues of differing provincial and territorial
approaches to protecting health information contained in EHRs, the patient experience,

35

D’Agostino and Woodward have stated that “the harmonization of privacy legislation nation-wide will be
essential to the sharing of electronic health information across borders”. Giuseppina D’Agostino & Dionne
A Woodward, “Diagnosing Our Health Records in the Digital World: Towards a Legal Governance Model
for The Electronic Health Record in Canada” (2010) 22:1 IPLJ 127 at 153.

36

Pan-Canadian HIP, supra note 4 at 12.

37

Ibid.

11
and the necessity of harmonization to increase understanding about health record
digitization. This study is intended to illuminate the effect of health record digitization on
personal data protection law and personal data protection laws’ converse effect on health
record digitization, which will ultimately inform government decision-making and
debates.
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, public confidence in health care providers
and the federal, territorial and provincial governments hinges on the way Canadians’
most intimate health details are safeguarded. By addressing whether EHR regulation
should and needs to be harmonized, this research study focuses on a central issue law and
policymakers must consider and resolve as EHR implementation continues and
proliferates. Therefore, this study’s results will enable legislators to make more informed
decisions about how to improve EHR regulation, thereby increasing governments’ and
health care providers’ ability to make decisions that maintain public confidence.
c) Importance of Fictional Patient
In this paper, Joe’s situation is used as a device to analyze the patient experience
with EHR implementation and the current Canadian legislative regimes addressing
EHRs. In requiring care in multiple Canadian jurisdictions, Joe encounters three different
personal data protection legislation regimes relating to EHRs. Each regime protects
personal health information contained in EHRs in a different manner and represents one
of three models concurrently existent in this country. The differing characteristics of each
model and their effect on patients’ experiences with Canadian legislation pertaining to
EHRs are the subject of this thesis. In this thesis, Joe’s scenario is therefore used to
analyze the existing Canadian legislation relating to personal health information in the

12
EHR context and to draw conclusions based on a legal analysis about harmonizing EHR
legislation across Canada.
d) Thesis Organization
The remainder of this thesis is organized in the following way:
Chapter Two discusses the relevant in literature in which academics have raised
and analyzed issues relating to EHRs. Chapter Two describes in greater detail the issues
and questions not yet explored and addressed in scholarly works. Chapter Three describes
the research methodology used in this study, including the research questions, three
hypotheses and the methodological limitations of this analysis.
Chapter Four presents the analysis performed and the research findings in this
study. The ways in which each of the jurisdictions and the models address EHRs is
described and critiqued. Based on the analysis presented in Chapter Four, Chapter Five
confirms whether the three hypotheses made in Chapter Two are correct and conclusions
are drawn about harmonization of Canadian legislation relating to protection of personal
health information contained in EHRs.

CHAPTER 2: THE EHR IN LEGAL LITERATURE
1) INTRODUCTION
This chapter discusses relevant literature in which academics have raised and
analyzed issues relating to EHRs. There is a modest amount of legal literature on EHRs,
as digitization of personal health information is a relatively recent and evolving
phenomenon. While conversion of medical records to electronic form has been occurring

13
for several decades, legal scholars have only recently begun to write about the specific
issues associated with EHRs. While some government reports are incorporated within
this chapter to supplement the discussion of EHR-related literature, journal articles
regarding EHR regulation are the emphasis of the following discussion.
2) RELEVANT LITERATURE
a) Literature about the Benefits and Disadvantages of EHRs
Legal scholars have begun to write about issues arising from EHR
implementation, including, for example, EHR ownership38, secondary use of EHRs39 and
international standards40. One of the main issues scholars describe is the potential benefit
of EHR use. Scott stated that technology is being used to revolutionize Canada’s
healthcare system to assist hospitals and facilitate communications.41 Hoffman and
Podgurski explained that EHRs enhance patient record access, care quality and research
prospects, as well as decrease costs and potential for errors.42 Ontario’s Information and
Privacy Commissioner, Ann Cavoukian, and Peter Rossos, also explained that EHRs
decrease the administrative burden of medical record keeping and consume less office

38

See D’Agostino & Woodward, supra note 35. This thesis is about personal data protection. Personal data
protection is framed in terms of control not ownership. See Margaret Ann Wilkinson, “Battleground
between New and Old Orders: Control Conflicts between Copyright and Personal Data Protection” in
Ysolde Gendreau, ed, Emerging Intellectual Property Paradigm -- Perspectives from Canada [Queen Mary
Studies in Intellectual Property series edited by Uma Suthersanen] (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2008)
227 at 257, n 143.

39

Kosseim & Brady, supra note 12.

40

Domenic A Crolla & Robert Sheahan, “Unbundling healthcare: the changing nature of the practitionerpatient relationships as a result of electronic health records” (2009) 10 Telehealth L 15. In particular, at
page 19, Crolla and Sheahan argue that international personal data protection standards are required.

41
42

Scott, supra note 26 at 58.

Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, “Finding a Cure: The Case for Regulation and Oversight of
Electronic Health Record Systems” (2008) 22:1 Harv JL & Tech 1 at 3.

14
space than paper records.43 EHRs also enable integration of several healthcare services
such as “patient monitoring, electronic prescribing, electronic referrals, radiology,
laboratory ordering and results display.”44 Murphy stated that EHR investments boost the
Canadian economy.45 Murphy also indicated, though, that the benefits of EHRs are only
beginning to be realized and that one study shows that these benefits may only be
realized if other aspects of a healthcare system are operating efficiently.46
Saskatchewan’s Information and Privacy Commissioner, R Gary Dickson (“Gary
Dickson”), predicted that EHR implementation would also generally affect various
entities and processes.47 For instance, regulatory bodies’ “role[s] and activities”48 will
change as a result of EHR rollout. Employment, malpractice, motor vehicle accident and
workers compensation litigation will also be affected.49
However, scholars have also indicated, on the other hand, that EHRs threaten
personal data protection. Hoffman and Podgurski explained that EHR systems entail
privacy risks and legal concerns.50 According to Rivkin-Haas, the “scale of the risk”51
associated with EHRs “is huge”.52 Indeed, scholars have described breaches of electronic
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personal health information that show the ease through which unauthorized individuals
can obtain personal data from EHRs.
Bair-Jacques reported that in 2006 a Florida medical office clerk downloaded
1,100 patient records and subsequently provided them to a family member who collected
$2.8 million from making fraudulent Medicare claims.53 Such a situation is more likely to
occur in the United States than in Canada because of the market-driven American private
healthcare system and it could be argued that this concern is not quite as relevant to the
Canadian legal landscape. However, this example certainly demonstrates that EHR
privacy breaches are real and that the international way in which some of our information
is held (i.e. when EHR system databases are located in countries other than Canada)
means that activity occurring in the United States could also negatively affect Canadians.
As such, Bair-Jacques showed that, in the context of EHRs, privacy breaches are a threat
and should not be dismissed as something that can be easily remedied.
Privacy breaches have also resulted from unauthorized access to EHRs in Canada.
Dickson explained that, in Regina, an acute care hospital records clerk’s employment was
suspended after she viewed a colleague’s EHR without the colleague’s consent to do so.54
While the clerk did not have the colleague’s consent to view the record, the clerk used
her computer “access privileges”55 to look at the colleague’s treatment record. The
colleague’s treatment record may not have been accessible if prepared in paper form. In
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paper form, the record could have been locked in a cupboard or simply put in a stack of
paper making it more difficult for the clerk to quickly view the record.
Authors such as Hoffman and Podgurksi, Bair-Jacques and Dickson demonstrate
that the data protection issues EHRs raise, are, in fact, the impetus for the growth in legal
literature on EHR implementation, as scholars are attempting to resolve the problems
presented by this new phenomenon. As described by Dickson, “[t]he challenge is to
recognize the fundamentally different kind of risk to privacy which is associated with the
electronic health record”.56 Further, Dickson stressed that digitization of personal health
information “warrant[s] different attitudes than those that traditionally have prevailed in a
paper-driven healthcare system.”57
Some scholars contend that EHR risks are not nearly as severe as originally
thought. Griener explained that EHR systems are not a novel record.58 Rather, Griener
argued that the change is instead that health care providers are required to think in a new
way about their responsibilities and “exercise them in unusual ways”.59 Specifically,
Griener pointed out that a professional’s decision regarding disclosure is system based
and is not up to individual professionals.60
Despite Griener’s assertions, legislators recognize that personal health
information contained in EHRs requires legal protection. As a result, provinces and
territories have begun addressing EHRs to varying degrees within legislation.
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b) Literature about Relevant Legislation
One author has described how some provinces have created or amended statutes
to address EHRs. According to the author, in Ontario, the Personal Health Information
Protection Act61 (“PHIPA”)
leaves specific rules regarding EHRs to be developed in the Regulations.
Section 10(3) of the Act provides that ‘[a] health information custodian
that uses electronic means to collect, use, modify, disclose, retain or
dispose of personal health information shall comply with the prescribed
requirements, if any’. Section 73(1)(h) authorizes the prescription of
regulations for the purposes set out in section 10(3) with which a health
information custodian is required to comply when using electronic
means.62
While the Ontario government recently enacted Ontario Regulation 331/1163
(“Regulation 331/11”), which includes provisions pertaining to eHealth Ontario’s role
regarding EHRs, it still does not address other EHR data protection issues, such as
“consent and access”64, which are addressed in British Columbia and Newfoundland’s
legislation discussed below. Regulation 331/11’s amended section 6.1 and added section
6.2 merely provide greater specificity about what eHealth Ontario must do relating to
EHRs.
In British Columbia, the government has not enacted health-specific personal data
protection legislation; rather, British Columbia enacted the E-Health Act. The E-Health
Act “only applies to the regulation of electronic health repositories”.65 As stated by
Gordon, “[w]hile most health privacy legislation, including Ontario‘s PHIPA, includes
61
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some provisions about EHRs, the E-Health Act [sic] specifically designs privacy
protections around EHRs.”66
Unlike other provinces, Alberta has both public health-specific personal data
protection legislation in the Health Information Act67 (“HIA”) as well as private sector
personal data protection legislation in the Personal Information Protection Act.68 The
Health Information Amendment Act, 200969, which amended the HIA,
establish[ed] a mandatory legislative framework for a pan-provincial
EHR…[and] also provides for the regulation of health information
repositories, which may include local systems or small scale EHRs.70
In Saskatchewan, the Health Information Protection Act71 (“HIPA”) includes
EHR-specific provisions that more precisely address consent and access.
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explained that HIPA uses “a decentralized access model to regulate custody and control
of…the provincial EHR.”73
Manitoba’s Personal Health Information Act74 (“PHIA”) addresses EHRs within
its preamble75 by stating:
clear and certain rules for the collection, use and disclosure of personal
health information are an essential support for electronic health
information systems that can improve both the quality of patient care and
the management of health care resources.
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Newfoundland recently enacted the Personal Health Information Act76 (“PHIA
Newfoundland”), which deals with both health-specific personal data protection and EHR
regulation, including the Newfoundland & Labrador Centre for Health Information.77
In New Brunswick, the provincial government enacted the Personal Health
Information Privacy and Access Act (“PHIPAA”).78 At first glance, PHIPAA does not
deal to any great extent with the specific data protection concerns raised by EHRs.
Section 50(4) requires custodians to use “any additional safeguards for the security and
protection of the information required by the regulations”. It appears that New Brunswick
may be taking a similar approach to Ontario by leaving EHR-specific requirements to
regulations. Section 79(1)(q) of PHIPAA, in fact, indicates that regulations may be made
regarding “establishment of an electronic health record”.
Nova Scotia is also in the process of enacting health-specific personal data
protection legislation that will address EHRs, but its proposed statute is not yet in force.79
Further, as discussed previously, PIPEDA may also apply in private healthcare
contexts unless a province or territory has legislation deemed substantially similar to
PIPEDA.80 Moreover, there are additional provincial and territorial personal data
protection statutes, which may apply to public sector activity, particularly in provinces
and territories that have not enacted health-specific personal data protection legislation.81
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Scholars have explained that the existing Canadian EHR regulatory framework
described above operates in a piecemeal manner, as multiple provincial or territorial and
federal statutes may apply in various situations. Gibson wrote that “[i]nformation privacy
law in Canada is a smorgasbord, with differences in degree and type of legal protection
interjurisdictionally and within each province”.82 Gibson also described the law
pertaining to EHRs as “a patchwork quilt with a number of holes”.83 As such, scholars
have identified that current personal data protection legislation is deficient in the way it
addresses EHRs. Young notes the lack of specific legislative direction with respect to
EHRs, despite EHR systems’ aggressive uptake in Canada.84 Young finds EHRs are not
addressed “with any specificity” 85 within current legislation.
c) Literature about EHR-Related Legislative Models
In this study, it is hypothesized that Canada’s unique piecemeal EHR legislative
schemes can actually be categorized by the way in which EHRs are dealt with in
legislation. While each province and territory chooses to deal with EHRs in its own way,
it is hypothesized that these differences are minor compared to the overall similarities
between the approaches. This study establishes there are currently three ways in which
EHRs are addressed across Canada: 1) EHRs regulated through EHR-specific legislation;
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2) EHRs regulated through health-specific personal data protection legislation containing
EHR-specific provisions; and 3) EHRs not specifically addressed in legislation at all.
There has been some discussion in the literature about the trends regarding the
way in which provinces and territories approach EHR regulation. In 2005, the University
of Alberta Health Law Institute and University of Victoria School of Health Information
Science jointly produced a report entitled Electronic Health Records and the “Personal
Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act” (“PIPEDA Report”).86 The
Report describes the way in which PIPEDA interacts with provincial and territorial
personal data protection laws in Canada. The authors discuss case studies of the way
EHRs have been implemented and dealt with in legislation in four provinces.87 The
authors explain that the four provinces described, including British Columbia, Alberta,
Saskatchewan and Nova Scotia, were chosen because they represent “archetypes of
legislative frameworks”.88 The authors described these archetypes as follows:
British Columbia represents a jurisdiction with privacy legislation that has
been deemed to be substantially similar to PIPEDA; Alberta represents a
jurisdiction with both private sector privacy legislation that is considered
substantially similar to PIPEDA, as well as specific health information
legislation (the Health Information Act); Saskatchewan represents a
jurisdiction that has specific health information legislation (the Health
Information Protection Act), but has not enacted private sector legislation
in response to PIPEDA; and Nova Scotia represents a jurisdiction that has
neither specific health information legislation nor private sector privacy
legislation. All four provinces have privacy legislation that applies in the
public sector.89
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The Report’s “archetypes” differ from the models presented in this thesis for
several reasons. First, the Report uses four archetypes rather than three, as are discussed
herein. Second, the archetypes are based on each provinces’ and territories’ public and
private sector treatment of personal health information. Public and private
characterizations are dealt with implicitly in this thesis but are not the focus of the
categories; rather the focus of the models in this thesis is EHR treatment. Third, the
Report’s “archetypes”, by virtue of the year in which the Report was prepared, are now
quite dated. At the time the Report was commissioned, Ontario’s PHIPA had not yet been
declared substantially similar to PIPEDA, British Columbia had not yet enacted the EHealth Act to specifically deal with EHRs, Newfoundland & Labrador and New
Brunswick had not yet enacted health-specific personal data protection legislation and
each of the provinces and territories legislation did not include the same provisions that
are contained in current legislation. One important similarity to the models proposed in
this thesis is that the archetypes were created following a truly national examination of
the way all of the provinces and territories dealt with personal health information in
Canada.
Other authors have categorized relevant legislation but, due to the scope of their
research, do not mention all of the provinces and territories. For instance, Gordon’s
recent thesis grouped provincial approaches to legislating on EHRs in her discussion
about reform of Ontario’s EHR-related laws.
Chapter Four of Gordon’s thesis described ways in which EHRs could be
regulated in Ontario.90 Gordon argued Ontario could reform its EHR-related laws by 1)
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“maintaining the status quo”91; 2) amending PHIPA to include EHR-related provisions92;
and, 3) enacting new legislation to deal with EHRs.93 Gordon then described provinces
(but not territories) that have followed each approach. According to Gordon,
Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Alberta use the second approach to EHR regulation and
British Columbia and Newfoundland use the third approach. No provinces or territories
are referenced with respect to the first approach, likely because, with respect to that
approach, Gordon simply described the background for PHIPA and what would happen if
Ontario relied on its then-current provisions to regulate EHRs. Gordon did not delve into
provinces or territories that have not enacted any health-specific personal data protection
legislation, such as Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island and the Yukon, as is done in this
thesis.
Furthermore, Gordon also referenced the same provinces in respect of each
approach. For example, British Columbia is discussed under both options two and three.
Consequently, Gordon’s options are not a true categorization of Canadian legislation per
se, but rather examples of ways Ontario could reform its EHR laws. In addition, Gordon
grouped provinces in different ways than is done in this thesis. According to Gordon,
Newfoundland is an example of a province that enacted new legislation to deal with
EHRs. As is shown in this thesis, Newfoundland is more accurately characterized as a
province that has health-specific personal data protection legislation that contains EHRspecific provisions.
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Gordon’s thesis did not delve into territorial or Quebec laws probably because its
aim was to reform Ontario law rather than survey the Canadian landscape. As such,
Gordon picked provinces to discuss under each reform method based on whether similar
provisions could be used to reform Ontario law about personal health information
protection in EHRs. That being said, Gordon’s groupings appear to be one of two
secondary sources that categorize EHR legislation in Canada. As neither the PIPEDA
Report94 nor Gordon’s thesis present an up-to-date, national survey of Canadian
legislation, this thesis fills this gap in the literature to draw conclusions about
harmonization of Canadian EHR-related legislation.
Ultimately, Gordon’s categorization of EHR regulation arises out of an entirely
different phenomenon (Ontario legislative reform) than is dealt with in this thesis
(harmonization). So, it is appropriate to revisit the way in which Canadian provincial and
territorial legislation should be categorized to analyze harmonization from the patient
perspective.
d) Literature about Interoperability and Harmonization
While several authors have explained that each province has a unique data
protection approach, scholars have also discussed pan-Canadian EHR implementation
and have suggested the ultimate goal of EHR implementation is nationwide
interoperability. Kosseim and Brady explained that the Federal Ministry of Health
Advisory Council on Health Info-Structure, which was established in 1997, had as its
mandate…to guide the development of an integrated Canadian health
information info-structure…[which] was envisaged as a broad, powerful,
94
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and seamless information resource that would facilitate the integration of
health services and enable continuous improvement[…].95
Further, Ries and Moysa stated that “[i]n 2002, the Kirby Report and the Romanow
Report made EHRs hot topics for media and policymakers by recommending their
national implementation.”96
Subsequent to these reports, Gibson drew attention to the problems associated
with nationwide EHR systems. In particular, Gibson cited issues such as difficulties with
practical implementation, due to incompatible vendor systems, and quick leadership
changes.97 Further, Gibson also stated that such a large undertaking might not be
economically feasible.98 Gibson was also an early whistle-blower about the specific
personal data protection issues associated with nationwide EHR interoperability.99
However, academics continue to comment frequently about Canada’s goal to
create an interoperable EHR system. For example, Ries stated “the eventual goal is to
establish an EHR system that provides seamless access to personal health information
wherever a patient may be in the country.”100 Further, Morris concluded his article by
indicating that Canada is ultimately moving towards a “pan-Canadian electronic health
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system”.101

Kosseim and Brady confirmed the provinces’ various stakeholders are,

indeed, aggressively planning and implementing “pan-Canadian, interoperable…[EHR]
systems.”102 Moreover, according to Kosseim and Brady, there is a “continued
commitment to the holistic vision of a pan-Canadian health info-structure [that] catalyzed
ongoing support for the development of interoperable EHR systems.”103
Scholars focus on pan-Canadian EHR interoperability because several situations
require that Canadians’ personal health information transfers between provinces and
territories. Canadians who live in smaller centres who have diminished access to
“specialized care”104 require that their EHRs can be accessed across the country.105 Some
Canadians move frequently between jurisdictions for work, travel or study.106 Telehealth
services and travelling physicians also cause trans-jurisdictional flows of personal health
information via EHRs.107
Canada’s Office of the Auditor General (“OAG”) has stated that provinces must
build EHR systems upon a foundation of unified “principles and characteristics”108 to
ensure countrywide interoperability.109 But jurisdictions that build such EHR systems are
simultaneously required to make sure that EHR systems follow their own personal data
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protection legislation,110 which, as shown above, varies between jurisdictions; each
jurisdiction appears to have its own unique approach to EHRs.111 It has been argued that
trans-jurisdictional health information sharing is hindered by Canada’s existing
piecemeal EHR legislative framework. Jurisdictions, such as Saskatchewan, fear that
health information it shares will not be adequately protected by recipient jurisdictions.
Saskatchewan’s Information and Privacy Commissioner stated that
[t]he reality is that Saskatchewan would presumably not be willing to
share the personal health information of Saskatchewan patients with
organizations in other provinces and territories unless there is adequate
reciprocal protection for the privacy of Saskatchewan patients and the
confidentiality of their [personal health information].112
Consequently, both government officials and scholars have asked what can be done to
resolve the piecemeal framework to permit trans-jursidictional information sharing.113
Early on, Gibson explained that Canada’s “spotty…protection”114 of health
information contained in EHRs has to be remedied by enacting “comprehensive and
harmonized legislation”.115 A Canada Health Infoway report explained ways in which
EHR-related legislation should be unified to obtain congruence between jurisdictions. For
example, Canada Health Infoway suggested interoperable EHR consent directives must
be associated with personal health information to
allow organisations connecting to the EHRi, or hosting components of the
EHRi, to apply a patient/person’s consent directives in their jurisdiction as
well as across jurisdictions. EHRi and systems connecting to the EHRi
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will also need a consistent representation of consent and masking/lockbox
directives in support of interoperability requirements within and ultimately
between jurisdictions.116
More recently, Rivkin-Haas concluded that the benefits of EHRs would not be realized
until the health information contained in EHRs is uniformly protected across Canada.117
Scott echoed this sentiment in her article about British Columbia’s EHR regulation.118
Other scholars have discussed the advantages associated with a unified federal
EHR regulatory approach. Gordon stated that
a harmonized federal approach to regulating the privacy protections
surrounding EHRs would enable legislators to consider Canadians’
definitions of health privacy and the values undermining privacy and to
address the privacy problems that deserve legal protection in an electronic
health environment. For example, a federal breach notification
requirement would address concerns that arise when patient information
travels across borders, such as in a recent situation when patient
information got lost in transit from New Brunswick to British
Columbia.119
Gordon explained that federal EHR regulation furthers the goals of fairness, uniformity
and social benefit.120 Moreover, federal regulation would
enable patients from across the country to experience the same controls
over their personal health information and the same ability to limit access
to this information, regardless of where they are in the country.121
As feared by Saskatchewan, a lack of harmonization between provinces may be a
significant threat to patient data protection. Williams and Weber-Jahnke stated, “the
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patchwork of privacy legislation has left a scattered body of law that lacks a unified
vision for information security in the health care domain”.122 Further, Morris explained
that from 1994 to 2002, the federal and provincial governments created various councils
and initiatives to address the way in which EHR development should progress in
Canada.123 A report of one of these committees124 indicated there is a “‘a real danger
[that] exists that Canada could end up with many different approaches to privacy and the
protection of personal health information’” [emphasis added].125
Another reason for federal unification is to create certainty within the law
pertaining to EHRs and ensure regulation is pro-active. Young stated it would be prudent
for legislators to enact “instructive and preventative”126 personal data protection laws
relating to EHRs, so individuals can avoid breaches in the first place rather than be
penalized for them.127 Gordon also explained lawmakers must ensure law pre-empts
technology.128 One way to ensure this occurs is to establish a federal regulatory
framework before EHRs interconnect nationally.
There has been some progress toward nationwide regulation. In fact, one scholar
concluded Canada is on the path to creating a “true national standard for privacy
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protection”129 of EHRs as compared to the United States. Another scholar indicated that
British Columbia is attempting to harmonize its EHR regulation with that of the other
provinces.130 In 2005, Health Canada finalized a Pan-Canadian Health Information
Privacy and Confidentiality Framework131 (the “Pan Canadian Framework”) that
recommended ways in which Canadian jurisdictions could unify EHR regulation.132 The
framework consisted of non-binding standards. Health Canada has not published any new
documents following the Pan Canadian Framework to address unification. In addition,
Saskatchewan133 and Quebec134 did not endorse this document.135
Canada Health Infoway created a “pan-Canadian Privacy Forum” in 2007 to
analyze and oversee EHR regulation across the Canada’s jurisdictions.136 The forum
consisted of a single individual from each Canadian jurisdiction’s Privacy Ombudsman
or Commissioner’s office and a single individual from each Canadian jurisdiction’s
Ministry of Health.137 In 2008, another group was formed, known as the Pan-Canadian
Health Information Privacy Group (the “HIP Group”), which continued EHR regulation
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discussions.138 The HIP Group consisted of the Ministry of Health representatives that
were part of the forum.139 The HIP Group produced a report containing “33 ‘common
understandings’ to support appropriate and privacy protective trans-jurisdictional
disclosures of EHR information for care and treatment and for secondary uses”.140 The
HIP Group meant for Canadian jurisdictions to endorse and use these “common
understandings” to unify electronic personal health information protection. Arguably, the
“common understandings” moved Canada towards unification by providing a basis from
which Canadian jurisdictions can work when creating EHR-related laws. However, the
HIP Group’s “common understandings” do not unify EHR regulation across Canada. The
“common understandings” are merely non-binding principles intended to encourage
consistent EHR regulation across jurisdictions. Furthermore, these principles also
promote “jurisdictional responsibility for decisions in these areas”.141
The OAG has stated that the provincial “[g]overnments are committed to
developing an appropriate policy and legal framework for the sharing of personal health
information between jurisdictions”.142 Indeed, the HIP Group indicated that Canada
requires a “single integrated pan-Canadian coordinating group to discuss, address and
coordinate common privacy related information governance issues”143 pertaining to
EHRs and proposed five structural variations of such a body.144 However, a body has not
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yet been created, and the “common understandings” and Pan-Canadian Framework do
not modify the existing legal framework pertaining to EHRs. Moreover, language used by
the HIP Group suggests that, while EHR regulation harmonization is desirable, the
provinces and territories145 will not be pressured to modify their differing approaches. In
particular, the HIP Group stated that
[t]he…[common] understandings…are a mix of high level and more
prescriptive principles that…should be adopted consistently across
jurisdictions to support trans-jurisdictional disclosures of personal
information in a manner that is respectful of privacy and the differing
approaches adopted by the jurisdictions. [emphasis added]146
Provinces will only be asked to think about trans-jurisdictional issues and consistency
rather than enact unifying laws.147 As such, it seems that little has been done to actively
harmonize provincial and territorial legislation at this time.148 Indeed, Gordon stated,
“there have been no real efforts to amend [PIPEDA] to accommodate EHR systems”.149
Therefore, either legislators are reluctant to turn their minds to unification or
perhaps national unification is, ultimately, not possible, given disparate jurisdictional
contexts and approaches. Indeed, Scott seems to suggest that legislators’ reluctance may
be the culprit because at least one province is cautious about proceeding with EHR
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regulation until it can see results in other jurisdictions that are “early adopters”150 of
EHRs.151
It should be acknowledged, though, that solutions to legislative harmonization and
uniform protection of electronic personal health information will not come easily. One
author stated “privacy solutions alone can prove to be an exercise in mental
gymnastics”.152 The complex nature of protecting electronic personal health information
will continue to challenge legislators as technology evolves.
e) Literature from the Patient Perspective
The Canadian patient perspective is not explored to any great extent in the
existing literature about EHRs. Literature about harmonization of EHR-legislation and
trans-jurisdictional disclosures of personal health information contained in EHRs is
completely devoid of the perspective of the patient experience. This study aims to
remedy this gap.
Only a few authors have addressed the patient experience to any degree. Most
authors generally and simply state that digitization threatens protection of personal health
information contained within medical records.
In her thesis, Gordon discussed patient interests while explaining three ways in
which Ontario’s laws could be reformed to better address the specific protection required
as a result of EHRs. For instance, in discussing the option of maintaining the status quo,
Gordon stated that PHIPA attempts “to balance the privacy interests of patients in the
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Ontario health care system against the need for efficient and timely sharing of their
personal health information”.153 Gordon described the mechanisms through which PHIPA
tries to achieve this balance, including use of the implied consent standard as a basis for
sharing personal health information.154
Gordon then discussed specific ways in which the patient will interact with
PHIPA. For example, Gordon explained that patients restrict the use and disclosure of
their personal health information through “lock box” provisions.155 In addition, Gordon
discussed the patient experience in respect of substitute decision making, in that the
substitute decision maker provisions in PHIPA serve an important role not
only in protecting the patient’s privacy by respecting his dignity and
autonomy, but also permits the substitute decision maker with some ability
to maintain his or her dignity and autonomy when dealing with a difficult
situation involving the health of a family member or friend who has died
or who is or has become mentally incapable.156
As with Ontario, Gordon also described how some of the other provinces’ (but not
territories’) EHR-related legislation permits patients to or prevents patients from
controlling and limiting access to their personal information. Gordon surveys some of
the current legislative schemes while arguing that control over and limiting access to
personal health information contained in EHRs “must be a central part of health privacy
legislation”.157 Furthermore, Gordon’s conclusions about the best way to improve Ontario
EHR regulation include non-patient considerations. For instance, Gordon states that
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amending PHIPA to include EHR-specific provisions would “provide guidance to
organizations and vendors building EHR systems”.158
Gordon’s analysis does not cover how the patient experience will differ across
Canada as a result of trans-jurisdictional flows of personal health information in EHRs
and how this will affect the patient experience if they are required to receive care in
multiple jurisdictions. Gordon’s analysis focuses on the ways Ontario’s legislation can be
improved to address EHRs.
Aside from Gordon, Bair-Jacques has argued it is possible for patients to protect
their health data when it is in electronic form.159 In making this argument, Bair-Jacques
explained in one paragraph that EHRs potentially make it possible for a patient’s
employer to learn medical information about them through a benefit program if the
employer has a “wandering eye”.160 While Bair-Jacques suggested privacy protections
that could be put in place161, she did not describe patients’ experience with existing EHRrelated legislation. Further, Bair Jacques did not discuss Canadian legislative
harmonization as the subject of the article was American EHR systems and legislative
initiatives.
Scott also describes the effect of the E-Health Act on the patient in addition to
discussing its effect on institutions.162 However, only British Columbia is the focus of the
article, and it does not present a national perspective of the patient experience. Scott’s
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description of the E-Health Act and its effect on the patient is discussed in model 1
below.
Lastly, the PIPEDA Report163 discussed how Canada’s jurisdictions’ data
protection statutes apply to various entities in the context of EHRs. However, it did not
describe the effect of the statutes’ interplay on the patient experience.
Ultimately, there is a dearth of literature describing the effects of EHR-related
legislation on the patient experience in trans-jurisdictional flows of personal health
information. Consequently, this study examines the patient experience with each
Canadian jurisdiction’s approach to EHR regulation.
f) Situating this Research Study in the Literature
This study examines the practical effect of the current Canadian personal data
protection legislative regimes pertaining to EHRs. The analysis in this study was
conducted from the patient’s perspective and illustrates how the legislation in each
jurisdiction treats a patient’s personal health information. This research study will clarify
previous scholars’ conclusions that personal data protection legislation pertaining to
EHRs should be harmonized across Canada. Consequently, this research will resolve
conflicting results identified in secondary literature because it will clarify whether the
laudable goal of legal interoperability is in fact necessary and imminently important.
Many authors have previously advocated for this approach but have not yet described
whether it should be operationalized based on each jurisdiction’s current statutes.
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Further, most authors do not look at all of the provinces and territories when
discussing harmonization. Often, Quebec and the territories are left out. This study
includes all Canadian jurisdictions in its analysis.
Some of the background provided in this study, as well as some provincial
comparisons that will be done, will replicate prior research discussed in secondary
literature.164 However, my analysis of harmonization and provincial and territorial
approaches as it pertains to a trans-jurisdictional patient will not replicate any literature
found to date. As such, this analysis will not directly challenge prior research in this area
because, at the time of researching this study, similar research has not been performed.
It is predicted that this study will uncover surprises not revealed by previous
research. According to the literature search performed for this proposal, there is no
evidence of authors who have tackled the issue of whether harmonization should be
achieved based on a patient’s interaction with Canadian legislation. While Gordon’s
thesis focused on improving the EHR legislative framework in Ontario, it did not
“address interrelated questions, such as those surrounding federalism, harmonization of
health privacy legislation across provinces”.165 As such, this research study will fill a
substantial gap in existing legal literature regarding EHRs.

CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY
1) RESEARCH QUESTIONS
A harmonized legislative scheme presents several problems.
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First, it has been said that even though provinces could harmonize statutes to
address an interoperable EHR, PIPEDA’s application to trans-jurisdictional transfers
would still add a layer of statutory obligations and disrupt a unified statutory scheme.166
As a result, a harmonized legislative scheme addressing protection of information in
EHRs currently envisioned by scholars and policy makers may not be truly possible.
Second, as previously discussed, provinces and territories have taken “[d]iffering
approaches to health information privacy”.167 Several reasons have been posited for this
difference; including that separate, health-specific laws deal with a sensitive type of
information held by numerous private and public entities whereas general, non-health
specific laws simplify obligations and promote increased privacy protections.168
However, it is in each territory and province’s jurisdiction to uniquely address personal
health information in personal data protections laws. It is also in each province and
territory’s jurisdiction to address EHRs in differing manners. But, according to Morris,
“the present course of development of privacy regimes across the country will exacerbate
‘legislative piling on’, with all its attendant weaknesses.”169 So, unification may also be a
challenge because health is in the purview of each separate jurisdiction and “legislative
piling on” is legally permissible. Even from the outset, it is clear that a harmonized
scheme would be a difficult to achieve, if not impossible to orchestrate.
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Given that there are a number of flaws associated with harmonized EHR
regulation, it seems logical that attention must be paid to whether a unified scheme
addressing EHRs is truly necessary. This study endeavours to answer this question by
showing whether existing legislative differences, in fact, create disparate patient
experiences between the provinces and territories. This research examines provincial and
territorial legislation relating to EHR regulation and categorizes Canadian jurisdictions’
approaches to EHR regulation. The patient experience when interacting with each of the
three models discovered and experiencing a combination of the models is described,
analyzed and reconciled. The following are this study’s hypotheses.
2) HYPOTHESES
This study had three hypotheses:170
1. Existing personal data protection legislation can be grouped into discrete models based
on the way it addresses EHRs.
2. A patient’s experience with each of these models identified in existing legislation will
differ but only to a small extent.
3. Small differences between jurisdictional experiences are acceptable and not
unreasonable for patients and, therefore, harmonization is not as necessary as is stated in
current literature.
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3) METHODOLOGY
This study intended to prove or disprove the above hypotheses in the following
ways:
(a) Categorical Analysis of Canadian Provinces and Territories
A categorical analysis of each province and territory’s personal data protection
legislation pertaining to EHRs was performed to identify discrete models of the ways
Canadian jurisdictions address EHRs in legislation. It was examined whether the
provinces and territories could be categorized according to:
(a) whether the provinces’ and territories’ personal data protection legislation is specific
only to the EHR environment or, if it is not,
(b) whether provinces’ or territories’ personal data protection legislation treat EHRs
specifically within the context of health-specific personal data protection legislation, or,
(c) whether EHRs are addressed specifically in general personal data protection
legislation, or,
(d) whether EHRs are not specifically addressed in health-specific personal data
protection legislation, or,
(e) whether EHRs are not addressed and only general legislation exists.
Each of the provinces and territories were tested against these five potential and separate
categories. Categories (c) and (d) were eliminated because no provinces and territories
fell into these two categories. The remaining three categories were adopted and formed
the three models described in Chapter 4 of this study.
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(b) Evaluating Patients’ Interaction with the Models
Second, in order to determine (a) the extent to which the patient experience
differed between the models in hypothesis 2 and (b) “acceptable” and “not unreasonable”
in hypothesis 3, it was necessary to establish criteria against which to test Joe’s
experience. In this study, the factors used to evaluate the patient’s interaction with the
legislative environment were derived primarily from the Guidelines Governing the
Protection of Privacy and Transport of Flows of Personal Data (“OECD Guidelines”).171
The OECD Guidelines guided and were the main impetus behind the development
of personal data protection laws at the federal level in Canada. Indeed, it has been stated
that the OECD Guidelines were the “genesis to PIPEDA”.172 The OECD Guidelines were
created by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and considered
the eight basic principles of “fair information practices”.173
It is appropriate to use these OECD Guidelines as the means by which we judge a
patient’s interaction with the three models and the statutes because it is quite likely that
Part Three of the OECD Guidelines, which addresses flow of data across international
borders, mirrors the concerns about trans-jurisdictional matters that arise with EHR use.
While concerns may still have arisen regardless of the OECD Guidelines, Part Three of
the Guidelines seems to suggest that harmonized data protection is required before
jurisdictions can be required to release personal data to one another. In particular, section
17 of the OECD Guidelines indicates that jurisdictions should refrain from restricting the

171

The Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Guidelines on the Protection of
Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data (Paris: OECD, 1981) [OECD Guidelines].

172

Morris, “EHR Alberta”, supra note 166 at 51.

173

Ibid.

42
flow of information between themselves and other jurisdictions unless the receiving
jurisdiction fails to “substantially observe these Guidelines”. According to section 17,
jurisdictions “may also impose restrictions in respect of certain categories of personal
data for which its…privacy legislation includes specific regulations…and for which the
other Member country provides no equivalent protection”.174
The OECD Guidelines apply to Member states – Canada is a member state. The
provinces and territories of Canada are not directly members of the OECD. However,
provinces and territories are influenced by the OECD Guidelines because of the section’s
historical importance and because they are part of the member state of Canada. The fact
the OECD Guidelines have been essentially made into law in Canada at the federal level,
in both the Privacy Act and PIPEDA,175 certainly makes the case that the OECD
Guidelines are a necessary consideration in all Canadian jurisdictions. Indeed, the federal
government has required there be private sector adoption of PIPEDA (and, hence,
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OECD) standards by insisting that PIPEDA apply in provinces and territories unless
equivalent legislation has been passed by those provinces and territories. So if PIPEDA is
based on the OECD Guidelines – and it is – then the provinces’ and territories’ statutes
must also explicitly and implicitly be equivalent.
Given that the Guidelines have been influential in Canada and used recently to
create PIPEDA176, four of the Guidelines’ sections will form the criteria by which the
patient experience with the legislative models is judged in this study:
1) whether consent is necessary to collect, use and disclose data in the EHR;
2) whether the models prescribe that the data in EHRs should have use limited only to
that purpose for which the data was collected;
3) whether there are security safeguards mentioned to protect patient data; and,
4) whether patients have the right to correct their EHR.
With respect to criterion one, consent to collection can take on many forms.
Express, implied or deemed consent may be required to collect personal health
information depending on the governing legislation.177 Canada Health Infoway has
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commented that “[t]he range of legal requirements regarding consent could create
governance issues once personal health information in the EHR Infostructure is able to
flow across jurisdictional boundaries.”178
Practically speaking, though, health care providers adopt a variety of means to
obtain consent to collection, such as:
An admission or appointment form may be used to seek consent, collect
PHI, and inform patients/persons of the uses that will be made of their
PHI;
A check-off box may be used to allow patients/persons to request that their
PHI not be shared with other organisations, the so-called “lock box”
concept. Patients/persons who do not check off the box are assumed to
consent to the transfer of this information to third parties;
Consent may be given orally; or
Consent may also be given at the time that patients/persons use a health
service.179
The EHR-related statutes discussed in this thesis generally do not address the mechanism
through which consent should be obtained, if consent to collection is addressed at all. So,
the analysis in this thesis will be limited to what is specified in statute rather than the
particular way health care providers obtain consent to collection in dealing with EHRs. It

approval). Implied consent is consent that can be reasonably determined through the actions
or inactions of the patient/person, for example, a patient/person presenting himself to a
pharmacist, a laboratory, an emergency department, or a physician in private practice. With
“deemed” consent it does not matter whether the patient/person has actually consented; the
law permits organisations to act as if the patient/person has consented; there is no right to
withdraw or withhold consent.
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has been said that “[t]he EHRi [interoperable EHR] must reflect legal obligations in its
privacy requirements in all of their relative sophistication in this novel area.”180
With respect to criterion two, limited use means that “[w]hen organisations
identify the purposes for which they collect PHI…and seek the appropriate consent for
these purposes, it is imperative that they then only use…information for these
purposes”.181 The scope of use and disclosure must be distinguished. Indeed, Canada
Health Infoway has stated “the distinction between use and disclosure is also highly
relevant. Use refers to any processing and treatment of data within the organisation,
whereas disclosure refers to the release of the information to third parties”.182 Canada
Health Infoway indicated that
[t]he ultimate goal is to have no secret, or unspecified, collections, uses or
disclosures of personal information held in an EHRi or in POS systems
connected to the EHRi. This is an especially delicate issue in healthcare,
because a patient/person may not have much of a choice with respect to
collection, use, or disclosure, if he or she wishes to receive healthcare.
Such patients/persons have a right to know what uses and disclosures, in
particular, are mandated by law, such as for mandatory reporting of
infectious diseases or suspected child abuse or for law enforcement.183
Canada Health Infoway has also explained that
to allow patients/persons to make appropriate decisions about their PHI, it
is important that they are made aware of and understand the purposes for
which it is being collected, used, and disclosed. The emphasis on openness
about the purposes for collection of PHI is meant to ensure that
patients/persons will have ample opportunity to find out what will be done
with their PHI, especially in addition to the delivery of healthcare (e.g.
research or health surveillance activities).184
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However, at the time of preparing its report, Canada Health Infoway found there were no
technical mechanisms in place to prevent use of personal health information contained in
EHRs for purposes beyond which it was collected.185
With respect to criterion three, security safeguards are required to protect against
“loss or theft, as well as unauthorized access, disclosure, copying, use, or
modification”.186 Indeed, security safeguards have always been a main data protection
tenant and such protections have gained increasing importance in digitized systems
because security breaches are more “devastating”.187 As was previously discussed,
security breaches of digitized information are more serious because damage sustained by
patients is irreversible.188 Physical safeguards may include the following, and some
provinces legislate that these must be present, although not specifically with respect to
EHRs:
Perimeter security of servers and other aspects of application hosting is a
minimum requirement for ensuring the availability and integrity of these
important applications and data and for ensuring the confidentiality of
information in storage that is not already secured cryptographically. In
turn, controlling access is a minimum requirement of perimeter security.189
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Controlling access entails identifying users upon registration, obtaining
authentication of users at subsequent log-ins to the system, as well as authorizing users
before they are granted access to both the services and data.190 Such controls can be
tailored to fit the context within which a health care provider is working.191 According to
Canada Health Infoway, jurisdictions must ascertain the protection amount necessary
“based on risk, technical and operational aspects”.192 Luckily, a number of technologies,
such as encryption and data de-identification, can be used to protect the confidentiality of
data while it is stored.193
In terms of trans-provincial and trans-territorial transfers, Canada’s EHR-related
legislation does not have particular directions about how personal health information
should be protected when transmitted.194 During storage, security safeguards may include
encryption, physical protection or de-identification.195 According to Canada Health
Infoway, physical protection during storage is almost always used, in addition to deidentification.196 Encryption, on the other hand, is less common.197 Audit logs are also a
component of ensuring the security of EHR data, especially in relation to transjurisidictional transfers.198
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With respect to criterion four, Canada Health Infoway emphasized health care
providers’ need to obtain accurate personal health information:
[t]he requirement for accuracy as a fair information practice has particular
relevance for the delivery of healthcare to patients/persons, who share
with organisations a commitment to accuracy in order to ensure efficient
and effective delivery of healthcare.199
Accuracy is necessary to reduce “the possibility that inappropriate PHI may be used to
make a decision about a patient/person”.200 Involving patients in the process of obtaining
accuracy promotes patients’ autonomy and allows them to be partners in their health care.
It has been said that an “unlimited right of access to…personal information”201 is “a
matter of respect for human dignity and the protection of human rights”.202 Indeed, a right
of access has become particularly vital in the digitized environment.203 Interestingly,
[d]ecisions made by Information and Privacy Commissioners (or their
equivalents across Canada) have resulted in jurisprudence that emphasizes
that only factual errors can be literally corrected, such as a birth date.
Matters of opinion are exactly that, including a diagnosis by a healthcare
professional that a patient/person wishes to contest.204
Further, it is contemplated that EHRs will “automatically distribute the most up to date
information when it is required for authorized purposes”.205
However, it has been found that it is not always the case that patients have been
permitted access to their personal health information held by health care providers.206 In
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the past, health care providers were concerned that revealing patient’s personal health
information would expose them to lawsuits, that patients would not actually understand
the information and be harmed by it, that physicians would fail to include and omit
certain information knowing patients would view it.207 Following the 1992 Supreme
Court of Canada decision in McInerney v MacDonald208, patients now are legally entitled
at common law to access their own personal health information except in certain
situations.209 Canada Health Infoway indicated, though, that “[i]n certain situations, the
EHRi, organisations connecting to the EHRi, or organisations hosting components of the
EHRi may not be able to provide access to all the PHI it holds about a patient/person”.210
Examples of when patients may not be given access include when
information…is prohibitively costly to provide, information…contains
references to other individuals[,]…information…cannot be disclosed for
legal, security, or commercial proprietary reasons, information…is subject
to solicitor-client litigation privilege.211
The Canada Health Infoway study asserted that Canadian jurisdictions take
different approaches to access.212 This study will examine whether the practical effect of
a patient’s experience with the different legal requirements is really that great.
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(c) The Fictional Patient
Last, a fictional trans-jurisdictional patient scenario was developed to analyze the
patient experience with the three models resulting from the categorical analysis. This
study explains the application of the legislation of a selected jurisdiction from each model
to Joe, the fictional patient. It posits a hypothetical situation in which EHRs can be
electronically transferred and accessed (otherwise known as “interoperable”) throughout
Canada: a state that is not yet technically possible, but soon will be. In fact, information
in Joe’s EHR cannot be electronically, and therefore physically, transferred via an
interoperable EHR network as the scenario portrays. For example, it is not yet possible
that “[t]he British Columbian physician updates Joe’s EHR so Joe’s Alberta and
Saskatchewan health care providers can access his most up to date cancer treatment
information” via an interoperable EHR system. Indeed, scholars concern about personal
data protection legislation being harmonized across Canada are premised on the fact that,
ultimately, it appears that EHRs will be interoperable throughout Canada and health care
providers everywhere in Canada will be able to access a patient’s record, no matter where
the patient is in the country. That is why this scenario has been constructed that way.
It should be further noted that the fictional patient envisioned in this study was a
patient receiving active treatment and who was not part of a research or any other
study.213 Further, it is envisioned that Joe learns about the law of each jurisdiction either
through conversations with his health care providers, for example, when those health care
providers are getting Joe’s consent, or through informational brochures or signage placed
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in health care provider facilities. Conversation, brochures and signage are generally how
most patients would learn about their personal data protection rights.
4) METHODOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS
This thesis does not describe the legal requirements and practical result of the
actual transfer of information between provinces and territories and what that entails
practically speaking, because the vignette is fictional, other than to indicate the following
[a]s a practical matter, a healthcare organisation wishing to access PHI
from another jurisdiction must do so in a manner that respects the legal
requirements for consent to disclose PHI in the jurisdiction of the
organisation that holds the data as well as satisfy all the legal requirements
for consent to access PHI in its own jurisdiction. (Otherwise the sender
cannot honour the access request). This has profound implications for the
interoperability of the EHRi. Information contained within a
patient/person's EHR may carry with it the legal requirements for consent
from multiple jurisdictions[…]. Before permitting accesses to PHI, the
EHRi must ensure that all necessary legal requirements are upheld before
transmitting data to a requestor.214
On the other hand, it has also been stated more recently that, in respect of transjurisdictional transfers of information, the jurisdictions sending information must
acknowledge that information sent to that jurisdiction will be dealt with under the laws of
the receiving jurisdictions, rather than its own.215
To resolve conflict of laws issues in other contexts, jurisdictions use data-sharing
agreements to address trans-jurisdictional data flows.216 In Canada, complete
interoperability would require many bilateral or multilateral agreements.217 Canada
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Health Infoway has stated that “[i]t remains to be seen how specific problems arising
from trans-jurisdictional data flows in the interoperable EHR will be addressed”.218This
thesis’ focus does not purport to answer these questions.
This thesis does not attempt to solve or describe all of the problems associated
with trans-jurisdictional flows of personal health information contained in EHRs, such as
transmitting consent directives.219 Instead, this thesis attempts to uncover what it is like
for a patient to have personal health information contained in EHRs under each current
EHR-related model of legislative scheme and to determine, generally, how disparate or
not disparate each model may be in fact in order to conclude whether harmonization is
truly necessary.

CHAPTER 4: THE LEGISLATIVE MODELS
1) INTRODUCTION TO MODELS
Examination of each Canadian jurisdictions’ EHR-related personal data protection
legislation showed that there are three ways in which Canada’s provinces and territories
requirements, privacy requirements, inspection, audit and enforcement clauses, and liability and sanctions”.
Each of these components would make certain parties to the agreement responsible for protecting personal
health information contained in the EHRs. Ibid at ix. An example of an agreement protecting personal
health information is discussed in Candice Teitlebaum & Aaron Collins, “Canadian Privacy Legislation and
the Cross-Border Transfer of Personal Information, Part One: Personal Health Information”, online: Aird
and
Berlis
LLP
<
http://www.airdberlis.com/Templates/Articles/articleFiles/454/Article%20%20Cross%20Border%20Transfer%20of%20Personal%20Health%20Information.pdf>. Teitlebaum and
Collins discussed a “service agreement” that existed between an American- and a Canadian-based
company, which imposed privacy protections to control access to personal health information stored by the
Canadian company. The data at issue concerned patients and was stored for laboratories, the Ministry of
Health and Long-Term Care, clinics and hospitals. Ibid at 2-3. Although such an agreement did not involve
transfers between Canadian jurisdictions, it was created to address cross-border flows of information
between Canada and the United States and is illustrative of the fact that agreements are currently and will
be used to control trans-jurisdictional transfers of digitized personal health information.
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address protection of personal health information contained in EHRs. The three modes of
addressing EHRs are represented in Figure 1 below. The three grey boxes represent each
of the models. Model 1 includes provinces that have legislation specific only to the EHR
environment. Model 2 includes provinces that have personal data protection legislation
that treats EHRs specifically within the context of health-specific personal data protection
legislation. Model 3 includes territories and provinces in which EHRs are not addressed
and only general personal data protection legislation exists. The direction of the arrows at
the top of Figure 1 indicates decreasing specificity in addressing EHRs. Model 1 is most
specific to EHRs and model 3 is least specific.
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FIGURE 1: THE THREE MODELS OF EHR-SPECIFICITY IN CANADIAN
JURISDICTIONS

2) MODEL 1 - EHR LEGISLATION SEPARATE AND SPECIFIC FROM OTHER
PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION LEGISLATION
Model 1 includes provinces that have EHR legislation that is separate and specific
to EHRs, including British Columbia and Quebec. In the proceeding discussion, the
British Columbia E-Health Act and Quebec’s Conditions are discussed and analyzed.
First, it is determined whether each piece of legislation contains an EHR or equivalent
definition. Next, it is determined whether each piece of legislation addresses the four
OECD principles relevant to the Canadian patient experience, namely consent to
collection, limited use, security safeguards and patient participation. These five criteria
are used to assess the patient interactions with the first mode of addressing EHRs in
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legislation in Canada. Reflections about the patient interaction with model 1 are provided
after both British Columbia and Quebec are discussed.
a) British Columbia:
In British Columbia, personal health information was first protected under the
Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act220 (“FIPPA”), which continues to
apply to the public sector, and the Personal Information Protection Act221 (“PIPA”),
which applies to the private sector.222 Like other Canadian jurisdictions, though, each
British Columbia hospital now has an EHR system.223 To address the EHR phenomenon,
the British Columbia E-Health Act came into force in November 2011.
The E-Health Act contains rules by which personal health information databases,
known as “health information banks” (“HIBs”), are governed.224 The E-Health Act rules
prevail over FIPPA and PIPA when the E-Health Act provides “specific and limiting”
rules about use and disclosure of personal health information.225 Scott stated “[the] EHealth Act enables a set of rules to emerge that are specific to each database, and that are
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subject to the privacy framework in the legislation.”226 So, collection, use and disclosure
of personal health information contained in databases are specifically addressed.227
The E-Health Act has received mixed reviews: by some, it has been hailed as a
distinctive, new way to address patients’ personal information in the e-health context.228
The British Columbia Ministry of Health stated that the E-Health Act ensures EHRs are
“protected by privacy measures that are among the strongest in Canada”.229 Scott also
stated “the E-Health Act sets fundamental standards for patient privacy and public
accountability for provincial e-health and represents a very necessary safeguard.”230 It is
also thought that the E-Health Act is just the start of improvements that can be made to
personal data protection in British Columbia. Scott commented “the new legislation is an
opportunity to create a consistent approach that will enhance current health care delivery
models”.231
Despite these accolades, it is acknowledged that the E-Health Act may simply
create more complexity for those attempting to comply with PIPA and FIPPA.232 For
some, the E-Health Act merely “legalizes”233 work done on e-health and it does not
actually protect patients’ interests. It has been posited that a main reason for enacting the
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E-Health Act was “to allow the Ministry to require personal health information to be
disclosed to [the] data banks, except where disclosure is prohibited by law.”234
Regardless of policy makers’ and authors’ views, the E-Health Act is one of only
two statutes separately and specifically enacted in Canada to address issues created by
digitized personal health information.235 The patient experience with the E-Health Act is
assessed next. It will be shown that, even though British Columbia enacted legislation to
separately and specifically address EHRs, the E-Health Act fails to address some of the
five criteria used in this study to assess the specificity with which statutes deal with
protecting personal health data in EHRs.
i) EHR Definition:
The E-Health Act does not define EHRs, even though it was specifically enacted
to address e-health. Instead, the E-Health Act deals with “health information banks”
(“HIBs”).236 HIBs are databases of personal health information collected for the purposes
set out in section 4 of the E-Health Act and that are in the custody or control of a health
care body.237 Databases become HIBs when established by an order or designation of the
Minister of Health.238 Some of the purposes for which personal health information is
collected include providing health services or care, preventing or managing chronic
health conditions, and assessing and dealing with public health requirements.239
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According to section 1, a health care body means the Ministry of Health, a health care
body as under British Columbia’s FIPPA240, the Provincial Health Services Authority and
any society reporting to the Provincial Health Services Authority.
While the E-Health Act defines HIBs rather than EHRs, personal health
information is defined in the Act as “recorded information about an identifiable
individual that is related to the individual’s health or the provision of health services to
the individual”.241 This definition seems quite broad. However, the definition implies that
health information ceases to be personal health information when it is not about an
“identifiable individual”. Consequently, it seems that health information that forms part
of an aggregate and is not identifiable, such as is created for research purposes, is not
personal health information under the E-Health Act.
What this Means for Joe:
The fact that EHRs are not defined in the E-Health Act has several implications
for Joe. When Joe travels to British Columbia and receives health care, Joe’s EHR would
not be automatically governed by the E-Health Act simply because it is a digitized record
of personal health information. If Joe’s EHR is contained within a database that has been
designated a HIB, collection use and disclosure of his personal health information will be
governed primarily by the E-Health Act and in some instances by FIPPA or PIPA
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(depending on whether his health care providers activities are public or private in nature).
If Joe’s EHR is not contained within a HIB, it will not be governed by the E-Health Act.
What this means for Joe is that if Joe’s EHR is part of a HIB, Joe’s personal
health information will benefit from any specific protections provided to or requirements
for digitized health information contained in the E-Health Act, which will be discussed in
following sections. If Joe’s EHR is not part of a HIB, his personal health information will
not be governed by an act that has any specificity to digitized health information, rather it
will be governed by more general personal data protection legislation such as FIPPA or
PIPA. As will be shown in this study, though, there will only be a few ways in which
such a difference in the governing act will actually affect the patient experience.
ii) Consent to Collection:
The E-Health Act does not use the word “consent” with reference to collection of
personal health information. There are only six mentions of consent within the text of the
E-Health Act.242 Four out of six consent references relate to obtaining an individual’s
express consent to disclosure in certain circumstances, such as for planning or research.
In the other two references, the word consent is part of a reference to the Health Care
(Consent) and Care Facility (Admission) Act. Accordingly, the E-Health Act does not
actually require patients to consent to the collection of their personal health
information.243 British Columbia legislators decided to forego patients’ consent to
collection of their personal health information into HIBs.
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Instead, British Columbia made it a priority for patients to be able to restrict
access to their personal health information contained in HIBs.244 In place of consent to
collection, the E-Health Act uses a disclosure directive, which “is a ‘written instruction’
that may be used to restrict the disclosure of all or some of the personal health
information within a HIB”.245 Scott commented that disclosure directives give patients “a
multiplicity of choices with respect to protecting their health information from
disclosure”.246 Section 5 of the E-Health Act describes the purposes for which personal
health information may be disclosed. If disclosure occurs in Canada, then purposes must
involve collecting and using personal health information as per section 4, planning or
researching or, if outside of Canada, it must be for dealing with a public health threat.
The E-Health Act’s Disclosure Directive Regulation247 also describes age related and
other requirements for making and revoking disclosure directives.
At first glance, disclosure directives appear to restore patients’ abilities to make
decisions about what is done with their personal health information, which was taken
away by the absence of a “consent to collection” requirement. However, the E-Health Act
still limits patients making disclosure directives. Under the E-Health Act, it is possible for
the Minister of Health to cap the number and breadth of disclosure directives available to
patients.248 The scope of disclosure directives can also be limited by a designation order,
in that patients may only be permitted to restrict disclosure based on the type of personal
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health information, the purpose for which it will be provided or the persons who will
receive the information.249 In emergency situations, when express consent is provided, a
disclosure directive may be ignored by health care providers in favour of obtaining
information that may assist with a patient’s care.250 The reasons for this include that
when patients/persons request that their healthcare provider mask or lock
components of their PHI, it may not be possible for their healthcare team
to provide appropriate care. The potential negative outcomes associated
with locking or masking PHI relevant to a patient/person’s care include
misdiagnosis, adverse drug events or even healthcare providers refusing to
provide care.251
Further, subsection 8(3) indicates that, in respect of some HIBs, disclosure
directives may not be available to patients if a data stewardship committee has suggested
to the Minister of Health that that HIB should not have disclosure directives. It is
interesting that data stewardship committees are afforded this ability, because section
11(1) explains that such committees are in charge of disclosure for planning and research
purposes. Data stewardship committees in charge of planning and research may be more
inclined to limit disclosure directives than data stewardship committees that are
independent of planning and research activities.
Another section of note is 9(4), which states that disclosure directives will only
become effective once activated in their HIB. However, the E-Health Act does not
describe when activation must take place or what activation entails.
Disclosure directives are a unique approach to promoting a patient’s ability to
control the way in which her or his digitized personal health information is used and
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disclosed. Examining the way disclosure directives affect the patient experience with the
E-Health Act will show whether model 1 differs in this respect from the other legislative
models. In fact, the analysis below demonstrates disclosure directives are one of the only
major ways the E-Health Act, as a statute that separately and specifically addresses
EHRs, changes the patient experience with Canadian EHR-related legislation.
What this Means for Joe:
In British Columbia, Joe will not be able to consent to the collection of his
personal health information into an EHR in a HIB. Collection of personal health
information in his EHR will be automatic if his EHR is to be part of a HIB, depending on
the way EHRs in nationwide, interoperable databases are dealt with in the E-Health Act
in future. Instead, under the current scheme, Joe would be given the opportunity to create
a disclosure directive to indicate how he would like to restrict use and disclosure of his
health information.
Joe will first need to be informed by his health care providers that he has the
ability to make these restrictions. Based on the limitations described in the preceding
section, it is also possible his restrictions will not be observed. It could be the case that
Joe has not previously encountered a jurisdiction wherein his personal health information
is automatically collected (although it will be shown that there are few Canadian
jurisdictions where consent is required). If that is true, Joe may be shocked to learn
British Columbia does not allow him to choose whether or not his information will be
collected. Perhaps there is some information contained in his EHR that is not relevant to
his cancer treatments and that he would prefer to remove from his HIB. For this reason, it
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can be argued “that choosing a disclosure directive model over consent to disclosure does
not sufficiently respect a patient's autonomy”.252
However, patients like Joe, who have particular information they prefer to
withhold, may be satisfied to know it is possible to restrict disclosure of certain types of
personal health information to certain health care providers. Joe’s fears about his
information getting into the wrong hands may be quelled by this E-Health Act option.
Joe may also be concerned about the implications of restricting disclosure of
certain types of his health information. Scott commented that
a disclosure directive that restricts certain persons or groups of persons
from access may mean that the information collected by an authorized
user may not be collected, used or disclosed by unauthorized persons or
groups in downstream systems. Such an interpretation could have a
significant impact on downstream [EHR] systems. However, it is not clear
how such activities could be tracked.253
It may make Joe uncomfortable to know his decision to restrict disclosure of some
information could negatively affect care he receives at a later time. But, Joe may be
satisfied he is the one to make this decision about his personal health information, rather
than an administrator or health care provider.
In fact, disclosure directives that do not allow certain individuals to see a patient’s
health information may be more of an issue for institutions, in terms of restricting what
“downstream” health care providers can see, and less of an immediate concern and cause
of stress for patients like Joe. If Joe intentionally restricted person(s) from accessing
information and that restriction is carried into other systems, it may affect the way
administrators deal with his information. In this situation, though, Joe’s autonomy is
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respected because his wishes are upheld and he has controlled the dissemination of his
own information.
iii) Limited Use:
Under the E-Health Act, the purposes for which personal health information
contained in HIBs can be collected and used are set out in the designation order.254
Section 21 of the E-Health Act prohibits the collection and use of personal health
information for any purpose that is not part of the designation order. Section 4 of the Act
states the allowed purposes, which include providing health services or care, preventing
and managing chronic conditions, health insurance and billing, dealing with public health
needs, researching health matters and addressing public health threats. Section 3 also
states a designation order must authorize one or more persons to use personal health
information in a HIB. Consequently, the designation order can limit the number of
persons authorized to use a patient’s information.
To better illustrate what is meant by a designation order, one author, Scott,
described the designation order contents for the Patient Laboratory Information Solution
(“PLIS”), which is an example of an e-health project in British Columbia.255 PLIS was
designated a HIB and enables clinicians to access digitized information about lab tests
and results generated by both private and public entities.256 The designation order for
PLIS states that personal health information contained within it may be used
to prevent or manage chronic conditions and to address public health
needs, collection and use for insurance and billing purposes, collection and
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use for health services planning or improvement and for research into
health issues and, subject to the approval of the data stewardship
committee, disclosure for health services planning or improvement and for
research into health issues.257
Interestingly, these uses, while purporting to limit the way lab tests results may be
used, are actually quite broad. Many different uses could fall within the purview of this
designation order. For instance, “planning or improvement” could encompass an infinite
number of hospital projects. “Research into health issues” could mean any conceivable
type of research about any conceivable health matter. Furthermore, “insurance purposes”
is undefined and could be interpreted to mean uses not in patients’ interests.
So, theoretically, a list of purposes for which personal health information
contained in HIBs can be used purport to limit what may be done with patients’
information. In the case of the above designation order, however, it could be argued that
the designation order purposes are so broad that practically all possible uses fall within
the contemplated purposes. That being said, though, one author argued “[t]he provisions
of the [E-Health] Act [sic] with respect to use and disclosure are more limiting than those
in FIPPA.”258 This study will show there are not great differences between the limits
prescribed by various jurisdictions’ general personal data protection statutes and those
prescribed by separate, specific acts, such as the E-Health Act.
What this Means for Joe:
To understand how the designation order limited use provision affects Joe, the
PLIS designation order purposes for which personal health information may be used is
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provided as an example in this section. It is appropriate to use the PLIS HIB as an
example because it is likely Joe would undergo laboratory tests in a private or public
sector laboratory to determine his cancer treatment progress after travelling to British
Columbia.
According to the designation order purposes described for the PLIS HIB above,
Joe’s personal health information, if collected into this HIB, could be used for a wide
variety of purposes. It is quite possible Joe’s personal health information would be used
for a number of secondary purposes, such as public health statistics. As previously
discussed, Joe would not be able to control whether his lab tests results were collected
into the PLIS HIB if he was concerned that his information would be used in a way with
which he did not agree. Under the E-Health Act, Joe is not required to consent to
collection of his personal heath information. However, it appears Joe would only be able
to control disclosure for undesirable secondary purposes by creating disclosure directives,
which do not necessarily guarantee prescribed uses.
The concept of limited use under the E-Health Act should also be examined in
light of Scott’s observation that the E-Health Act limits the purposes for which personal
health information contained in HIBs may be collected and used more than FIPPA. Based
on the analysis of the PLIS designation order uses, Joe’s experience with the model 3
provinces and territories will probably not differ to as great an extent as authors currently
purport. Under model 3, it would seem only logical that broader use could be made of
Joe’s EHR data because these jurisdictions’ have general personal data protection rather
than EHR-specific and separate protection, or even health-specific personal data
protection. But, based on the broad purposes for which Joe’s personal health information
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could be used under a PLIS HIB, there may be little difference between Joe’s experience
with models 1, 2 and 3 in this regard.
The impact of designation order purposes on Joe also depends on whether he is
concerned about limiting his data’s use in the first place. Joe may be perturbed to know
that, when he travels to PEI, for example, his personal health information could
theoretically be used for more purposes. Joe may be fairly unconcerned that the so-called
broader FIPPA provisions are
those respecting disclosure in accordance with a treaty, arrangement or
written agreement made under an enactment of B.C. or Canada or to a
Member of the Legislative Assembly who has been requested by the
individual to resolve a problem or to a representative of the bargaining
agent of an employee who has authorized an inquiry.259
Furthermore, Joe may realize that, practically speaking the designation order
purposes required under the E-Health Act, may not truly mean his personal health
information will be disclosed in fewer situations than are allowed under FIPPA. This will
be described in greater detail in the discussion of model 3.
iv) Security Safeguards:
There are no provisions in the E-Health Act that directly address the type or
nature of protective safeguards that should be used in respect of HIBs. There is also no
reference to any other act, such as FIPPA or PIPA, which specifies safeguards that should
be employed. In terms of protecting privacy, section 21 of the E-Health Act simply
indicates personal health information contained in HIBs must not be collected or used for
purposes other than as described in the designation order and must not be disclosed
contrary to the designation order or as stated in the E-Health Act.
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What this Means for Joe:
Even though the E-Health Act specifically deals with digitized health information,
Joe cannot be confident EHR-specific safeguards are being used to keep his personal
health information secure. Joe can assume hospital policies are in place to safeguard his
data, but this is not legally prescribed. Joe can only be assured the physicians’ duty to
keep his personal health information confidential is enough to ensure proper safeguards
are set up. Joe is likely confident this is the case, given that even before his health
information was digitized, his health care providers kept his health information secret.
But, as yet, there is no indication that technological safeguards will be legally required
under the E-Health Act.
v) Patient Participation:
The E-Health Act enables patient participation by affording patients the right to
put disclosure directives in place. Section 17, which is not yet in force, will also allow
patients to access their personal health information and the associated audit logs
describing disclosures of their health information.260 Some of these mechanisms are
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unique to the E-Health Act and not contained in other British Columbia personal data
protection statutes.261 Disclosure directives and the patient implications were discussed
above in regards to consent to collection but brief additional comments are made below.
Patients’ access to health information and audit logs are then discussed.
As described above, patients can participate with protecting their personal health
information contained in HIBs by making a disclosure directive. While this type of
participation is not specifically contemplated by the OECD individual participation
principle, it does involve a patient’s active interaction with protecting their personal
health information. Not only do disclosure directives allow patients to participate in
protecting their data, disclosure directives have been touted as an “ingenious and
workable privacy solution”.262 It has been argued “[t]he disclosure directive model
created by the [E-Health] Act has sufficient flexibility to take account of all of the key
variables and the privacy context for any given HIB”.263 The different contexts include
community clinics, hospitals and general practitioners’ offices.264 Scott explained that
each of these environments might engender different “patient privacy expectations”.265
As a result, patients are permitted to participate in protecting their personal health
information in different ways in each of these contexts and environments, thereby

(3) Section 19 [information-sharing agreements] does not apply to disclosure of personal
health information under this section.
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actively tailoring the way their data may be used. However, as was previously discussed,
there may be some instances where disclosure directives will be contravened in favour of
efficiency or obtaining complete medical histories in emergency situations.
Once proclaimed into force, section 17 of the E-Health Act will enable another
type of patient participation directly contemplated in the OECD individual participation
principle. Section 17 will permit patients to access their personal health information that
is within a HIB.266 However, FIPPA may restrict patient participation in that it may limit
the information the patient is entitled to see.267 It appears from this section, though, that
patients would be able to view their record but not necessarily affect corrections to it.
Indeed, Scott argued that “[t]hese standards, along with disclosure directives, establish
new expectations for patient privacy in B.C. …enabling patients to review and have a say
(albeit a limited say) as to how their records are being managed” [emphasis added].
Currently, though, reference to requests for information in the E-Health Act268, only
pertain to persons authorized by designation orders to obtain the personal health
information for the designation order purposes. The requests for information sections do
not pertain to patients who are the source of personal health information.
Lastly, in future, patients may participate in protecting their health information by
viewing an audit log describing disclosures, if any, of their personal health information.
Audit logs are used to monitor breaches of personal health information and disclosure
directives in HIBs.269 Scott indicated the variety of HIBs created mandates audit logs
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specific to each database.270 Like the above access provisions, the provisions permitting
patients to access audit logs are also not yet in force.
What this Means for Joe:
If Joe’s personal health information is contained within an HIB in British
Columbia after being transferred from Alberta and Saskatchewan, as was discussed with
respect to consent to collection, Joe participates with data protection by creating a
disclosure directive for his EHR.
The effect of Joe creating a disclosure directive was discussed above. However,
one author suggested there are additional considerations involved in that process. Scott
suggested “it [is] important that the patient is well informed about his or her choice and
the associated risks and is mature enough to appreciate the consequences”271 of creating a
disclosure directive. It is true Joe must be informed about the risks and consequences of
making a particular disclosure directive. But, if it is the intention of health care providers
to judge whether Joe has the maturity to make a decision about a disclosure directive, the
disclosure directive process will simply become paternalistic, rather than promote Joe’s
autonomy. A patient like Joe probably wants to know decisions they make about
disclosing health information will not be doubted or overridden. For this reason, the EHealth Act may do little to assuage patients’ data protection concerns if it is
commonplace for health care providers to circumvent disclosure directives in a system
where the patients are not even able to consent to collection of their health information
into an HIB.
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Until section 17 is proclaimed into force, Joe has no right under the E-Health Act
to access his personal health information contained in an HIB to affect corrections or
simply view its contents. Joe is also not yet able to view audit logs to see who has
accessed his information, for what purposes its been used and to whom and when it was
disclosed. Consequently, at this time, the E-Health Act does not afford Joe much ability
to know what truly goes on with his personal health information, and will not do so until
section 17 is proclaimed in force.
So, while British Columbia purports to address the legal concerns raised by EHRs
in a separate and specific way in the E-Health Act, the five criteria used in the study are
not all dealt with in the EHR-specific context. It is shown in the next section that Quebec
is similar in this respect as well.
b) Quebec:
This section introduces what has been done to implement an EHR system in
Quebec, as well as the EHR separate and specific legislation enacted to address EHR
implementation.272 Some insight regarding the way Quebec’s civil law regime is
contrasted with the other provinces and territories’ EHR-related legislation must first be
provided to address the way Quebec fits into the three models developed in this thesis.
Civil law in Quebec involves prescribing specific rules under which all scenarios
are to be interpreted. Consequently, Quebec’s treatment of EHRs will naturally address
specific legal problems raised by EHRs more readily than the other provinces and
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territories’ statutes, as a general rule. Quebec, therefore, and somewhat inevitably, will
fall within and define model 1 because Quebec will always lead the way in enacting
legislation that contemplates legal issues associated with new technology. However, this
means that, in some ways, Quebec’s legislation can provide a benchmark for the way
with which EHRs could be specifically dealt in statute. This will not necessarily change
the patient experience with the EHR in Quebec, though. The patient experience will be
analyzed further in this section.
It has been more than ten years since Quebec determined e-Health would be part
of its healthcare vision.273 The Quebec Ministry of Health and Social Services introduced
Quebec’s EHR, the Dossier de santé du Québec,274 or Quebec Health Record (“QHR”),
as an experimental project in the territory of the Capitale-Nationale, Saguenay—LacSaint-Jean or Lanaudière health and social services agency. Currently, the regions of
Capitale-Nationale, Estrie, Lanaudière and Montréal are participating and more regions
will join in future.275 The Minister of Health and Social Services determines which
regions take part in the project.276 Individuals in the participating regions may refuse to
have an EHR, but only those individuals living in the regions can have an EHR.277 Within
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the last two years, portions of the project have become operational and Quebec’s EHR is
expected to achieve complete functionality by 2016.278
In some senses, Quebec is not unlike the provinces in model 2 that enacted
regulations pursuant to existing legislation to address EHRs. First and foremost,
Quebec’s An Act respecting Health Services and Social Services279 governs records
containing personal health information “held by public and private health and social
service institutions.”280 Quebec’s Conditions281 is an Order in Council that governs EHR
development in Quebec. Much like a regulation, an Order in Council is made pursuant to
a statutory provision of a legislative enactment. The Conditions were created pursuant to
the first paragraph of section 434 of An Act respecting health services and social
services, which provides that
the Minister of Health and Social Services…may, notwithstanding any
inconsistent provision, to the extent and on the conditions fixed by the
Government, implement any experimental project concerning the
organization of the human or material resources of institutions for the
purpose of fostering integrated organization and the provision of health
services and social services.282
The Conditions address the implementation of an experimental project initiated by the
Quebec government in 2006 known as the Health and Social Services Network
Computerization Plan, the point of which was to create an interoperable EHR. The
Ministry of Health and Social Services stated “[a person’s] right to privacy and the

278

Powers, supra note 273 at e30.

279

RSQ, c S-4.2.

280

Information Governance, supra note 178 at 27.

281

Conditions, supra note 18. As is clear from the title, two phases of EHR implementation have occurred.
The first phase began in a medical clinic in the Capitale-Nationale region of Quebec in May 2008. The
second phase brought EHR implementation to additional medical clinics in the Capitale-Nationale region
and Estrie, Lanaudière and Montréal. Information Document, supra note 276 at 4-5.

282

Conditions, supra note 18, preamble.

75
protection of the health information in [their] QHR are part of the guiding principles of
the QHR project.”283
The Quebec government made additional Orders in Council to address the
evolution of EHR implementation. On November 30, 2011, the Minister of Health and
Social Services made an additional Order in Council, Minister’s Order 2011-015, to
indicate the Conditions would apply to the introduction of the EHR in Montreal.284
Ultimately, in this study, Quebec is placed in model 1 because of the separate and
specific way it addresses EHRs in its Order in Council. No other province has enacted a
regulation that so comprehensively deals with the specific legal issues raised by EHRs.
Even British Columbia’s E-Health Act is not as detailed as the Conditions. Further, the
Conditions provide that
[i]f the Québec Health Record is deployed throughout Québec, subject to
any legislative amendments passed by the National Assembly for that
purpose, the information stored under these Conditions by the entities
referred to in section 1 shall continue to be stored by them, on the
conditions prescribed by law at the time of the deployment.285
In other words, the Conditions will be accepted as the governing statute at such time as
the EHR is deployed throughout the province.
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Moreover, Bill 59, An Act respecting the sharing of certain health information286,
was introduced to the second session of the thirty-ninth legislature of the Quebec
National Assembly in 2012. The Bill introduces legislation quite similar on its face to the
E-Health Act. Like the E-Health Act, the Bill deals with health information banks. The
Bill’s explanatory notes indicate the Act establishes six clinical domains and states that
“[a] clinical domain is made up of one or more health information banks holding
information that may be released in a secure manner through the Quebec Health
Record”.287 The Bill also establishes “an electronic prescription management system for
medication”288 to “shar[e]…electronic prescriptions for medication in a secure
environment”.289
However, unlike the E-Health Act, the Act creates rules to “protect health
information held in a health information bank and to govern the release, use and
conservation of information”.290 In addition, the Bill describes “[t]he rights of the persons
to whom the information relates”291 such as “the right to refuse to allow the release of
information held in a health information bank in a clinical domain and the right to have
the information corrected.”292 Perhaps most importantly, the Act discusses “[s]pecific
rules on the release, use and conservation of health information”293 which apply in place
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of any legislative provisions, that provide rules to the contrary. In particular,
“[a]djustments are made to the rights, provided for under the Act respecting Access to
documents held by public bodies and the Protection of personal information, of a person
to whom the information relates”.294
The below analysis of the patient experience will be based on the Conditions,
which are currently in force in Quebec, rather than Bill 59, although it seems Bill 59 may
pass in the near future. Analysis of the Conditions is most appropriate, though, because
they reflect the current legislative landscape in Quebec. In order to describe the patient
experience in Quebec, the following sections discuss whether the Conditions have an
EHR definition, and whether the Conditions address consent to collection, limited use,
security safeguards and patient participation in their provisions.
i) EHR Definition:
As was previously discussed, the way a patient interacts with EHR-legislation in
each Canadian province and territory depends upon whether and how EHR is defined in
legislation. There is no definition of Quebec’s EHR in the Conditions. Instead, a
definition is found in the Information Document Regarding the Implementation of the
Second Phase of the Experimental Project for the Quebec Electronic Health Record.295
According to the Information Document, the Quebec Electronic Health Record “is a new
electronic tool aimed at giving all Quebeckers a file in which basic information on their
state of health is kept”.296 The Information Document indicates the EHR “will enable
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mainly physicians, nurses and pharmacists to consult and share…information”.297 In
addition, although it does not explicitly define EHR, section 7 of the Conditions
stipulates that an EHR “is made up of” the following types of information:
the unique identifying number of the person concerned and the following
information:
(1) the results of the person’s laboratory analyses…;
(2) the results of the person’s medical imaging examinations…;
(3) the person’s medication…including any therapeutic indications given
on the prescription.
Based on the gradual implementation strategy for the experimental project,
the Health Record may also include the following information:
(1) contact information for the person’s professional contacts…;
(2) the person’s immunization data…;
(3) any allergies or intolerance that may have an impact on the person’s
health or on a health and social service provider’s ability to take the
person in charge;
(4) emergency data and complementary information…
The Information Document indicates “complementary information” includes “any
additional information [an individual] and an authorized clinician decide to enter (such
as: treatment, orthosis wearing, pacemaker, organ donation).”298 The Information
Document further clarifies that subsection 7(3) entails all of an individual’s prescription
medications obtained at pharmacies, which includes “intended therapeutic effects, if
indicated on the prescription”.299
Lastly, section 22 provides that
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[t]he agency may also store emergency data and complementary
information on the person concerned, which may include any essential
information needed before treating a person who is unable to communicate
or presents clinical conditions that place the person’s health or life at risk
if specific measures are not taken, including diagnoses, treatments,
surgeries or immunization coverage, blood transfusion record, the use of
orthotic or prosthetic devices or high technology devices, the fact that the
person is a carrier of multiple resistant bacteria, the existence of consent to
organ or tissue donation or a living will, the presence of a metal implant,
pacemaker or contact lenses, the date of the event concerned and the
number of reoccurrences, and any refusal to have a blood transfusion.
So, while the Conditions do not define EHR, a number of sections in the Conditions
describe in great enough detail what is contained in an EHR. It is suggested that it is,
therefore, probably clear to patients what an EHR includes in Quebec.
What this Means for Joe:
If health care providers in Quebec use a combination of the definition contained
in the Information Document, as well as the contents specified in section 7 of the
Conditions, to explain to Joe that which his EHR contains, Joe would probably
understand what constitutes his EHR. While the definition contained in the Information
Document is not a statutory definition, the contents specified in section 7 clarify to a fair
level of detail what comprises Joe’s EHR. Joe may wonder what may comprise
“complementary information” and “emergency data”. These answers are not enumerated
in the statute but instead described in the Information Document. The statute, therefore,
provides a broad basis from which to draw the particular types of information, and
enables an EHR to include information previously not contemplated by Order in Council
drafters.
As will be discussed, the Conditions are far more specific about EHR contents
than the E-Health Act, which purports to deal directly with digitized information. A
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patient, like Joe, can be much more certain about what types of information his physician
will view and use to provide treatment if Joe travelled to Quebec rather than British
Columbia. However, this discrepancy between EHR descriptions may not alter Joe’s
EHR experience with the EHR statutory regime. Health care providers in British
Columbia and Quebec likely established through practice what to include in EHRs.
As with the E-Health Act, though, the fact that EHR is not defined in the
Conditions may still leave it open to interpretation as to what the EHR in fact entails in
Quebec. Further, it is not clear from the Conditions if the EHR is the individual computer
file, or the electronic system itself.
ii) Consent to Collection:
As was previously discussed, the OECD collection limitation principle states that
individuals should have knowledge of or consent to collection of their personal
information.300 However, the Conditions do not allow patients to consent to collection.
Section 6 of the Conditions provides it is the EHR project’s aim to provide every
insured person on the Board’s register with a Quebec Health Record, unless they
explicitly refused to have one. Therefore, section 6 makes clear that the Quebec EHR
system is premised on voluntary participation; however, in the participating regions, an
individual’s personal health information is always collected into an EHR, even if an
individual refuses an EHR.
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Section 79 of the Conditions indicates that “[a]ny person who is entered in the
register of insured persons kept by the Board may refuse to have a Health Record”.
Persons 14-years-of-age or older may refuse an EHR; refusal can also be expressed by a
holder of parental authority or tutor of a person under the age of 14, [a]
tutor or curator of an incapable person, [a] mandatary of a person whose
mandate given in anticipation of incapacity has been homologated,
or…any person authorized for that purpose by the person concerned.301
Individuals who refuse an EHR must be instructed about the EHR project
“objectives and aims”,302 as well as the “terms and conditions”303 relating to access and
use, communication, retention and destruction of information contained in EHR
systems.304
The Conditions permit qualified individuals to refuse a Health Record through
many different means.305 Individuals are permitted 21 days from a date determined by the
Minister of Health and Social Services in which to refuse an EHR.306 And, as Quebec’s
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EHR project was still experimental at the time the Order in Council was made, section 83
provides that “if the Health Record is deployed throughout Québec the agreement is
deemed to be valid until the person refuses to have a Health Record.”307 So, first-phase
EHRs stayed active in the second phase of implementation, but individuals were also
permitted to indicate they did not want an EHR anymore.308 As per section 84, “[a]
person may refuse at any time to have a Health Record [emphasis added].”
However, as described above, no matter when an individual refuses to have an
EHR, entities will still collect information, including the individual’s pharmacy
prescription medication, medical imaging exam results, and laboratory examinations and
test results.309 Consequently, the Conditions do not afford individuals the right to consent
to collection, but rather to prevent the collected information from being accessed and
used.
Moreover, unlike in British Columbia, individuals cannot choose which
information to include in their EHR.310 Quebec cites “professional responsibility and
quality of care”311 as reasons for including all of the stipulated information. Individuals
are advised to simply refuse an EHR if they do not wish certain information to be
available to health care providers.312 Similarly, individuals are not permitted to state
which health care providers can access their EHRs. Again, this prohibition differs from
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British Columbia’s E-Health Act, which permits individuals to specify particular health
care providers to whom individuals do not wish to grant access. However, section 17 of
the Conditions provides that
Information stored prior to a person’s refusal to have a Health Record
remains inaccessible to an authorized health service provider while the
refusal is in effect, unless the health service provider justifies the need to
access the information for one of the following reasons:
(1) the health service provider has already accessed the person’s Health
Record, before the person refuses to have a Health Record;
(2) the health service provider is part of a care team that includes another
health service provider to whom subsection 1 applies.
So, even in Quebec, a patient’s direction about accessing information contained in her or
his EHR is subject to multiple exceptions, as is also the case in British Columbia.
What this means for Joe
The patient experience with Quebec’s Conditions is not unlike that in British
Columbia in respect of the consent to collection criterion. As in British Columbia,
Quebec’s legislation allows patients like Joe to limit access to their information. In both
British Columbia and Quebec, Joe is not given an opportunity to consent to the collection
of his personal health information into his EHR. Instead, Joe is permitted to refuse access
to his information once its collected. So, in some respects, Quebec’s legislation ensures
Joe’s autonomy by introducing some patient controls over personal health information.
But, under Quebec’s Conditions, an individual never has a choice as to whether the
information is collected in the first place.
Quebec and British Columbia’s legislation differ in terms of whether individuals
can specify to whom and what type of information may be made accessible. Quebec does
not allow individuals to specify these criteria, but British Columbia’s E-Health Act does.
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However, it is arguable that Quebec and British Columbia do not differ to any great
extent in this respect because British Columbia’s E-Health Act permits health care
providers to access normally inaccessible information in the event of emergency.
Emergency situations are the reason for allowing Quebec health care providers access to
all of individuals’ personal health information all the time. British Columbia allows
access in emergency situations as well, so this effectively makes the patient experience in
both provinces the same in model 1 in respect of this criterion.
iii) Limited Use:
In Quebec, another principle upon which the second phase of implementation is
premised is “limiting the use and disclosure of the information contained in [an
individual’s] file”.313 This principle aligns with the OECD limited use guideline, which
again states that “[p]ersonal data should not be disclosed, made available or otherwise
used for purposes other than” those specified at the time of collection or those compatible
with the original purposes and specified at the time the purpose is changed.314
Accordingly, section 11(5) of the Conditions sets limits on using information contained
in EHRs; information may only be used for purposes stipulated in section 10 of the
Conditions. The purposes discussed in section 10 include giving
authorized health service providers access to relevant, organized,
integrated and updated information to enable them to quickly assimilate
information on a person’s health when they take charge of that person or
dispense any kind of health service to the person that continues and is
complementary to the services dispensed by other health service
providers; and…
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[ensuring] the effective communication of the Health Record, for the sole
purpose of dispensing health services to the person concerned [emphasis
added].
Only “authorized health service providers” may receive the information if it is required to
execute their duties.315 In other words, personal health information contained in EHRs
can only be used by health services providers when providers take care of or provide
health services to an individual who is the subject of the EHR.
Moreover, according to section 75,
[t]he manager of the Québec Health Record directory may not use the
stored information for any other purposes than its communication to
authorized health service providers according to the access profile
assigned to them.
Sections 11(5), 10 and 75 are broad provisions governing the way in which patients’
personal health information contained in EHRs may be used. Unlike the specific
provisions indicating the type of information contained in EHRs, the purview of the use
provisions is quite wide – “dispensing health services” can conceivably encompass many
actions taken by health service providers and this phrase is not defined in the Conditions.
Practically speaking, the use provisions wide purview is important for enabling
health service providers’ access to patients’ health information in many health contexts
and for numerous situations that may arise. Consequently, it appears that, under the
Conditions, use of personal health information contained in EHRs is only narrowed by
the fact that health service providers must be “authorized” rather than by any purposes
specified in section 10.
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What this means for Joe:
If Joe travels to Quebec and receives health care, he will be sure his health service
providers will only use the personal health information contained in his EHR if they are
authorized to do so and will only use it for the purposes of dispensing health services to
him. Similarly, the EHR directory manager is also bound to use his personal health
information in this manner. It is likely Joe will be unsure about what constitutes health
services. Joe may be concerned about the fact the limited use provision is actually quite
broad. However, he will probably take some comfort that health service providers must
obtain a certificate of authorization, which is discussed next, before they can use his
information.
iv) Security Safeguards:
Quebec’s second phase of EHR implementation is also premised upon the
importance of keeping information secure.316 In section 2 of Chapter 1, Division 1, the
Conditions address entities317 requiring safety measures to ensure information is
protected. Section 2 states that “entities must establish a set of safety measures and
mechanisms to ensure the availability, integrity and confidentiality of the information
they hold. They must also ensure that the mechanisms function adequately.” In addition,
section 11 requires compliance with the principles of
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(8) responsibility and accountability, in that the entities referred to in
section 1, as well as institutions and health service providers referred to in
section 4, must ensure the proper operation of the measures and
mechanisms established under their responsibility to ensure the security of
the informational assets concerned and the confidentiality of information;
[and]
(9) the security of informational assets, in that the entities referred to in
section 1 must establish a set of safety measures and mechanisms to
ensure the availability, integrity and confidentiality of the information they
hold
Moreover, the manager of access services, who is appointed by the Minister of
Health and Social Services, is duty bound to create components maintaining security of
the personal health information contained in EHRs.318 As described in the previous
section, a specific security safeguard addressed by the Conditions entails authentication
certificates issued by the Regie de l’assurance maladie du Quebec.319 Only health care
providers who hold these certificates can access an individual’s EHR. The authentication
certificate is specific to the health care providers’ particular role.320 The Ministry of
Health and Social Services indicates the authentication certificates create a “highly secure
access mechanism”.321
What this means for Joe
Patients travelling to Quebec can expect that security measures are in place
protecting personal health information contained in their EHRs based on the above
provisions. In fact, patients like Joe would be more confident that their information is
safeguarded in Quebec because a particular individual is appointed to address the very
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issue of security. Other than authentication certificates, however, Joe would be unclear
about what specific mechanisms were being used to protect his health information. In
fact, the general security safeguards prescribed in sections 2 and 11 are not unlike those
required in health-specific and general personal data protection legislation described in
models 1 and 2.
v) Patient Participation:
Quebec’s Information Document states patient rights “are respected and
protected”322 during the second phase of EHR implementation. The rights to which the
Information Document refers include individuals’ “right to privacy; right to information
and the right to access one’s own health record; right to correct inaccurate or incomplete
information; and right to lodge a complaint.”323 Each of these rights reflect the OECD
individual participation principle that patients should have the right to learn whether an
entity has data about them, what that information is and to be able to change the data if
required. Several sections of the Conditions address these rights.
Section 11(6) provides that a person has “the right of access and rectification”.324
A description of these rights is found in later sections of the Conditions. To consult
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information contained in an EHR, an individual is required to file a request with the head
of the hospital or community centre’s Medical Records Department. Section 90 states
that an access or rectification application must be in writing and made out by the person
who is the subject of the information or another person entitled to receive that personal
information. Section 92 provides that
[th]e person is entitled to receive any personal information concerning the
person contained in the person’s Health Record or in one of the
information systems referred to in sections 23, 28 and 45.
The person may also receive the identifier of the computer system or the
name of the health service provider who entered information in an
information system or the storage system referred to in section 17, and the
date on which the information was entered.
Interestingly, section 92 of the Conditions also indicates that a “person may receive the
reason why the person’s refusal to have a Health Record has been overridden.” Patients
will receive a receipt of acknowledgement of their request and an answer to the request
20 days after acknowledgement.325 If the answer does not follow in 20 days, the patient
will receive a notice and an answer will follow 10 days after that.326

(c) may demand the rectification of any information concerning the person held by an entity
referred to in section 1, or contained in the person’s Health Record, that is inaccurate,
incomplete or equivocal, or that was gathered, stored or communicated without authorization;
(7) a right of redress, in that any person is entitled to file a complaint with
(a) the person responsible for access to documents and the protection of personal information
at an entity referred to in section 1;
(b) the person responsible for the central coordination of requests for access and rectification
and complaints referred to in section 100;
(c) the Commission d’accès à l’information;
(d) the Minister[.]
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As provided for in section 11(6), the Conditions also permit patients to rectify
“inaccurate, incomplete, ambiguous [and] unauthorized information”327 contained in their
EHR. Section 100 addresses rectification:
[e]very person who receives confirmation that the person’s Health Record
or one of the information systems referred to in sections 23, 28 and 45
contains personal information concerning the person that is inaccurate,
incomplete or equivocal, or whose collection, communication or
conservation were not authorized by these Conditions, may demand that it
be rectified.
Sections 101-111 then describe further requirements for rectification procedures,
including timelines for response from appropriate officials. A patient may file a
rectification request at the same location as for the access requests. A response will
follow in 30 days, and if not within that time, then 30 days following that.328 The same
process is followed when a patient wants to obtain a list of those entities or individuals
that have accessed their EHR.329 Sections 101-111 also provide alternatives to
rectification and enable health providers to correct information if inaccurate.
What this means for Joe
Based on the provisions laid out in the Conditions, a patient like Joe, would
clearly understand how to obtain any information contained in his personal health record,
details about its use and also how the information could be corrected if he finds an error
or omission.
Consequently, Joe would feel confident he could ensure his health care providers
have the correct and complete information about his medical history at their disposal
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when dispensing health services to him. This may be particularly important for
individuals travelling from other provinces, who wish to confirm that their new health
services providers know what has occurred in Joe’s medical history. As a result, such
provisions would enhance Joe’s autonomy by ensuring he participates in his own care
and the responsibility of taking charge of his health.
The specificity with which Quebec’s Conditions addresses access and requests for
corrections is not unique, however. A discussion of the similarity between Quebec’s
Conditions and even general personal data protection legislation in this respect will
follow in discussions of models 2 and 3.
c) Summary of Patients’ Interaction with Model 1
Model 1, separately and specifically addressing EHRs in legislation, is found in
British Columbia and Quebec. Even though both provinces purport to specifically deal
with EHRs in statute, it could still be expected that Quebec and British Columbia’s laws
would differ to a great extent because Quebec is a civil law and British Columbia is a
common law jurisdiction. At least with respect to EHRs, though, the differences are in
fact much less pronounced than expected.
As shown in Table 1, neither jurisdiction defines the technological phenomena
with which their statutes purport to deal. Quebec describes EHRs through various
provisions but does not define the term in statute. British Columbia does not describe
EHRs at all but rather refers to HIBs. Neither province requires consent to collection;
however, both provinces require limited use of digitized health records.330 But, the
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provisions requiring limited use essentially afford health care providers broad discretion
to override such requirements for various reasons. The E-Health Act does not refer to
security safeguards, but such protection is available through FIPPA, although it is not
EHR-specific. Quebec’s Conditions refers specifically to security safeguards but does not
delve deeply into what such safeguards entail; in effect, Quebec’s security requirements
are, therefore, not unlike FIPPA’s. Last, these two model 1 provinces permit patient
participation through different means, although, ultimately, both allow access and
requests to make corrections.
One significant difference between Quebec and British Columbia, and, as will be
shown in the proceeding analyses, between each of the other Canadian jurisdictions and
British Columbia, is the E-Health Act’s use of disclosure directives. Disclosure directives
are the single most unique aspect of British Columbia’s EHR-specific legislation and do
buck the trend toward similarity that exists between the other jurisdictions.
The similarity between the model 2 and 3 jurisdictions is addressed in the next
discussions.
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TABLE 1: OVERVIEW OF LEGISLATIVE TREATMENT OF PERSONAL
HEALTH INFORMATION IN EHRS IN MODEL 1
Study
Criteria:

EHR
Definition

Consent to
Collection

Limited Use

Security
Safeguards331

Patient
Participation

Models &
their
Jurisdictions:
Model 1:
BC
QC

No
No

No
No

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes332
Yes

3) MODEL 2 – HEALTH-SPECIFIC PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION
LEGISLATION CONTAINING EHR-RELATED PROVISIONS
As shown in Figure 1, model 2 includes provinces that have health-specific
personal data protection legislation containing EHR-specific provisions in statute or
regulations. The greatest number of Canadian jurisdictions have chosen this legislative
route and amended existing legislation to accommodate the specific legal issues raised by
EHRs: Ontario, Alberta, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Newfoundland and Labrador and New
Brunswick. Using this legislative model enables jurisdictions to build upon existing data
protection rules relating to health information to encompass the digitized environment
within a pre-existing framework.
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Arguably, amending pre-existing legislation is the most efficient way of
addressing an existing phenomenon, such as health records, that has recently evolved
through technological change. Rules and safeguards that may still apply to health records
are already contained within the legislation. The advantage of such a strategy is that,
theoretically, all the change that is required is any provisions dealing with the technology
and the problems it presents. The disadvantage is that conflict may inevitably result
between provisions addressing the new and old technology. Provisions may be left in
that, are, in fact, detrimental to protecting personal health information in the new
technological context. Some of the pre-existing provisions will not necessarily harm
patient privacy but may, instead, make it more difficult to interpret amendments and
simply cause unnecessary complications in administering the legislation.333
While there are both advantages and disadvantages to integrating new with old
provisions, six Canadian provinces have already made a legislative choice to address
EHR through amendment, rather than by creating new separate EHR-specific legislation,
as was done in British Columbia and Quebec, or by ignoring the EHR context all
together, as in the territories, Nova Scotia and PEI. Even though each of these provinces
have dealt with EHR governance through enacting EHR related regulations to amend
statutes, each jurisdiction also differs (to a certain extent) between the way it deals with
the specific legal concerns raised by personal health information contained in EHRs. For
instance, several provinces have different ways of dealing with consent to collection of
personal health information contained in EHRs. Canada Health Infoway wrote that
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[t]he differing consent regimes can best be illustrated by noting specific
examples from various Canadian jurisdictions, such as Manitoba, Ontario,
and Saskatchewan, which employ a non-consensual, implied and deemed
consent model, respectively, for obtaining patient consent.334
Albeit, there are certainly ways in which even provinces that have chosen the same
legislative model differ. However, it will be shown in the below legislative descriptions,
comparisons and analyses, that the current EHR-related provisions in both model 1 and
model 2 provinces do not create extremely disparate patient experiences between
Canadian jurisdictions. In fact, many of the ways in which the model 2 provinces have
amended their statutes are quite similar to the ways the model 1 provinces have enacted
EHR-specific statutes, even despite that Quebec is a civil law regime.
The following sections will describe the legislative provisions in each of Ontario,
Alberta, New Brunswick, Manitoba, Newfoundland and Labrador and Saskatchewan.
Following that analysis, the resulting patient experience under model 2 is described and
then compared with the patient experience in model 1 provinces. It is found that the
patient experience with model 2 provinces does not differ to a great extent from the
patient experience discovered in the analysis of model 1 provinces.
a) Ontario:
In Ontario, an organization called eHealth Ontario is “harnessing information
technology and innovation to improve patient care, safety and access in support of the
government’s health strategy”.335 eHealth Ontario was created in the fall of 2008 and
resulted from the merger of two existing organizations, including Smart Systems for
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Health Agency and the eHealth Program of the Ministry of Health and Long-Term
Care.336 eHealth Ontario has the primary responsibility for executing Ontario’s “eHealth
strategy” and its purpose includes encompassing “all health care system information
system initiatives that [a]re provincially funded [;] [s]upport clinicians and the delivery of
patient care [;] [a]re actually or potentially province-wide in scope”.337 eHealth Ontario
indicates that, through its initiatives, Ontario will have a comprehensive EHR by 2015.338
While eHealth Ontario’s personal data protection requirements are addressed in
PHIPA, interestingly, eHealth Ontario implemented its own privacy and data protection
policy, personal information privacy policy, and personal health information privacy
policy.339 eHealth Ontario’s personal health information privacy policy states that it
contains mandatory requirements that “go beyond [those] laid out in legislation and
regulation”.340 Moreover, some of eHealth Ontario’s programs and services have their
own privacy policies. The Enterprise Master Patient Index (EMPI) is such a tool; its own
privacy policy is fashioned to reflect the Canadian Standards Association’s Model Code
for Protection of Personal Information, which, as previously discussed, was modeled after
the OECD Guidelines.341 eHealth Ontario indicates that personal health information
collected, used and disclosed through the EMPI is governed by PHIPA. It is, in fact, the
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EMPI Privacy Policy, though, which deals quite specifically with the OECD criteria
analyzed in this thesis, including consent to collection, limited use, security safeguards
and patient participation. However, the EMPI Privacy Policy and all others produced by
eHealth Ontario are not legally binding and we must look to PHIPA’s regulation to
determine the way Ontario deals with EHRs. Despite the specificity with which eHealth
Ontario’s policies deal with the OECD principles, the interplay between eHealth
Ontario’s policies and PHIPA is a topic that requires further analysis and which is outside
the scope of this thesis.
Ontario amended its health-specific personal data protection statute, PHIPA, to
include EHR-specific provisions. However, electronic records are only briefly mentioned
within the text of the PHIPA itself. Namely, section 10(3) of PHIPA states that “[a]
health information custodian that uses electronic means to collect, use, modify, disclose,
retain or dispose of personal health information shall comply with the prescribed
requirements, if any.” Section 10(4) further indicates that
[a] person who provides goods or services for the purpose of enabling a
health information custodian to use electronic means to collect, use,
modify, disclose, retain or dispose of personal health information shall
comply with the prescribed requirements, if any.
It is section 73(1)(h) that authorizes the Minister to make the prescribed requirements in
regulations. PHIPA’s General Regulation 329/04342 (“General Regulation”) was
amended to address EHRs.
To flesh out its “prescribed requirements” and address EHRs, PHIPA’s General
Regulation was amended in June 2011. Regulation 331/11 amended section 6.1 and
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added section 6.2 to General Regulation to provide greater specificity about what eHealth
Ontario must do relating to EHRs. As will be described in greater detail below, the
amendments clarified obligations of EHR service providers, and described eHealth
Ontario’s obligations, which include safeguarding information and ensuring compliance.
The amendments “clarif[ied] that eHealth Ontario can create or maintain Electronic
Health Records as a service for Health Information Custodians, when it is acting as a
Health Information Network Provider for those Custodians”.343
As in British Columbia, it could be argued that PHIPA’s General Regulation
simply legalizes the work done by eHealth Ontario in creating or maintaining EHRs
because section 6.2 provides eHealth Ontario with the authority to do so. The specific
ways with which personal health information contained in EHRs must be dealt seem to be
left to health care administrators. Legislators have allowed administrators to determine
the ways legal problems associated with EHRs will be addressed through policies, even
though such policies are not legally binding. As will be discussed below, it could be
argued Ontario’s EHR-related regulation deals with EHRs less specifically and
comprehensively than British Columbia and Quebec. However, analysis of specific
aspects of PHIPA’s General Regulation shows that the actual statutory differences
between Ontario and the two model 1 provinces do not truly affect patients’ practical
experience with the legislation.
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In the following discussion, Ontario’s PHIPA will be discussed in light of the five
criteria analyzed in this study, and then compared with those provinces previously
described in this thesis.
i) EHR Definition:
EHR is defined in Ontario’s personal data protection legislation. Section 6.2(4) of
PHIPA’s General Regulation states that an
“electronic health record” means a record of personal health information
created or maintained in electronic form by eHealth Ontario to enable
health information custodians to use electronic means to disclose personal
health information to one another for the purpose of providing or assisting
in the provision of health care to the individual whose personal health
information is contained in the record.
eHealth Ontario is involved in, and therefore creates or maintains, EHRs for custodians in
the following contexts: Diabetes Management, ePrescribing, Drug Profile Viewer,
eReferral & Resource Matching, Ontario Laboratories Information System, Diagnostic
Imaging and several other services, including the EMPI.344 Each of these services fulfill
functions to which each of their names allude. The EMPI’s function is perhaps not as
self-evident. The EMPI “stores and links demographic and selected personal
information”345 such as a person’s date of birth, name, health card and medical record
numbers. It is clear from the General Regulation’s EHR definition that the EHR-specific
provisions govern EHRs in each of these contexts because these are contexts in which
EHRs are created or maintained by eHealth Ontario.
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In Ontario, PHIPA’s EHR definition is tied to eHealth Ontario; other digitized
health records not created or maintained by eHealth Ontario are not directly contemplated
by the EHR-specific regulation; instead, such digitized records are governed by PHIPA’s
non-EHR specific provisions. So, even though, Ontario, defined EHR directly within the
amended regulation, unlike British Columbia and Quebec, it is possible that not all
digitized health records are contemplated by the regulation. British Columbia and Quebec
purported to specifically address EHRs through statute but did not define EHRs in
legislation. Ultimately, though, it seems likely that the model 1 provinces’ and Ontario’s
legislation will still be interpreted to include digitized information, regardless of whether
it is captured by the EHR definition.
What this Means for Joe
At first glance, it may seem that an actual EHR definition would mean a patient in
Ontario would know exactly what is implicated by their digitized personal health
information. A patient, like Joe, would know from reading the definition that the record is
required to be created or maintained by eHealth Ontario to fall within the provisions of
the act. If Joe is travelling to Ontario, his EHR may not have been created or be
maintained by eHealth Ontario. Rather, it is likely that his record was created and is
maintained in another jurisdiction. Consequently, it is unclear whether the EHR-specific
provision in the regulation would apply to his record. It appears that the non-EHR
specific provisions in PHIPA would apply, though.
On the other hand, depending on the care Joe receives when he travels to Ontario,
it is conceivable an EHR may be created and then be maintained by eHealth Ontario if
Joe requires treatment or tests that necessitate a new eHealth Ontario record. Presumably,
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this could include any one of the records in the above listed eHealth Ontario services,
such as a record in the EMPI. The EHR definition does not enumerate records, but
instead indicates it could be any of the records developed by eHealth Ontario, as long as
eHealth Ontario creates or maintains it.
Joe may find his experience with EHR legislation in Ontario is similar to his
experience in British Columbia. In both provinces, to be caught by each act’s respective
provisions, Joe’s record must be encompassed by a designated service, which is either a
database designated by the Minister, as in British Columbia, or a database created or
maintained by eHealth Ontario. It is likely the two provinces’ services will not differ
drastically in terms of the records designated health information banks by the Minister
and the records created or maintained by eHealth Ontario. Both will include records
generated as a result of laboratory testing, for instance.
Even though each province’s EHR definitions may not change Joe’s experience to
any great degree, Ontario’s approach to consent, limited use, safeguards and patient
participation could differ. After all, Ontario’s PHIPA has been declared substantially
similar to PIPEDA whereas British Columbia’s E-Health Act has not. At face value, a
patient might expect that, for this reason, Ontario’s EHR personal data protection
legislation more comprehensively addresses the OECD principles, even though British
Columbia enacted specific legislation to deal with EHRs. It will be shown, however, that
the existing statutory differences do not create a great disparity in the patient experience
between models.
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ii) Consent to Collection:
As was previously discussed, the OECD collection limitation principle states
individuals should have knowledge of or consent to collection of their personal
information.346 In Ontario, PHIPA does not specifically address consent in the EHR
context, rather PHIPA requires that implied consent is necessary for collecting, using and
disclosing personal health information generally.347 Section 18(1) provides that, when
consent is mandated, it “must be: knowledgeable; relate to the information and must not
be obtained through deception or coercion.”348 According to Canada Health Infoway,
“[k]nowledgeable consent means that a patient must know the purpose for the collection,
use or disclosure and know that he or she may provide or withhold consent.”349 However,
health information custodians can collect personal health information from patients
without consent for the purpose of treatment and care.350 In particular, collection is
permitted when it is “reasonably necessary for the provision of health care and it is not
reasonably possible to obtain consent in a timely manner”.351
In Ontario, consent is also important in terms of restricting use and disclosure,
and as with consent to collection, provisions addressing restriction of use and disclosure
are not particular to EHRs. Restrictions upon use and disclosure of personal health
information are termed a “lock box”.352 Sections 37(1)(a), 38(1)(a) and 50(1) of PHIPA
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permit patients to provide instructions about the ways in which their personal health
information can be used and disclosed.353 As in British Columbia and Quebec, though,
section 40(1) of PHIPA indicates lock boxes can be overridden in situations where there
is “a significant risk of serious bodily harm to a person or group of persons”.354
What this Means for Joe:
In Ontario, Joe will find health information will be collected into his EHR when
he receives care and treatment, without health information custodians directly asking him
whether he wishes to have the information included in his EHR. Joe will be able to
restrict the purposes for which his health information is used and disclosed through
placing a lock box on certain types of health information contained in his EHR. However,
lock boxes and collection without consent are not specific to EHRs. Joe was previously
able to use a lock box to protect certain personal health information outside the digital
context.
As was discussed above, though, Joe is also not required to consent to collection
in either British Columbia or Quebec. Consequently, his experience between the model 1
and model 2 provinces do not differ with respect to the consent to collection criterion.
iii) Limited Use:
The provisions in PHIPA that address limited use are not EHR-specific. Ontario’s
PHIPA mandates that personal health information custodians use only as much
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information “as is reasonably necessary to carry out the identified purposes”.355 Sections
31-33 and 37-50 of PHIPA address a number of different uses and disclosures that can be
made of personal health information. This principle aligns with the OECD limited use
principle, which again states that “[p]ersonal data should not be disclosed, made available
or otherwise used for purposes other than” those specified at the time of collection or
those compatible with the original purposes and specified at the time the purpose is
changed.356
What this Means for Joe
As in British Columbia and Quebec, the way in which Joe’s digitized personal
health information is used in Ontario is also restricted to those purposes specified in the
legislation and at the time of collection. Joe will find the Ontario does not differ greatly
from the model 1 provinces even though they represent different legislative models.
iv) Security Safeguards:
According to Canada Health Infoway:
[h]ealth information legislation does not contain specific directions
regarding protection of information during transmission, but there are
some general requirements. For example, Ontario’s health information
legislation requires custodians to ‘transfer’ PHI in a secure manner.357
Ontario has amended its General Regulation to indicate that appropriate security
safeguards must be implemented to protect personal health information in EHRs. In
particular, section 6.1 states that eHealth Ontario must introduce technical, physical and
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administrative safeguards, as well as procedures and practices approved by Ontario’s
Information and Privacy Commissioner. Specific security and privacy requirements must
also be met when eHealth Ontario deals with EHRs. Section 6.1 states that such
safeguards, practices and procedures must
permit compliance with the Act by health information custodians who rely
on services supplied by eHealth Ontario to use electronic means to collect,
use, modify, disclose, retain or dispose of personal health information;
While stating that eHealth Ontario and custodians must ensure safeguards are in place,
there are no provisions that actually address what the technical safeguards entail. It can
be assumed this is established through organization and hospital policy. Consequently, it
is conceivable there may be a fair degree of variation between each entities’ safeguards.
If “appropriate” is not defined and a standard not mandated by law, there is no legally
binding standard to which organizations must adhere. Section 6.2(2)(4)(i) describes that
the safeguards must be aimed at
A. protect[ing] against theft, loss and unauthorized use or disclosure of
personal health information contained in the electronic health record,
B. protect[ing] the electronic health record against unauthorized copying,
modification or disposal, and
C. protect[ing] the integrity, security and confidentiality of the personal
health information contained in the electronic health record
No methods of achieving these protections are discussed in the General Regulation or
PHIPA itself, though.
However, section 6.1 implies that only eHealth Ontario is responsible for
implementing safeguards, rather than custodians themselves. Custodians must comply
with such safeguards. For this reason, a certain degree of stability will exist between the
safeguards instituted for those records created and maintained by eHealth Ontario. It is
not clear what safeguards will apply to other EHRs. Further, the wording in section 6.1 –
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“custodians who rely on services supplied by eHealth Ontario” - implies that some
custodians do not rely on eHealth’s services. To what provision do these custodians refer
to determine what security safeguards should be implemented?
The questions raised by Ontario’s EHR-specific amendments are not unique to
Ontario, though. British Columbia’s E-Health Act also does not stipulate the specific
nature of security safeguards. Quebec legislation does not provide greater specificity in
this respect. Consequently, at face value, little variation exists between the ways a
patient’s personal health information is protected between each of these provinces.
What this Means for Joe:
Joe will feel confident personal health information contained in his EHR, if
created or maintained by eHealth Ontario, will be safeguarded, in some way, against data
protection breaches and abuse. Joe may question whether personal health information
contained in EHRs that are neither created nor maintained by eHealth Ontario will be
specifically protected. That being said, PHIPA’s General Regulation does not specify the
ways in which personal health information contained in EHRs will be protected, but
simply states safeguards will be put in place. Consequently, Joe will simply be
superficially reassured his information is protected and that the necessary precautions are
being implemented and carried out.
Joe will find his experience with knowing the ways in which his personal health
information is safeguarded does not differ greatly between Ontario and the model 1
provinces. In fact, Quebec and British Columbia, similar to Ontario’s PHIPA, simply
assert that personal health information contained in EHRs will be safeguarded through
security measures. Neither the EHR-specific statutes nor the statutes amended to address
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EHRs state exactly what measures are taken to protect personal health information
contained in EHRs. So, as with the EHR definition, consent to collection, and limited use,
Joe will likely not experience great disparities in the way in which his personal health
information contained in his EHR is dealt between the jurisdictions based on the current
legislation.
v) Patient Participation:
The OECD patient participation principle provides that patients should have the
right to learn whether an entity has data about them, what that information is and to be
able to change the data if required. This principle is made part of PHIPA in section 58.
However, as with the other provisions addressed above it is not tailored specifically to
EHRs. According to section 58(8), there is a duty to correct
if the individual demonstrates, to the satisfaction of the custodian, that the
record is incomplete or inaccurate for the purposes for which the custodian
uses the information and gives the custodian the information necessary to
enable the custodian to correct the record.
Patients will not always succeed if the correction consists of their physician’s opinion, as
“there is no obligation to correct a record that ‘consists of a professional opinion or
observation that a custodian has made in good faith about the individual’.”358
Section 55(1) provides further direction about patient’s participation rights.
According to section 55(1), patients can request the corrections in writing and must show
that the information “is incomplete or incorrect”. Custodians are required to provide the
patients with reasons if the custodian refuses to make the corrections.359 Even though
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section 55(1) and 58 are not EHR-specific, these provisions mean that, in Ontario,
patients are entitled to know what information is held in their EHR and correct it if the
custodian is satisfied that a correction should be made.
It could be argued that in satisfying a custodian that changes must be made, the
patient does not truly participate with his or her digitized information, because a
custodian may veto a change. It is foreseeable that some patients may find it difficult to
satisfy a custodian because the General Regulation does not stipulate what must be
proved to request the change and in what form the request must be submitted, if any.
What this Means for Joe:
As in Quebec and British Columbia, Joe is permitted to request changes be made
to his personal health information contained in his EHR, albeit with slightly different
conditions attached to whether the custodians will in fact implement the change. Quebec
and Ontario, despite being under different legislative regimes, are similar in this regard.
While Joe would perhaps expect British Columbia’s E-Health Act to be more similar to
Quebec with respect to the patient participation criterion, he will not experience the same
level of patient participation in British Columbia under the E-Health Act, as he would in
Quebec and Ontario, unless the E-Health Act is amended to include such provisions. As
of now, patients rely on FIPPA for access and requests to corrections in British
Columbia.
So, despite being a province that has less-specific EHR-related legislation, Joe
may find that Ontario fosters greater participation with his EHR than in British Columbia,
if only the E-Health Act is meant to govern patient participation with EHRs. As is
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discussed next, similar findings are made upon analyzing Alberta’s health-specific
personal data protection legislation which has been amended to address EHRs.
b) Alberta:
As with the other provinces discussed previously, a brief overview of EHR
development in Alberta is provided and the health-specific data protection legislation
amended to accommodate EHR is then analyzed. The extensive EHR initiatives in
Alberta are not explored in any great depth herein, however.
In Alberta, EHR development began 13 years ago. The winter of 1999 brought the
introduction of Alberta WellNet – the means through which Alberta invested in “health
care information technology”.360 During February 1999, Alberta’s government appointed
Alberta Wellnet’s CEO. Alberta WellNet’s goal was and still is to allow health care
providers to “share health information within a secure network environment that will help
them to make better decisions about health care.”361 More formally, Alberta Wellnet’s
objective is “[t]o enable better decisions, using integrated system wide health
information, to improve the health of Albertans and the management of the health
system.”362 A few years after Alberta Wellnet’s formation, several western regional
health authorities (RHA), including an Alberta health authority, joined forces in 2001 to
coordinate and fund EHR initiatives.
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Regional Health Authority364 commenced a partnership to “deliver comprehensive health
care services to over 4.7 million Canadians and provide tertiary care services to the 9
million Canadians of western Canada and three territories.”365 This conglomerate of
health authorities employs each of the RHA’s resources and member knowledge to
enhance health care delivery by developing an EHR.366 Given that these provinces have
joined together to pool resources to develop EHR systems in each province, it seems
likely, at least at face value, that the patient experience with each of these jurisdictions
will not actually be that disparate with one another. Of course, further examination of
whether this hypothesis is correct is conducted in the proceeding discussion of the model
2 provinces.
It has been said that “Alberta is the only province with both a general private
sector law and a health specific law.”367 As previously described, Alberta’s health
information is governed by the HIA.368 Alberta’s HIA contains Part 5.1 entitled “Alberta
Electronic Health Record” and also contains an EHR-specific regulation, enacted in
2010, entitled Alberta Electronic Health Record Regulation.369 The regulation amended
the HIA to include EHR-related provisions dealing with EHR-specific issues such as
logging capacity and audit information logs. Similar to Ontario and unlike British
Columbia and Quebec, Alberta addressed EHR technology by amending an existing
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personal data protection statute to accommodate the technological advances.
Furthermore, the provisions contained in the HIA and its regulation are arguably just as
comprehensive, if not more, than those in British Columbia’s E-Health Act and Quebec’s
Order in Council. Yet, Alberta, according to the characterization method used in this
study, falls under model 2 because the Alberta government chose to accommodate EHRs
through an existing statute.
Interestingly, the Health Law Institute at the University of Alberta made a written
submission to the Standing Committee regarding EHRs, prior to the most recent statutory
amendments. The submission described the concern that “Bill 52, The Health
Information Amendment Act, 2009 would significantly undermine the achievement of an
appropriate balance between”370 protecting individual privacy and using health
information for societal benefit. The purported goal of the amendments was to support
EHR development in Alberta.371 The Health Law Institute indicated that it was
“imperative to maintain some role for individuals in the use of their information.”372
According to the group of scholars at the institute, “Bill 52 eliminate[d] any such role and
render[ed] a balance between these two important aims non-existent.”373 Whether this
balance has shifted or eliminated since Bill 52 received royal assent can be evaluated by
looking at the patient perspective. The way in which patients interact with the HIA is
explored and discussed further next. The patient interactions with the statute and
regulation are then compared to those of the previously examined provinces.
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i) EHR Definition:
EHRs are directly defined within the HIA. Section 56.1 of Part 5.1 of the HIA
entitled “Alberta Electronic Health Record” states that an Alberta EHR is
the integrated electronic health information system established to provide
shared access by authorized custodians to prescribed health information in
a secure environment as may be further defined or described in the
regulations.
Section 60(3) further defines EHRs in stating that “‘electronic health records’ means
records of health information in electronic form”. However, section 60(3) defines EHR
with specific reference to section 60(2)(a) which indicates that
[t]he safeguards to be maintained under subsection (1) must include
appropriate measures (a) for the security and confidentiality of records,
which measures must address the risks associated with electronic health
records.374
Alberta’s HIA also contains an EHR specific regulation, enacted in 2010, Alberta
Electronic Health Record Regulation.375 Section 1(b) of the regulation also defines
“electronic health record information system” as “the system used by an authorized
custodian to collect, use and disclose health information about an individual.”
What this means for Joe:
Patient’s like Joe will have a clearer idea of how an EHR is defined in Alberta
than in British Columbia, Quebec and, perhaps even Ontario376. Even though British
Columbia and Quebec have enacted separate legislation to address EHRs, it is Alberta
and Ontario that define the EHR in EHR-related amendments to pre-existing statutes. In
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Quebec, Joe will know about what is contained in his EHR based on Quebec’s
Information Document, but that document does not have the force of law. British
Columbia’s E-Health Act, on the other hand, does not in fact define the EHR at all, but
rather defines an entirely different term altogether.
Arguably, though, at first glance, Alberta HIA’s EHR definition does not actually
clarify EHR’s meaning for patients like Joe, with the result that the meaning of EHR
likely does not truly differ greatly between provinces. It can be argued that the definitions
in section 56.1 and 60(3) of the HIA do not provide any greater insight into what
constitutes an EHR than the phrase “electronic health record”. Use of generic, nondescriptive definitions in Alberta and Ontario could mean EHRs are similarly constituted
in both provinces.377 It could also mean each province’s EHRs vary in design but that,
ultimately, EHRs in both provinces are used and function for the same purpose.
Consequently, a patient like Joe may not experience a situation where he moves between
provinces and different records are considered EHRs.
Several additional observations can be made from the HIA EHR definitions.
When taking section 56.1’s definition at face value, it seems the emphasis of Alberta’s
EHR is promoting the ease with which health information can be shared amongst
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custodians, rather than protection of patient information. Indeed, section 56.2 states that
the purpose of Part 5.1 of the HIA is “to enable the sharing and use, via the Alberta EHR,
of prescribed health information among authorized custodians.” Section 56.1 states that
the information is shared in a “secure” environment, but there is no reference to patients
in the Alberta EHR definition. Perhaps this is indicative of less emphasis on patient
protection and more importance placed on efficiency and effective health care delivery by
custodians and those health care providers interacting with custodians.
However, patient’s like Joe perhaps will be reassured the definition in section
60(3) is associated and specifically contemplated with reference to security safeguards
for EHRs. The Regulation does not clarify EHR’s meaning to any great extent and may
leave patient’s like Joe with further questions about the relationship between the EHR
itself and the system referred to in its definition.
So, at first glance, it is not entirely clear which health records are encompassed by
these definitions, nor is it clear what information is contained within them. However,
section 56.1(c) defines “prescribed health information” to mean
health information about an individual that is of a class or type prescribed
by the regulations that a regulated health profesional [sic] or an authorized
custodian may or must make accessible to authorized custodians via the
Alberta EHR.
This definition refers to the EHR, so reference can be made to the regulations for further
information about what constitutes an EHR in Alberta. Indeed, section 4 of the Alberta
Electronic Health Record Regulation lists in quite specific detail the personal health
information contained in EHRs for the purposes of section 56.1(c):
(a) personal demographic information that uniquely identifies the
individual,

115
(b) information that uniquely identifies health service providers who
provide health services to the individual,
(c) information about where health services are performed on and
delivered to the individual,
(d) information about key clinical events at the point of care in respect of
the individual,
(e) known allergies and intolerances of the individual,
(f) immunizations of the individual,
(g) prescription information in respect of the individual,
(h) dispensing information relating to prescriptions in respect of the
individual,
(i) drug‑to‑drug interaction alerts in respect of the individual,
(j) laboratory test results of the individual,
(k) diagnostic imaging reports and tests of the individual,
(l) diagnostic imaging digital images of the individual, and
(m) other medical reports of the individual.
This list, in combination with the EHR definitions in the HIA and its regulation, provide
one of the most comprehensive descriptions of an EHR among the provinces examined
thus far. Quebec similarly lists information included by “personal health information” but
does not have a comparable EHR definition. However, comparison of the Alberta and
Quebec lists shows that very similar information is likely contained within the EHR
between provinces.
Consequently, the general vagueness with which the records are defined in the
other provinces’ statutes may actually mean that what is included and contemplated by
EHR does not vary greatly between model 1 and model 2 provinces. For this reason,
perhaps Joe’s experience between provinces may not truly change because of the way in
which EHRs are defined.
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ii) Consent to Collection:
According to Canada Health Infoway, “[s]ome jurisdictions, such as Alberta, do
not use the notion of implied consent in their health information legislation. Consent is
either express and informed, or it is not required in specified circumstances.”378 In
Alberta, custodians are permitted to directly collect personal health information for EHRs
without patients’ consent if that “information relates directly to and is necessary to enable
the custodian to carry out the provision of health services.”379 A patient’s consent, when
required, must be informed and given in writing or electronically.380
As earlier discussed, consent to collection is often intimately related to disclosure
in that patient control over their information is either controlled through consent to
collection or consent to disclosure. So, while provincial legislation may not emphasize
consent to collection, patients can prescribe what is done with personal health
information after collection through the filter of health care providers. Similar to
Ontario’s lock box provisions, and British Columbia’s disclosure provisions, Alberta’s
HIA section 56.4 explains that, when decisions are made about what information will be
made accessible from the EHR,
a regulated health professional or an authorized custodian must consider as
an important factor any expressed wishes of the individual who is the
subject of the prescribed health information relating to access to that
information, together with any other factors the regulated health
professional or authorized custodian considers important.
Further, section 58(2) of Part 6 of Alberta’s HIA mandates that, prior to disclosing a
patient’s personal health information, healthcare providers must consider that patient’s
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“expressed wishes”381 about disclosure of the patient’s personal health information, as
well as any other important considerations.382 Sections 56.4 and 58(2) do not necessarily
create a formal process through which the health professional or custodian considers
patients wishes, as is created through lock box provisions. However, the effect of these
sections is likely the same for patients.
Following the implementation of Bill 52, it is not as clear that personal health data
in Alberta’s EHRs is effectively protected by a lock box-like mechanism, though. Bill 52
“amendments deem actual disclosure of prescribed health information pursuant to a
Ministerial request a ‘provision of information’.”383 According to Tracey Bailey of
Alberta’s Health Law Institute,
providing information in compliance with a request by the Minister is not
considered to be ‘disclosure’ of health information, [which] [i]n
effect…remove[s] protections for patient privacy that are currently
provided by the HIA.384
Tracey Bailey argued that “[b]y deeming the transfer of information a non-disclosure, the
amendments eliminate the current duty to consider the wishes of individuals.”385 Indeed,
section 56.3(7) of Part 5.1 of the HIA now states that
the making of prescribed health information accessible pursuant to this
section does not
(a) constitute a disclosure of that information, or
(b) require the consent of the individual who is the subject of the
information.
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What this means for Joe:
As has been shown through examining other provinces, Joe will not be able to
control that personal health information which is included within his EHR but he may
have some control over the way that information is disseminated. Such a system, as in
other provinces, maintains a certain degree of patient autonomy, but as Tracey Bailey
argues, some of that autonomy over personal health information is removed when health
care custodians can easily override patient wishes when custodians do not consider the
patient opinion important.
To some degree, Ontario’s lock box provisions may be more effective for patients
like Joe in this respect. However, Ontario, too, allows health care providers to override
patient wishes in certain circumstances.
iii) Limited Use:
Alberta has been referred to as an example of a jurisdiction that limits use of
personal health information contained in EHRs. According to Canada Health Infoway,
“[t]he limitation principle in relation to uses and disclosures of personal health
information can be illustrated by the privacy framework contained in Alberta’s HIA.”386
As in Ontario, Quebec and British Columbia, Alberta health information custodians are
only permitted to use personal health information contained in EHRs for prescribed and
limited uses.387 In Alberta, EHR personal health information can only be used as is
necessary for specific purposes.388 For example, section 56.5 provides the following:
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(1) Subject to the regulations,
(a) an authorized custodian referred to in section 56.1(b)(i) may use
prescribed health information that is accessible via the Alberta EHR for
any purpose that is authorized by section 27;
Section 27(1) lists such broad uses as “providing health services;…determining or
verifying the eligibility of an individual to receive a health service; [and] providing for
health services provider education” among many others. Quite similar purposes are listed
by Ontario and Quebec, for example. Section 56.5 then also states that
(b) an authorized custodian referred to in section 56.1(b)(ii) may use
prescribed health information that is accessible via the Alberta EHR, and
that is not otherwise in the custody or under the control of that authorized
custodian, only for a purpose that is authorized by
(i) section 27(1)(a), (b) or (f), or
(ii) section 27(1)(g), but only to the extent necessary for obtaining or
processing payment for health services.
Sections 27(1)(a), (b) or (f) refer to providing health services, determining or verifying
health service eligibility and carrying out a purpose authorized by an Alberta or federal
statute. Section 27(1)(g) involves “internal management purposes” such as resource
allocation and policy development for human resource management and health services.
Section 56.5 concludes by providing that:
(2) For greater certainty, the use pursuant to subsection (1) of prescribed
health information that is accessible via the Alberta EHR does not
constitute collection of that information under this Act.
(3) For greater certainty, the use pursuant to subsection (1) of prescribed
health information that is accessible via the Alberta EHR does not
constitute a disclosure of that information by
(a) the regulated health professional or authorized custodian who
originally made that information accessible via the Alberta EHR pursuant
to section 56.3,
(b) any other authorized custodian,
(c) the information manager of the Alberta EHR, or
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(d) any other person.
What this means for Joe:
Even though Alberta is grouped amongst the model 2 provinces because it has
accommodated EHRs through amending existing statutes, its limited use provisions
resemble those used in British Columbia, Quebec and Ontario. In fact, the uses discussed
are similar to those described in section 4 of the E-Health Act, such as identifying an
individual receiving health services (s. 4(a)), providing health services (s.4(b)), and
engaging in health services improvement (s.4(g)). As such, it is predicted Joe will not
experience great disparities in the way in which his personal health information contained
in his EHR can be and is used between provinces.
iv) Security Safeguards:
As could be observed by looking at Ontario, British Columbia and Quebec’s laws
thus far, “there does not appear to be any broad agreement in Canadian healthcare
jurisdictions (or in most other jurisdictions) as to what constitutes adequate technical
safeguards (or security safeguards or security arrangements).”389 Section 60(1) of the
HIA provides that safeguards are required to have appropriate mechanisms for securing
records, including mechanisms that deal with the privacy risks of EHRs. 390 Safeguards
entail “ensuring health data is protected against threats or hazards to the security or
integrity of the information or the loss, unauthorized use, disclosure or modification of
the information”.391 The duty requiring safeguards applies also to Alberta custodians
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storing and using health information not in Alberta or disclosing to anyone not in
Alberta.392 Section 60(2) specifically requires safeguards for EHRs:
(2) The safeguards to be maintained under subsection (1) must include
appropriate measures
(a) for the security and confidentiality of records, which measures must
address the risks associated with electronic health records[.]
Furthermore, in Alberta, contracts are used to protect personal health information
during third party processing.393 As is also true in Ontario, Privacy Impact Assessments
are also required by law and ensure that an analysis of the appropriate privacy protective
mechanisms is performed on personal health information contained in EHRs.394 Bill 52
contemplated that this safeguard be removed. In her submission to the Standing
Committee on Bill 52, Tracey Bailey of Alberta’s Health Law Institute argued that it was
“extremely concerning”395 that Bill 52 did “away with this oversight and public
accountability without justification”.396 As such, the Alberta government decided to
retain Privacy Impact Assessments which still form part of the required safeguards listed
in Part 5.1 of the HIA. Section 56.3(3)(b) states the Minister is required to
prepare a privacy impact assessment describing how disclosure of the
health information may affect the privacy of the individual who is the
subject of the information and submit the privacy impact assessment to the
Commissioner for review and comment
prior to making a patient’s health information accessible to authorized custodians.
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Further, Alberta health information custodians must make logs about data
accessed from EHRs. Section 6 of the Regulation states that “[a] custodian must ensure
its electronic health record information system creates and maintains logs”. Custodians
must note who obtained access to personal health information contained in an EHR, when
and why the information was disclosed and what information was disclosed, among other
things.397 In addition, this information is required to be kept for 10 years after
disclosure.398 The Alberta EHR information manager is also required by section 7 of the
Regulation to conduct a monthly review of the logs.
What this means for Joe:
All provinces examined thus far, including Alberta, Ontario, Quebec and British
Columbia, state that security safeguards are required to protect the personal health
information contained in EHRs. However, very little else is said in these provinces’
legislation about what the security safeguards entail. Only Quebec ventures into the
security requirements with any degree of detail. Consequently, it could be possible that
each province has widely disparate methods of ensuring data protection for EHRs. It is
more likely, though, that the safeguard methods are, in fact, quite similar because each
provinces health professionals are bound by professional ethical codes and common law
obligations of confidentiality399 to ensure protection of patient information, and these
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methods began to evolve as soon as computers were used in medical practices and health
care settings.
Alberta and Ontario do differ from British Columbia and Quebec in requiring
privacy impact assessments, however. Patients like Joe may, therefore, experience some
trickle-down effect of the lack of privacy assessment use in provinces like British
Columbia and Quebec. It is unlikely, though, that individual patients will experience the
immediate effect of this difference, unless there is a particular privacy concern associated
with the particular disclosure of their health information. It is likely that a cumulative
effect of a lack of such mechanisms will be felt by many patients interacting with a health
care provider over time as privacy concerns arise.
v) Patient Participation:
One of the express purposes of the HIA is to “provide individuals with a right to
request correction or amendment of health information about themselves”.400 Pursuant to
section 13 of the HIA, patients may make a written request that personal health
information contained in their EHR be corrected and then custodians must provide
reasons if they refuse such corrections.401 Patients can then request that the custodian’s
decision be reviewed by the Commissioner.402
What this means for Joe:
As in the Ontario, Quebec and British Columbia, Joe can also participate with his
EHR to request changes or corrections be made. Like the other provinces, it is possible
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for custodians to override the patient’s requests, which detracts from some of the
autonomy afforded patients by the right to correct contained in the statutes.
c) New Brunswick:
Another more recently formed example of a model 2 province is New Brunswick.
In spring 2008, the New Brunswick government announced its plan to digitize health
records.403 In New Brunswick, responsibility for EHR implementation lies with the
Department of Health along with its e-health branch.404 EHR implementation in New
Brunswick is part of the “One Patient, One Record” or “OPOR” initiative.405 Laboratory
and diagnostic imaging, as well as patient admission and discharge information, were the
initial focus of the project.406 Authorized health care providers at hospitals and health
care facilities in New Brunswick’s two Regional Health Authorities view patients’ EHRs
through a web portal.407 Additional systems are used to view other patient information.408
Phase implementation has been used to roll out the EHR in New Brunswick and began
first with emergency room nurses and physicians, as well as neuro and orthopaedic
surgeons, oncologists and nephrologists in various hospitals and centres.409
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PHIPAA came into force in September 2010. At first glance and while New
Brunswick was placed amongst model 2 provinces, this statute does not deal to any great
extent with the specific data protection concerns raised by EHRs. It appears, at first, that
New Brunswick may be taking a similar approach to Ontario by leaving EHR specific
requirements to regulations. Section 79(1)(q), in fact, indicates that regulations may be
made regarding “establishment of an electronic health record”.410
As PHIPAA was so recently enacted, the New Brunswick government had a great
number of statutory examples from which to draw to create its health-specific personal
data protection legislation relating to EHRs. Consequently, there are more details
contained in PHIPAA and its regulations relating to EHRs than in other model 2
provinces’ statutes, generally. That being said, New Brunswick does not necessarily
afford patients greater protection for the personal health information than other provinces.
It simply deals more specifically with EHRs within its health-specific personal data
protection provisions.
Therefore, even though New Brunswick is a model 2 province, one aspect of
PHIPAA’s General Regulation411 operates in a similar fashion to British Columbia’s EHealth Act. In New Brunswick, the Minister of Health is given the authority to designate
an information network412, as is true in British Columbia where the Minister designates a
health information bank. So, while on the whole New Brunswick is most appropriately
categorized as a model 2 province because of the way it addresses EHRs, its provisions
share similar features with a model 1 province. This finding bolsters the conclusion that
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the patient experience with each model is actually fairly similar generally, with only
small differences, which are discussed in this study.
i) EHR Definition:
Like Ontario, New Brunswick defines EHR not within statute but within the
corresponding regulation to PHIPAA. Within PHIPAA itself, the existence of EHRs is
merely acknowledged in the fact that electronic records are included within the definition
of record in section 1.
“record” means a record containing information in any form, including
information that is oral, written, photographed, recorded or stored in any
manner, on any storage medium or by graphic, electronic, mechanical or
any other means, but does not include electronic software or any
mechanism that produces records.
Section 2 of PHIPAA’s General Regulation413 provides that, in New Brunswick, EHR
means “an electronic record of an individual’s personal health information that is
accessible from interoperable systems within an information network”. For even further
clarification, patients may look to what the New Brunswick government has said
regarding the EHR; namely, that an EHR
provides authorized health professionals access to clinically-relevant
information. Information available will include: demographic information
(name, date of birth, address, etc); lab test results (Chemistry,
Hematology, Coagulation and Challenge); and diagnostic imaging reports
(Imaging intervention, MRI, Nuclear Medicine, Ultrasound, CT and XRay). Echocardiograms are excluded at this time.414
According to section 15 of the General Regulation, it is the Minister who creates EHRs
for each individual, EHRs which are then contained in an information network designated
as such by the Minister.
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What this means for Joe:
Joe will have quite a clear idea of what comprises his EHR if he travels to New
Brunswick and a record is made of his personal health information. PHIPAA’s definition
clearly describes what an EHR constitutes in New Brunswick. However, Joe will not
have a clear idea in what aspects of health care his EHR is involved and exactly what it
contains by simply knowing this definition. None of the details contained in the
government’s comments about what constitutes an EHR as described above are part of
EHRs statutory definition. Nevertheless, as in British Columbia, which is oddly enough a
model 1 province, Joe will know that the Minister, in effect, created the EHR as it is
designated part of an information network.
ii) Consent to Collection:
New Brunswick is also unique because it expressly addresses EHRs in PHIPAA’s
consent provisions by indicating that patients are unable to withdraw consent to
collection of personal health information into EHRs. Section 22(1) of PHIPAA provides
that
[a]n individual may refuse to grant his or her consent or withdraw his or
her consent to the collection, use or disclosure of the individual’s personal
health information by a custodian except if…
(c) the collection, use or disclosure is for the purposes of the creation or
maintenance of an electronic health record[.]
Consequently, PHIPAA explicitly indicates consent to collection is not required for
EHRs. Unlike other model 1 and 2 provinces, which leave the lack of consent required
for collection implied, New Brunswick explicitly clarifies that consent is not necessary.
In terms of consent to disclosure, New Brunswick also does not require patient
consent to disclose personal health information for the following reason:
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A custodian shall disclose personal health information relating to an
individual without the consent of the individual…to or via an information
network designated by the Minister in accordance with the regulations in
which personal health information is recorded for the purpose of
facilitating the creation and maintenance of an electronic health record
established in accordance with the regulations[.]415
What this means for Joe:
Thus far in this analysis, it has been shown that other Canadian jurisdictions do
not require consent to collection of a patient’s personal health information into a patient’s
EHR. However, no other provinces explicitly states consent is not required for collection.
Joe will likely not experience a difference between these jurisdictions simply because
New Brunswick explicitly states consent is not required in respect of collection to EHRs.
iii) Limited Use:
PHIPAA’s General Regulation specifically contemplates that particular limits may
need to be imposed on the use of personal health information contained in EHRs and
authorizes the Minister to require such limits be placed on use of the information. Section
14(1)(g) of the General Regulation states that the Minister may
identify and impose on the custodian limits or conditions on the collection,
storage, use or disclosure of personal health information contained in or
disclosed from an information network that are, in the opinion of the
Minister, required for the privacy and security of the personal health
information.
What this means for Joe:
In New Brunswick, while Joe will not know exactly what limits will be place on
use of his personal health information contained in his EHR, he will be confident that the
Minister has prescribed limits that will ensure the privacy and security of his information,
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as it specifically relates to the concerns that arise as a result of using digitized records.
Consequently, as is true in provinces such as Quebec and British Columbia, Joe will
perhaps be more confident that specific concerns he has regarding digitized records are
being addressed by legislation.
iv) Security Safeguards:
At a general level, and as is required by many other model 2 provinces, section
50(1) of PHIPAA requires custodians to
protect personal health information by adopting information practices that
include reasonable administrative, technical and physical safeguards that
ensure the confidentiality, security, accuracy and integrity of the
information.
PHIPAA accounts for the specific concerns related to digitized records in section 50(3) in
requiring custodians to put in place protocols that eliminate the chance that electronic
personal health information is intercepted through some means by “unauthorized
persons”. Section 50(4) requires custodians to use “any additional safeguards for the
security and protection of the information required by the regulations”. Further, section
46(1) explains that when disclosures are made without consent, custodians must note to
whom, when and why the information was disclosed and also what information was
disclosed, except as provided in section 46(2), which directly addresses electronic
records. According to section 46(2), section 46(1) fails to apply “if the custodian
discloses personal health information by permitting access to the information stored in
the information system of the custodian” as long as the system automatically creates an
“electronic log” of who accessed the information, when the access occurred and what
information the individual accessed.
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What this means for Joe:
Joe’s experience with legislative safeguards for personal health information in his
EHR in New Brunswick will be similar to the other model 2 and model 1 jurisdictions
because safeguards are required by the statute but not specified. Moreover, New
Brunswick keeps audit logs in the same way as is done by other model 2 jurisdictions; so,
consequently, Joe’s experience will be similar between jurisdictions in this respect as
well. However, subsection 50(3) does mandate specific protections for EHRs, in a way
not done by other provinces. Further, section 20(1) of the General Regulation goes into
even greater detail regarding security requirements for EHRs – requirements that appear
most like those contained in Quebec’s EHR-specific legislation. In particular, section 20
requires the following:
(a) measures to protect the security of personal health information during
its collection, use, disclosure, storage and destruction;
(b) measures, for example by the use of passwords and encryption, to
ensure that removable media used to record, transport or transfer personal
health information is appropriately protected when in use;
(c) measures to ensure that removable media used to record personal
health information is stored securely when not in use;
(d) measures to ensure that personal health information is maintained in a
designated area and is subject to appropriate security safeguards;
(e) measures that limit physical access to designated areas containing
personal health information to authorized persons;
(f) procedures that provide for the recording of security breaches; and
(g) corrective procedures to address security breaches.
Security mechanisms such as encryption and passwords are safeguards particular to
digitized records, showing that New Brunswick, more than some other model 2
provinces, took into consideration what EHRs require in terms of security. Moreover,
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agreements between custodians and information managers must discuss what information
managers will do to ensure how safeguards will be put in place to protect personal health
information.416 It is likely, though, that other provinces have interception prevention in
place as a result of industry standards, even though it is not required by statute in those
jurisdictions.
v) Patient Participation:
New Brunswick’s general access provisions indicate that patients have a right to
request in writing a copy of their health record.417 A custodian must respond to the
request within 30 days. Section 15 has these same requirements for a request to correct
personal health information in a patient’s health record. As in Manitoba, described below,
there is no requirement that custodians refuse a correction if the request is made to
correct opinion-based health information in a patient’s record.
New Brunswick’s access provision pertaining to electronic records is virtually
identical to that used in Manitoba. Section 10(5) provides that
[i]f a request is made for personal health information that a custodian
maintains in electronic form, the custodian shall produce a record of the
information for the individual in a form usable by the individual if it can
be produced using the custodian’s normal computer hardware and
software and technical expertise.
What this means for Joe:
Joe’s experience with New Brunswick health-specific personal data protection
law will differ very little from that in Manitoba, so the analysis provided for Manitoba
next also applies here and further comment will not be made in this regard.
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d) Manitoba:
Like the other model 2 jurisdictions, Manitoba is also in the midst of
implementing its EHR with the intention of providing “authorized health-care providers
immediate access to selected patient information”.418 As in Ontario and Saskatchewan,
Manitoba eHealth has been involved in digitizing health records in particular areas and in
hospitals

since

2007.419

Manitoba

contracted

with

IBM

to

carry

out

the

implementation.420 The areas specifically targeted for EHR creation included diagnostic,
laboratory and hospital health records. In the spring of 2011, it was announced that
Manitoba’s EHR system, known as eChart, was launched in the province, allowing health
care providers across the province access to patient records regardless of a patient’s
location.421 The system was implemented in 30 hospitals and clinics province-wide.
Manitoba’s PHIA addresses EHRs within its preamble by stating:
clear and certain rules for the collection, use and disclosure of personal
health information are an essential support for electronic health
information systems that can improve both the quality of patient care and
the management of health care resources.
PHIA’s regulation also discusses additional safeguards for electronic health information
systems and audit requirements for EHRs. However, only 1 section of the regulations
addresses EHRs. In PHIA itself, only the preamble addresses EHRs, which is more like
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Ontario in the way it accommodates this new technological phenomenon. The way in
which PHIA addresses each of the four OECD principles examined in this study, as well
as an EHR definition is discussed next.
i) EHR Definition:
EHR is not defined in PHIA. Instead, section 1(1) of PHIA simply states
"record" or "recorded information" means a record of information in any
form, and includes information that is written, photographed, recorded or
stored in any manner, on any storage medium or by any means, including
by graphic, electronic or mechanical means, but does not include
electronic software or any mechanism that produces records[.]
The word “electronic” is used 9 other times in PHIA and 11 in the regulation but neither
EHR nor an equivalent term are defined in Manitoba’s legislation.
What this means for Joe:
Manitoba is truly a hybrid province in terms of the way that it addresses EHRs in
PHIA. On the one hand, a patient like Joe will find that Manitoba is similar to model 3
provinces and territories in the sense that it does not define EHR in statute and merely
indicates a record can be electronic. In other ways, patients like Joe will find that
Manitoba is much like Quebec in the way that it addresses EHR security in its regulation
and the act itself.
ii) Consent to Collection:
There are no consent provisions that specifically discuss EHRs in Manitoba’s
PHIA. In fact, PHIA does not usually mandate consent for collection, use and disclosure
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of personal health information generally for “healthcare and treatment purposes.”422
Section 15(1) of PHIA allows collection minus consent. In terms of use, section 21
allows trustees to use personal health information without consent as long as it is used for
the purpose for which it was collected, a purpose permitted by PHIA. A patient’s consent
is required if a trustee is going to use the information for any other purpose. The purposes
for which consent is not required are provided in section 22(2) of PHIA.
What this Means for Joe:
Manitoba does not specify which type of consent is required, for example,
whether the consent must be informed or knowledgeable; other jurisdictions, such as
Ontario, stipulate the consent type required.423 In the absence of a consent standard, Joe
may or may not find his experience between Ontario and the other provinces differs. For
this reason, in Manitoba, the type of consent obtained by trustees during interactions with
health care providers will likely resemble that in other provinces because it will be
shaped by ethical standards of professionals, rather than statute.
iii) Limited Use:
Section 20(2) of PHIA states that
[e]very use and disclosure by a trustee of personal health information must
be limited to the minimum amount of information necessary to accomplish
the purpose for which it is used or disclosed.
Consequently, PHIA accords with the OECD’s limited use principle. Section 21
describes the purposes for which personal health information may be used, if such
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purposes were not those originally intended at the time the information was collected. For
instance, a patient’s personal health information may be used if “the information is
demographic information about an individual and is used to collect a debt the individual
owes to the trustee, or to the government if the trustee is a department”424 or “the
information is demographic information about an individual, or is his or her PHIN, and is
used to …confirm eligibility for health care or payment for health care”. 425
At first it appears that EHRs are not expressly mentioned in reference to the
limited use requirement; however, section 22 seems to address digitized records’ use.
Section 25(1) explains that trustees are permitted to supply personal health information
“to an information manager” to process, store or destroy the information or supply the
trustee “with information management or information technology services.” If trustees
use an information manager in this capacity that
information manager may use personal health information provided to
it…only for the purposes and activities mentioned in subsection [25](1),
which must be purposes and activities that the trustee itself may
undertake.426
What this means for Joe:
A patient like Joe will find the limited use requirements placed upon health care
providers in Manitoba are similar to those in the other model 1 and 2 provinces. In each
of these jurisdictions, personal health information can only be used for the purposes for
which it was collected, subject to some exceptions outlined in each jurisdiction’s relevant
act. Manitoba, in some respects, is more like Quebec and British Columbia, in that it
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explicitly refers to the way in which electronic health information can be used. Either
way, though, Joe will likely find the limits placed on the general use of his digitized
information does not differ greatly between model 1 and 2 provinces, even though EHRs
are not explicitly referenced in the requirements for each of these jurisdictions.
iv) Security Safeguards:
Manitoba’s PHIA requires safeguards for both paper and EHRs. Namely,
safeguards specific to EHRs entail identity verification, mechanisms to prevent
unauthorized information interception, and logs of EHR use.427 Section 18(2) provides
for specific safeguards pertaining to EHRs and that
[w]ithout limiting subsection (1), a trustee shall if the trustee uses
electronic means to request disclosure of personal health information or to
respond to requests for disclosure, implement procedures to prevent the
interception of the information by unauthorized persons[.]
Section 18(3) addresses “additional safeguards” for EHRs but merely states that “[a]
trustee who maintains personal health information in electronic form shall implement any
additional safeguards for such information required by the regulations.” PHIA requires
nothing further in terms of particular security requirements for EHRs.
However, section 66(1) of PHIA provides that regulations may be made in respect
of “security safeguards for personal health information that trustees must establish,
including requirements for information held in electronic form”. So far, Manitoba’s
provincial government has included several additional safeguards in PHIA’s one
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regulation, the Personal Health Information Regulation.428 For example, section 2 of the
regulation indicates that
[a] trustee shall establish and comply with a written policy and procedures
containing…(a) provisions for the security of personal health information
during its collection, use and disclosure, storage and destruction, including
measures (ii) to ensure the security of personal health information in
electronic form when the computer hardware or removable electronic
storage media on which it has been recorded is being disposed of or used
for another purpose[.]
Moreover, section 4 of the regulations mandates that “user activity” is recorded in respect
of “any electronic information system” and subsection 4(3) stipulates when the user
activity record is not required. Electronic information system is not defined in PHIA or
the regulations, though, so it appears to take on a plain meaning.
What this means for Joe:
The safeguards to which PHIA refers in section 18(3) differ very little from those
required by other model 2 provinces, like Ontario and Saskatchewan. In these three
provinces it is acknowledged that safeguards relating to electronic information change
depending upon technological advances and industry standards. Effectively this means
that the safeguards patients like Joe experience in each of these provinces will be quite
similar if not the same, as has been argued previously.
That being said, Manitoba’s PHIA goes further than Ontario and Saskatchewan in
terms of some of the safety requirements prescribed in the regulations, such that
Manitoba, in some respects resembles Quebec and New Brunswick’s EHR security
requirements.
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v) Patient Participation:
PHIA’s preamble codifies patient access and ability to make corrections as part of
PHIA’s purpose. PHIA’s preamble states:
AND WHEREAS [sic] individuals need access to their own health
information as a matter of fairness, to enable them to make informed
decisions about health care and to request the correction of inaccurate or
incomplete information about themselves[.]
Unlike some of the other model 2 provinces, such as Ontario, PHIA’s statutory
provisions describing access and corrections expressly reference EHRs. Specifically,
section 7 describes that patients’ electronic record must be in a form the patient can use
when received, as long as “can be produced using the trustee's normal computer hardware
and software and technical expertise”.429
On face value, the caveat placed upon access to records in electronic form has
several implications; namely, the section 7(3) caveat could imply trustees should be
trained to produce electronic records for patient access otherwise few to no patients will
ever receive a copy of the personal health information contained in their electronic
record. Section 7(3)’s caveat also implies trustees are not required to go above and
beyond what they normally can perform with their computer hardware and software and
technical expertise to assist a patient in accessing their record.
Section 12 of PHIA provides patients the right to correct their health information.
PHIA states that “[f]or purposes of accuracy or completeness, an individual may request
a trustee to correct any personal health information that the individual may examine and
copy under this Part.” According to subsection 12(2), a patient’s request must be in
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writing and trustees must respond to patients’ requests within 30 days. There are no
provisions stating when a trustee is permitted to refuse patient requested corrections,
although there are provisions that explain what must occur when a refusal is made.
Section 12 (4) indicates that
A trustee who refuses to make a correction that is requested under this
section shall
(a) permit the individual to file a concise statement of disagreement stating
the correction requested and the reason for the correction; and
(b) add the statement of disagreement to the record in such a manner that it
will be read with and form part of the record or be adequately crossreferenced to it.
What this means for Joe:
Joe, as in other model 2 and 1 provinces, is permitted to access his electronic
record containing his personal health information if he is located in Manitoba. In
Manitoba, Joe’s health care provider, or trustee, must provide his record to him in a form
Joe can use. Joe might expect, though, that access requests he makes in other provinces
will not result in him receiving a record entirely unusable either. Patients like Joe may
think that, in some respects, the requirement that the record be usable is redundant and,
therefore, unnecessary, and also seems to protect trustees from scrutiny if they cannot
actually produce the record to the patient if it proves to technically difficult to do so. For
this reason, section 7(3) of PHIA is geared more towards trustees’ interests rather than
patients’ interests.
However, while Joe may perceive section 7(3) to protect trustees rather than help
patients, it is likely the case that patients who make access requests in each of the other
model 1 and 2 provinces in fact experience this same limitation without it being
acknowledged in statute. In other words, Joe has the right to request and receive a copy of
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his personal health information contained in his EHR in provinces such as Ontario,
Saskatchewan and Quebec, but he may not receive the record promptly or at all if the
health care provider in charge of the record cannot provide the record to him in a usable
form, particularly if the provider does not have the expertise to produce the record to Joe.
In any case, it is interesting to speculate as to why Manitoba included this caveat,
whereas other provinces did not include it, even if other aspects of their EHR-related
statute address specific problems associated with digitized records. Perhaps, Manitoba,
while codifying patients’ interests in its preamble, is attempting to ensure trustees focus
on providing efficient, good quality patient care, rather than attempting to solve
technological issues associated with reproducing information in a digitized patient record.
Arguably, though, providing patients with access to their health records is part of
providing good quality care, in that patients can make the most informed decisions about
treatment if they have access to all the same information to which their health care
provider has access and also make corrections if an error was made in their record.
The content of Joe’s right to correct his personal health information in Manitoba
is virtually identical to that in each of the other model 2 provinces, as well as Quebec;
namely, the 30-day trustee response requirement and the requirement that the request be
in writing. However, the lack of reasons for refusal means that PHIA does not directly
parallel those in the other jurisdictions. In Manitoba, Joe may not know whether trustees
will refuse to make a correction if the information Joe requests to correct is a health care
provider’s opinion. Once a refusal is made, Joe is permitted to learn why the refusal was
made430, but Joe will not know if a request to correct opinion-based information will be
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denied outright. Certainly, PHIA does not give trustees the right to deny correction of this
type of information; however, this does not mean they will not refuse corrections on this
basis anyway.
e) Newfoundland:
Newfoundland and Labrador, like New Brunswick, more recently enacted its
health-specific personal data protection legislation, but has been transitioning to EHRs
for a number of years. Newfoundland and Labrador’s Centre for Health Information is a
crown agency created in 1996. Its website indicates that it is the “most comprehensive
health information centre of its kind in Canada”431 and that it “is a model for other
jurisdictions.”432 The Centre has developed the EHR initiative in Newfoundland and
Labrador and it “implemented the first provincial client registry specifically for the
electronic health record.”433 Newfoundland and Labrador are still implementing EHR
projects throughout the province. The Centre defines the EHR as “a secure and private
lifetime record of a person’s health and health care history which is available
electronically to patient-authorized health care providers.”434
On April 1, 2011, Newfoundland and Labrador’s Personal Health Information
Act (“PHIA Newfoundland”) came into force and deals with both health-specific personal
data protection and EHR regulation, including the Newfoundland & Labrador Centre for
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Health Information. Newfoundland and Labrador’s Department of Health and
Community Services stated that PHIA Newfoundland governs collection, use and
disclosure of personal health information and also patients right to access their
information.435 Newfoundland is more like Ontario in its EHR regulation because it deals
with the Centre for Health Information briefly in its regulations and does not yet have
specific protections built into the act. EHR-specific regulations are simply contemplated
at this time. The characteristics of the new act are discussed next.
i) EHR Definition:
Even though the Centre defines EHR, PHIA Newfoundland does not. However,
11 references are made to electronic records. In particular, section 14(4) requires that
[a] person who provides goods or services for the purpose of enabling a
custodian to use electronic means to collect, use, modify, disclose, retain
or dispose of personal health information shall comply with [PHIA
Newfoundland] and [its] regulations.
Moreover, section 22(7) specifically authorizes the creation of electronic records
[a]n information manager may, in accordance with the terms of an
agreement with a custodian, construct or create an integrated electronic
record of personal health information comprising individual records, the
custody or control of each of which may be in one or more custodians.
EHRs are also not mentioned in either of PHIA Newfoundland’s two regulations,
although the Pharmacy Network Regulations436 reference the Centre for Health
Information at sections 2(b) and 3.
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What this means for Joe:
As is the case with several other model 2 and the model 1 provinces, EHRs are
specifically contemplated by PHIA Newfoundland, but not actually defined.
Consequently, a patient like Joe may be at a loss to know exactly what an EHR will
constitute or look like if he travels to Newfoundland and Labrador. Joe will know that
protections are afforded to EHR-like documents in statute, but his EHR in Newfoundland
may not necessarily look entirely like the EHR in Quebec, for instance. Practically
speaking, though, it is quite unlikely that the two records would differ greatly between
the jurisdictions.
ii) Consent to Collection:
One of the rights PHIA Newfoundland affords patients is to “[r]efuse or give
consent to the collection, use or disclosure of personal health information, except in
circumstances specified in PHIA [Newfoundland]”.437 Such a right, on its face, accords
with the corresponding OECD principle. However, this right is not particular to EHRs
per se and it contains exceptions.
Unlike some of the other provinces, though, section 29 of PHIA Newfoundland
requires consent to collection as follows:
29. (1) A custodian shall not collect personal health information about an
individual unless
(a) the individual who is the subject of the information has consented to
its collection and the collection is necessary for a lawful purpose; or
(b) the collection is permitted or required by this Act.
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Newfoundland and Labrador’s PHIA contains provisions similar to lock box
provisions used in jurisdictions like Ontario. The Frequently Asked Questions document
pertaining to the act states that
When an individual requests a health information custodian not to use or
disclose his or her personal health information to another custodian, the
custodian is obliged to inform the recipient custodian that some personal
health information is inaccessible as a result of it having been “locked” by
the individual. A custodian must inform the recipient custodian if the
custodian considers some of the locked information to be reasonably
necessary for the provision of health care.438
Section 27 of PHIA Newfoundland gives patients this right to “limited consent”.
What this means for Joe:
Joe may experience a disparity between Newfoundland and Labrador and all the
other Canadian jurisdictions except Ontario because the former generally requires
consent to collection (like Ontario) and the other jurisdictions generally do not.
Travelling between provinces and interacting with new health care providers, Joe may
find his personal health information is dealt with differently between the jurisdictions that
differ with respect to this requirement. However, it is the case that Alberta previously
required consent to collection of personal health information into individual’s EHRs439
but has since repealed the section requiring consent.440 Such a decision may perhaps be
because it was too cumbersome for health care providers to obtain each patients’ consent
to collection and that it impacted efficiency of patient care. Newfoundland and Labrador
may have this experience as well and correspondingly change PHIA Newfoundland’s
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consent provision. Until that time, however, this is one situation in which Joe will
experience a difference between his interactions with the two legal regimes, even though
the provinces that differ belong to the same model.
Further, while PHIA Newfoundland does expressly pertain to EHRs, it presents a
similarly flexible scheme to that in Ontario because Joe can place conditions on
collection, use and disclosure of his personal health information. As PHIA Newfoundland
is not yet truly specific to EHRs, it does not have EHR-specific options built into the act.
iii) Limited Use:
According to section 34 of PHIA Newfoundland, use of patients’ personal health
information is limited to those purposes expressly permitted by the act. Section 34 does
not explicitly refer to EHRs, though. Some of the permitted uses include the following:
(a) …the purpose for which the information was collected or created and
for all the functions reasonably necessary for carrying out that purpose …
(c) for planning or delivering health care programs or services provided or
funded by the custodian, in whole or in part, allocating resources to those
programs or services, evaluating or monitoring those programs or services
or preventing fraud or an unauthorized receipt of services or benefits
related to those programs or services;
(d) for the purpose of risk management or error management or for the
purpose of activities to improve or maintain the quality of care or to
improve or maintain the quality of related programs or services of the
custodian[.]
The uses prescribed in these sections are quite obviously similar to those described in the
other jurisdictions examined thus far. Newfoundland and Labrador, therefore, does not
differ from the other jurisdictions in the extent to which considerably discretion is
afforded to custodians in terms of determining if a use is permissible, based on the
wording of the section 34 subsections.
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What this means for Joe:
The permissible uses in section 34 demonstrate that Joe’s experience with the way
in which his personal health information contained in his EHR will be used in
Newfoundland and Labrador will not differ to any great extent from those provinces
previously discussed.
iv) Security Safeguards:
Section 15 of PHIA Newfoundland addresses security of personal health records.
This section is not EHR specific and does not mention any safeguards specific to
electronic records. Section 15 provides that:
15. (1) A custodian shall take steps that are reasonable in the
circumstances to ensure that
(a) personal health information in its custody or control is protected
against theft, loss and unauthorized access, use or disclosure;
(b) records containing personal health information in its custody or
control are protected against unauthorized copying or modification; and
(c) records containing personal health information in its custody or
control are retained, transferred and disposed of in a secure manner.
Such safeguards are not unlike those prescribed in the other model 1 and 2 provinces.
Even though some of the provinces examined thus far expressly mention EHRs in
reference to security safeguards, none of the provinces express the specific mechanisms
through which safeguards are implemented and achieved. So, in effect each province
states all of its records will be protected without regard to the type of record at hand.
Perhaps the only exceptions to these assertions include Quebec and New Brunswick,
which provide some greater specificity pertaining to EHRs. However, it seems most
provinces followed the decision to not prescribe certain security requirements as this is
dictated by industry standards and changes as rapidly as the EHR technology itself.
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As is true of Saskatchewan, a Frequently Asked Questions document relating to
PHIA Newfoundland describes security safeguards that would pertain to EHRs with great
specificity. The document indicates that technological safeguards include “passwords,
firewalls and encryption, where appropriate and applicable.”441 The document further
states that “[t]he PHIA [Newfoundland] policy development manual contains further
information about information security under PHIA [Newfoundland].”442 Use of policy
documents and guides, such as the Frequently Asked Questions document, is analyzed
and discussed in greater depth below in the Saskatchewan discussion.
What this means for Joe:
As was previously discussed for Alberta, most provinces have not specified the
specific security safeguards required because provinces follow industry standards.
Newfoundland and Labrador has clearly chosen to follow this route as well, so Joe will
likely not experience different safeguards pertaining to his EHR in Newfoundland.
Safeguards, in some respects, are more likely to be dictated by the economic viability of
each province, rather than legal standards.
v) Patient Participation:
Lastly, PHIA Newfoundland expressly provides patients the right to “[r]equest
corrections…be made to one’s own personal health information”.443 Consequently, the
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OECD individual participation principle is embraced in this newly enacted statute.
Section 60 of PHIA Newfoundland provides that
60. (1) Where a custodian has granted an individual access to a record of
his or her personal health information and the individual believes that the
record is inaccurate or incomplete, he or she may request that the
custodian correct the information.
(2) A request under subsection (1) may be made orally or in writing.
Section 61 indicates that patients must receive a response to their request to correction
within 30 days, as is also the case in Quebec, Saskatchewan, Alberta and Ontario, for
instance. As is also prescribed in these other provinces, a correction will not be made if it
pertains to professional opinion or an observation made by a custodian.444
What this means for Joe:
As in each of the other model 1 and 2 provinces, Joe will have the right to request
corrections be made in his EHR. Consequently, Joe will not find there is a difference
between the model 1 and 2 provinces in this respect. The time frame and mode of request
for and response to correction requests may differ between the provinces, but the analysis
thus far has shown that, overall, Joe’s experience will be similar between jurisdictions.
However, at least in respect of Newfoundland and Labrador, Joe would experience this
similarity regardless of whether he is dealing with his EHR or paper medical records.
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f) Saskatchewan:
Saskatchewan is the final province that appropriately fits in model 2. In
Saskatchewan, the Saskatchewan Health Information Network (SHIN) was introduced in
the provincial government’s Throne Speech in 1998.445 At the time of its creation, SHIN
was going to be responsible for Saskatchewan’s EHR. According to a Government of
Saskatchewan News Release issued August 25, 1997:
[e]lements of SHIN include[d] the development of individual electronic
health records, the installation of technology linking health district
professionals, and the implementation of software systems for ordering,
recording and tracking health services.446
Ultimately, the Saskatchewan Ministry of Health took responsibility for the EHR and
introduced the Health Information Solutions Centre (HISC) to oversee EHR system
development.447 Most recently, and as in Ontario, eHealth Saskatchewan was created and
is a crown corporation that has taken on this task. Saskatchewan’s Information and
Privacy Commissioner recently stated that “[i]t is not clear what the role will be for the
recently announced eHealth Saskatchewan [and whether it will] be a trustee for purposes
of HIPA”.448 Even though it may not be clear what will be eHealth Saskatchewan’s role,
in Saskatchewan, the current EHR system being implemented consists of a “distributed
network[,] which links information from a number of different domain repositories.”449
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In conjunction with SHIN’s introduction in 1998, the Saskatchewan government
also announced its intention to introduce HIPA. The objective of HIPA is to permit
personal health information sharing between trustees.450 This new act was and still is
“focused on certain providers and organizations that are defined as ‘trustees’”451 and
includes provisions that address patient consent and access. According to Gary Dickson,
[w]hat is new, due to HIPA, is the privacy piece. This is a set of elements
that speak to a degree of patient control and go significantly beyond the
culture of confidentiality. Confidentiality speaks only to keeping the
information safe once it is in the custody of the trustee.452
Gary Dickson’s comment on confidentiality applies to each of the other provinces healthspecific personal data protection legislation as well. Personal data protection legislation
adds another layer of requirements that lie on top of and interact with existing
confidentiality requirements that must be observed by individuals dealing with patient
information. Digitized health records have further complicated the layer of personal data
protection requirements in health-specific personal data protection legislation. As such,
this section discusses how Saskatchewan laws have dealt with the EHR phenomenon.
An Overview of the Health Information Protection Act453 (the “HIPA guide”)
indicates that “[t]he Act prevails over all other Acts and regulations in regard to personal
health information held by trustees”.454 But, Saskatchewan courts have provided little
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insight into how HIPA should be interpreted.455 One Court of Queen’s Bench decision456
has dealt with section 4(4) of HIPA and its exclusion provision. According to
Saskatchewan’s Information and Privacy Commissioner, Gary Dickson, “[t]here have
been no judicial decisions…dealing with Saskatchewan’s developing EHRi.”457 Perhaps
the Saskatchewan government intended the HIPA guide to be used as an interpretive tool.
However, as will be demonstrated in the proceeding discussion, the HIPA guide often
appears to operate in conjunction with HIPA because of the great degree to which HIPA
is explained in the HIPA guide.
It is not entirely clear how the Saskatchewan government intended the HIPA
guide to operate, and whether it is simply to be used as explanatory notes by patients and
health care providers, or whether it is meant to be used to guide judges’ and legal
professionals’ interpretation of HIPA. Guideline use is becoming more prevalent.458
However, guidelines “akin to dictation can also be a form of law-making, which, absent
legislative authorization, is invalid or even unconstitutional”.459 The HIPA guide
emanates from the Policy and Planning Branch of Saskatchewan Health. So, the HIPA
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guide is not created by an agency attempting to revoke “adjudicative independence”460,
but instead a government office, which appears to be intending to supplement the act. The
HIPA guide still has interesting legal character, though, because its contents could,
theoretically, have been made part of HIPA, but were not. Notwithstanding any
conclusions as to the HIPA guide’s legal character, its contents are analyzed and included
in the following discussion of the act, as HIPA’s provisions often are not sufficiently
specific to enable analysis of this study’s five criteria.
The patient experience with Saskatchewan’s HIPA through the lens of the five
criteria is discussed next. At first blush, it seems that each of the criteria derived from the
OECD Guidelines will be addressed within HIPA because the guide to the act461 states
HIPA is based on principles drawn from the Canadian Standards Association's Model
Code for the Protection of Personal Information, which as previously discussed, was
based upon the OECD Guidelines. As this is the final model 2 province, a brief summary
of each of the provinces will be described following the Saskatchewan analysis.
i) EHR Definition:
An interesting feature of HIPA is that not only does it not define EHR, it also
does not mention the word electronic at all. Instead, Saskatchewan refers to EHRs as
“comprehensive health records” and explains that comprehensive health records are
electronic in the HIPA guide.462 Despite that no mention is made of electronic records in
the text of the act, the guide states HIPA “applies to personal health information in the
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health system in any form, including traditional paper records and emerging electronic
records such as in the Saskatchewan Health Information Network.”463 HIPA’s application
to EHRs is, therefore, not evident on the face of the act. In this way, Saskatchewan’s
HIPA appears similar to, but distinct from, model 3. HIPA is intended to address EHRs,
but its application to EHRs is not expressly evident in the act. Consequently, on face
value, Saskatchewan has health-specific personal data protection legislation, which does
not address EHRs.
Further reading about the act reveals, though, that the term “comprehensive health
record” is meant to include EHRs, and could be akin to the “Quebec Health Record” as is
used in the Quebec Conditions. Therefore, Saskatchewan most appropriately falls within
model 2 because it addresses EHRs in health-specific personal data protection legislation.
However, it could be argued that Saskatchewan ideally falls into its own category in
terms of the way it has addressed EHRs in statute.
The HIPA guide states that the “comprehensive health record” definition is “[o]f
particular importance”.464 In HIPA section 2 (c.1), “comprehensive health record” is
defined as “a comprehensive health record described in subsection 18.1(2)”, where
subsection 18.1(2) states that
(2) A comprehensive health record with respect to an individual:
(a) consists of records containing the individual’s personal health
information that are provided by two or more trustees;
(b) is created for the purposes of:
(i) compiling a complete health history of the individual; and
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(ii) providing access to that history to any trustee; and
(c) is stored and controlled by the Saskatchewan Health Information
Network or the prescribed person that created it.
EHRs are not mentioned explicitly in this definition. Subsection 18.1(2)(c) seems to
imply that some form of electronic document may be used for patient’s personal health
information because it states that the Saskatchewan Health Information Network stores
and controls comprehensive health records. Use of the term “network” implies that
information is digitized but does not expressly indicate this to be true. In fact, the
definition could also easily apply to paper, as well as electronic, records, as use of term
Saskatchewan Health Information Network does not expressly exclude paper records.
The guide to the act indicates that
[i]t is not the intent that this definition apply to more operational electronic
health records that are being created, for example, by regional health
authorities, affiliates, and/or physicians within the regional health
authority for the purpose of providing services to people seeking services
with the health region.465
The statement “more operational electronic health records” implies that comprehensive
health records includes EHRs. However, for some reason, the Saskatchewan government
chose to leave the definition open to interpretation, perhaps to accommodate any future
changes to the technology or the way the technology is managed. Reference to the
Saskatchewan Health Information Network definition in subsection 2(r) does not provide
further insight, as it merely states that “‘Saskatchewan Health Information Network’
means the Saskatchewan Health Information Network established as a Crown corporation
pursuant to The Crown Corporations Act, 1993.” This definition does not indicate
whether this corporation is responsible for paper or electronic records.
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However, the HIPA guide, rather than HIPA itself, goes on to state that the
“Saskatchewan Health Information Network (SHIN) is an information management
service provider.”466 This description again implies that SHIN deals with digitized
records only and therefore comprehensive health records means EHRs. It is also the guide
that states that “through the agreements a physician will retain the same degree of control
over an electronic health record on SHIN as he or she has over paper records in a locked
file cabinet in the office”.467 This quote again indicates that SHIN, at least primarily,
deals with EHRs rather than paper records.
Additional guidance regarding what may constitute an EHR in Saskatchewan can
be found in other secondary sources. According to Saskatchewan’s Information and
Privacy Commissioner, “[a]n EHR is an integrated health information system that
provides authorized users a shared view of health information in a secure
environment.”468 Dickson describes the EHR environment in Saskatchewan as the
following:
Registries or repositories from which information is accessed with an
EHRi system normally includes provincial pharmacy, laboratory and
diagnostic imaging clinical repositories, and patient and provider registries
that contain registration information necessary to properly identify patients
and providers to the system. Saskatchewan already has in place several
domain repositories- the Pharmaceutical Information Program (PIP), the
Diagnostic Imaging and Picture Archiving System (RIS-PAC S), Lab
Results Repository (SLRR) (so far only in part of the province).469
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While the secondary sources may be of use, none of the sources are legally binding, and
instead, merely somewhat instructive.
What this Means for Joe
Patients like Joe will perhaps find the comprehensive health record
definition, coupled with the definition of personal health information in HIPA,
provide a fairly complete picture of what constitutes Joe’s EHR in Saskatchewan.
The definition of comprehensive health record not only points to a definition of
what is contained in the Saskatchewan health record, but also its purpose and the
entity that manages and is responsible for the record. However, this definition is
only truly helpful to Joe if it can somehow be determined that it in fact applies to
EHR.
Further, on the surface, use of the term “comprehensive health record”
rather than “electronic health record” could be confusing to Joe, if they do in fact
mean the same thing in practice. In actual fact, it may be that Saskatchewan’s
version of the EHR is not any different than that in other provinces, but the
provincial government made the decision to not call it an EHR in legislation to
ensure that both paper and electronic records were covered by the act.
Patients may perceive though that the rules pertaining to EHRs are less
developed in Saskatchewan because EHRs are not expressly defined. Alternatively,
it could be argued that the rules relating to EHRs are in fact more developed in
Saskatchewan legislation because EHRs are more seamlessly integrated into the
statutory scheme, such that little to no distinction is made between paper and
electronic records and that the same rules apply to both.
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Ultimately, though, a lack of specific rules applying to EHRs harkens back
to the model 3 provinces, which simply address EHRs through existing legislation
that applies to non-health paper records.
ii) Consent to Collection:
Presuming that HIPA does in fact apply to EHRs, even though they are not
explicitly mentioned in the act as such, then individuals’ informed consent is required in
order to use and disclose personal health information contained in their EHR, unless
HIPA indicates that only deemed consent is required.470 Section 5 states:
Consent required for use or disclosure
5(1) Subject to subsection (2), an individual has the right to consent to the
use or disclosure of personal health information about himself or herself.
(2) A trustee shall use or disclose personal health information about an
individual only:
(a) with the consent of the subject individual; or
(b) in accordance with a provision of this Act that authorizes the use or
disclosure.
Indeed, in Saskatchewan consent is deemed amongst those trustees sharing personal
health information used for treatment and care.471
In contrast, HIPA does not expressly indicate when consent is required for
collection of personal health information to the comprehensive health record. Section 6
provides:
6(1) Where consent is required by this Act for the collection, use or
disclosure of personal health information, the consent:
(a) must relate to the purpose for which the information is required;
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(b) must be informed;
(c) must be given voluntarily; and
(d) must not be obtained through misrepresentation, fraud or coercion.
(2) A consent to the collection, use or disclosure of personal health
information is
informed if the individual who gives the consent is provided with the
information that a reasonable person in the same circumstances would
require in order to make
a decision about the collection, use or disclosure of personal health
information.
(3) A consent may be given that is effective for a limited period.
(4) Consent may be express or implied unless otherwise provided.
(5) An express consent need not be in writing [emphasis added].
Section 6 contemplates that consent to collection may be required in particular
circumstances, but not all circumstances. Indeed,
[s]ection 6 of HIPA provides that, where consent is required for collection,
use or disclosure of personal health information, it must relate to the
purpose for which it was collected; be informed; be given voluntarily; and
not be obtained through misrepresentation, fraud or deception.472
Further, section 7 of HIPA gives patients the right to revoke their consent to collection,
which will take effect at any time but will not have retroactive effect.
Curiously,

Gary

Dickson,

Saskatchewan’s

Information

and

Privacy

Commissioner, recently stated that Saskatchewan has only recently changed its approach
to consent as a result of health care provider convenience; in that implied, rather than
express or deemed, consent is now used “in the initial domain repositories constructed for
this province’s EHR[.]”473 Gary Dickson’s observation is interesting because it
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demonstrates that what occurs in practice is not necessarily dictated by the confines of
statute. In that HIPA still mentions deemed consent but practitioners are moving away
from that type of consent. For instance section 27 of HIPA states that:
27(1) A trustee shall not disclose personal health information in the
custody or control of the trustee except with the consent of the subject
individual or in accordance with this section, section 28 or section 29.
(2) A subject individual is deemed to consent to the disclosure of personal
health information
However, Gary Dickson suggests that, in most circumstances, implied consent is the
norm, as is provided in section 6 of HIPA. In either case, a careful reading of the act is
required to understand which form of consent is legally required in respect of collection,
use and disclosure.
Regardless of the types of consent required and the way in which they may vary
between Saskatchewan and the other provinces, HIPA’s consent provisions do not
directly address concerns associated with EHRs. That being said, if it is presumed that
comprehensive health records are the equivalent to EHRs, section 8 of HIPA does
indicate that “[a]n individual has the right to prevent access to a comprehensive health
record of that individual’s personal health information.” Further, section 8(2) provides
that
[i]n the case of a comprehensive health record created and controlled by
the Saskatchewan Health Information Network, the subject individual may
require that the record not be disclosed to trustees by giving a written
direction, in the prescribed form, to the Saskatchewan Health Information
Network.
Arguably, section 8, therefore, does deal specifically with how a patient can control their
digitized health information, albeit not necessarily specifically through consent to
collection, but rather through disclosure. However, application of section 8 to EHRs is
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not immediately evident because no specific mention is made of digitized records in this
provision, unless it is assumed that comprehensive health record denotes an EHR.
What this Means for Joe:
Patients like Joe may experience that Saskatchewan’s “informed consent” differs
from that used in another model 2 province, namely Ontario, because Ontario uses
“knowledgeable consent”.474 In Saskatchewan, unlike Ontario, Joe must receive the
information a reasonable person requires in the same circumstances to decide about
whether this personal health information should be collected, used or disclosed; such
information could include “details such as who has access to the information, for what
purposes, what security measures are in place to protect the information and what the
risks and benefits are of refusing or consenting to the collection, use or disclosure.”475
Section 7 of HIPA affords patients rights similar to those in the other model 2 and
1 provinces, wherein a lock box can be put on their information. In both cases, revoking
consent to collection and preventing disclosure of information, enable the patient to
control access to their most personal health details and, therefore, promote the patient’s
autonomy. However, one could also argue that these two mechanisms are technically
distinct from one another, and that these provinces have differing privacy requirements in
standards. Ultimately, though, Joe may not experience a great disparity between these
provinces in terms of that information which is available to the multitude of health care
providers with whom he will interact.
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iii) Limited Use:
As is the case with the other model 1 and 2 provinces previously discussed, HIPA
limits use of patients’ personal health information. However, HIPA does not expressly
reference limits on use of EHRs, and instead appears to use a blanket provision that could
apply to both paper and digitized records. In this way, HIPA is similar to Ontario and
Alberta. HIPA’s limited use provisions include sections 23 and 26. Section 23 provides
that “[a] trustee shall collect, use or disclose only the personal health information that is
reasonably necessary for the purpose for which it is being collected, used or disclosed.”
Section 26 also states that
(1) A trustee shall not use personal health information in the custody or
control of the trustee except with the consent of the subject individual or
in accordance with this section.
(2) A trustee may use personal health information:
(a) for a purpose for which the information may be disclosed by the trustee
pursuant to section 27, 28 or 29;
(b) for the purposes of de-identifying the personal health information;
(c) for a purpose that will primarily benefit the subject individual; or
(d) for a prescribed purpose.
What this Means for Joe:
HIPA contains sections that require trustees to limit use of EHR personal health
information. However, sections 23 and 26 provide trustees with a fair amount of
discretion over the way use is limited. For instance, it may not be clear to a patient like
Joe who travels to Saskatchewan how trustees determine what is “reasonably necessary”.
Section 26(c) also affords trustees leeway. What will “primarily benefit” the patient is
also not certain. Joe will not necessarily have confidence that use of personal health
information contained in his EHR (or comprehensive health record) will be truly helpful
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to him. Who decides what is primarily beneficial? How do trustees discern what is
primarily beneficial and what is somewhat beneficial? What constitutes a benefit?
That being said, Joe will likely find his experience between the provinces
examined this far and the way their health care providers limit use does not change
greatly. Each jurisdiction’s statute contains statutory provisions limiting use but giving
health care providers discretion as to use. In other words, even though the specific uses
may differ between provinces, each jurisdiction examined thus far has included statutory
language that permits trustees or custodians to decide whether use is appropriate in
particular situations.
iv) Security Safeguards:
Section 16 of HIPA imposes a duty upon trustees to create procedures and
policies that ensure trustees comply with technical, administrative and physical security
safeguards for personal health information. 476 Indeed, section16 states that
Subject to the regulations, a trustee that has custody or control of personal
health information must establish policies and procedures to maintain
administrative, technical and physical safeguards that will:
(a) protect the integrity, accuracy and confidentiality of the information;
(b) protect against any reasonably anticipated;
(i) threat or hazard to the security or integrity of the information;
(ii) loss of the information; or
(iii) unauthorized access to or use, disclosure or modification of the
information; and
(c) otherwise ensure compliance with this Act by its employees.
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HIPA does not provide greater detail about the ways each of these requirements are met.
However, the HIPA guide describes that there are many ways that trustees will ensure
personal health information is protected, some of which clearly pertain to digitized
records.477 However, most of these methods simply include HIPAs statutory
requirements, such as limited use and consent to disclosure.
The HIPA guide also explains that HIPA does not include specific security
requirements because the technology changes so quickly and it is more practical to
simply require trustees to be “reasonably up-to-date with security provisions for all types
of information”.478 The HIPA guide does mention that an example of security safeguards
include trustees ensuring computer systems meet or exceed industry standards for
security and integrity.479 Further, Saskatchewan’s Information and Privacy Commissioner
approved guidelines for protecting personal health information “as the standard for
privacy and security protection by trustees in respect of section 16.73[.]”480
What this Means for Joe:
It seems that all of the model 1 and 2 provinces examined thus far require security
safeguards of some type to protect personal health information contained in EHRs. It
seems quite evident, though, that the actual means through which security and protection
of personal health information is obtained is through a set of industry standards that are
prescribed in legislation. Consequently, patients like Joe are less likely to experience a
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significant disparity in the ways that his personal health information is safeguarded across
Canadian jurisdictions because the actual safeguards used are not jurisdiction specific.
Technical industry standards are quite likely Canada-wide rather than province-wide.
v) Patient Participation:
As has been described by Gary Dickson, “[o]ne of the most important features of
HIPA is the right of a patient to request in writing access to their own personal health
information from any particular trustee.”481 Section 13 of HIPA describes patients’ right
of access and amendment:
In accordance with Part V, an individual who is given access to a record
that contains personal health information with respect to himself or herself
is entitled:
(a) to request amendment of the personal health information contained in
the record if the person believes that there is an error or omission in it; or
(b) if an amendment is requested but not made, to require that a notation to
that effect be made in the record.
Patients’ request to access their health record and trustees must respond to patients within
30 calendar days.482 Trustees are permitted to refuse patient access in six situations,483
although these situations are quite uncommon.484 Patients’ requests for correction must
only pertain to factual errors and no amendments can be made to “differences of
opinion”.485
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What this Means for Joe:
Patients like Joe will not experience a great difference in the way they participate
with their EHR between model 1 and 2 provinces. In particular, the timelines for response
to access requests, as well as the types of amendments that can be requested are quite
similar between jurisdictions.
Perhaps one of Joe’s only striking experiential changes may be between the way
British Columbia and Saskatchewan deal with patient participation. British Columbia’s
E-Health Act does not yet permit patients the right to access and amend their EHR. Yet,
the E-Health Act was designed specifically to accommodate the specific legal problems
associated with EHRs. HIPA, though it does not explicitly state that it pertains to EHRs,
it deals quite comprehensively with patient participation. Ultimately, though, Joe will not
be precluded from specifically participating with his EHR in either province, unless
British Columbia fails to adopt the access and amendment provisions the E-Health Act
currently lacks and relies on FIPPA.
One clear deficiency in HIPA with respect to access and amendment, which also
applies to each of the other model 1 and 2 provinces previously examined herein, is that
there is not a prescribed route to access the complete information contained in a patient’s
EHR.486
g) Summary of Patients’ Interactions with Model 2
Table 2 below summarizes the patient interactions with model 2 provinces. As
was the case with the model 1 provinces, patients will experience similar trends amongst
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the model 2 provinces. Ontario, Alberta and New Brunswick are the only provinces that
define EHR in statute. However, secondary documents, such as the HIPA guide used in
Saskatchewan, as well as the other statutory provisions contained in Newfoundland and
Labrador and Manitoba’s statutes, will effectively make clear to the same extent what
constitutes a patient’s health record is the same as in Alberta, Ontario and New
Brunswick. This is the case because even the provinces in model 2 that actually define
EHR do not do so with any great specificity, other than perhaps Alberta. Moreover,
patients’ experiences with limited use, security safeguards and patient participation will
also not differ to a great extent because (a) health care providers generally have a wide
discretion for using personal health information despite limited use provisions, (b)
security safeguards are general and do not directly address the problems associated with
EHRs and (c) access and correction provisions contain almost identical requirements in
each jurisdiction in model 2, as a general rule.
Perhaps the only major difference amongst the model 2 jurisdictions is that
Newfoundland and Labrador, Saskatchewan and Ontario require consent to collection in
some situations, but not all, whereas the other jurisdictions do not require consent to
collection of information for EHRs at all. Such a difference could result in a discrepancy
in the patient experience between model 2 jurisdictions.

167

TABLE 2: OVERVIEW OF LEGISLATIVE TREATMENT OF PERSONAL
HEALTH INFORMATION IN EHRS IN MODEL 2
Study
Criteria:

EHR
Definition

Consent to
Collection487

Limited Use

Security
Safeguards

Patient
Participation

Models &
their
Jurisdictions:
Model 2:
ON
AB
NB
MB
NL
SK

Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No

No
No
No
No
No
No

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

4) MODEL 3 – NO HEALTH-SPECIFIC PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION OR
EHR-RELATED LEGISLATION
a) Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, Northwest Territories, Nunavut, Yukon:
Model 3 includes territories and provinces that do not have EHR- or healthspecific personal data protection legislation, but instead have general personal data
protection legislation that applies to EHRs. Model 3 territories and provinces chose to
enact legislation such as freedom of information and protection of privacy statutes to
protect health information held by public bodies.488 The Northwest Territories, the
Yukon, and Nunavut have enacted Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Acts
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(“AIPPAs”).489 Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island have enacted Freedom of
Information and Protection of Privacy Acts (“FIPPAs”).490 These enactments simply
permit individuals’ to request access to information that is held by a jurisdiction’s public
entities.
Unlike the other model 3 jurisdictions, Nova Scotia appears to be in the process of
enacting health-specific personal data protection legislation that may address EHRs. The
Department of Health and Wellness is dealing with these issues and has developed the
Personal Health Information Act491, which received royal assent in December 2010.492
The act is not yet in force. The Department expects it will be proclaimed in the winter of
2012-2013.493
The Department of Health and Wellness explains that an important aspect of the
new legislation is that it was developed with electronic health information as a primary
concern and that current laws in Nova Scotia were premised on a paper record health
system.494 Consequently, once the act is in force, it is arguable that Nova Scotia could fall
under model 1 because it created legislation specific to EHRs. It could also be argued,
though, that it simply has health-specific personal data protection legislation, which
addresses EHRs, like the other model 2 provinces. In some respects, Newfoundland and
489
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Labrador, which quite recently enacted health-specific personal data protection
legislation that addresses EHRs (PHIPAA), is similar to Nova Scotia’s PHIA, because
both are primarily health-specific personal data protection legislation, but the acts both
contain EHR-specific provisions.
Apart from Nova Scotia, model 1 and 2 provinces have also enacted similar
general personal data protection statutes. For instance, Newfoundland and Labrador has
an Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act495, Saskatchewan, British
Columbia, Alberta and Ontario have enacted Freedom of Information and Protection of
Privacy Acts.496 In addition, Quebec enacted An Act Respecting Access to Documents
Held by Public Bodies and the Protection of Personal Information497 “which applies to
public bodies and health institutions.”498 So, in addition to the general personal data
protection statutes, model 1 and 2 provinces have simply chosen to address either health
information or EHRs specifically in separate pieces of legislation. In those provinces that
have acts such as Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Acts that may
operate in addition to, instead of or be trumped by EHR and health-specific personal data
protection legislation depending upon the way in which general personal data protection
statutes are treated in the health or EHR-specific legislation. This study does not examine
in detail the way that each of the general personal data protection statutes operates in
provinces that also have EHR- or health-specific personal data protection legislation as
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well. Instead, the focus in this paper is to determine to what extent each model and the
jurisdictions in each model addresses EHRs, in particular, to assess how a patient’s
experience may differ and whether this necessitates immediate or eventual
harmonization, as has been espoused by scholars to date.
The following discussion of the model 3 provinces and territories simultaneously
deals with each of the model 3 jurisdictions when assessing the five criteria used to
examine the patient experience in this study. In this model, the provinces and territories
are grouped together under each criterion because the legislative enactments of most of
the territories and provinces in model 3 are similar, if not identical, and the specificity
with which the model 3 jurisdictions deal with EHRs is not great enough to warrant a
separate examination of each jurisdiction. In addition, each of the proposed provisions in
Nova Scotia’s Personal Health information Act will not be examined in complete detail,
as this bill is not yet in force, so it does not reflect the current patient experience in Nova
Scotia. Some reference will be made to the Nova Scotia’s Personal Health Information
Act for interest’s sake.
i) EHR Definition:
None of the model 3 jurisdictions’ statutes define EHR, as none of the statutes in
these jurisdictions are EHR or even health-specific. Both of Prince Edward Island and
Nova Scotia’s FIPPAs define personal information in section 1 and the definition
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explicitly references health information499, but not EHRs. Each of the territories AIPPA’s
have “personal information” definitions that explicitly reference health information.500
Of the three territories and Prince Edward Island, the Yukon is perhaps the most
geared towards the EHR because its AIPPA’s definition of record in section 3 includes
“electronic”. The Northwest Territories, on the other hand, fails to mention the word
“electronic” in its AIPPA but “health information” is explicitly mentioned in the
definition of “personal information”501 and provisions regarding how access to
information will be provided.502
The term “electronic health record” is used twice in Nova Scotia’s Bill 89503 but
there is no definition of EHR in the proposed statute.504 However, no other definitions
provide any specificity with respect to electronic or health information.
What this means for Joe:
Even though EHR is not defined in model 3 jurisdictions’ legislation, Joe’s EHR
would still be covered by these jurisdictions’ general personal data protection statutes.
There would still be privacy protections for Joe’s personal health information in these
jurisdictions but Joe would be unsure as to what is considered an EHR in these
jurisdictions. As has been previously discussed, though, some of the current EHR
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definitions in model 1 and 2 jurisdictions are vague enough that Joe would not know
what constitutes and is contained in his EHR. Joe may simply be content to know that
whatever type of record he has, in any form, it is covered by privacy protections.
Joe may feel that protections afforded his EHR should differ from those afforded
to other types of records. Consequently, the next sections of this paper examine to what
extent model 3 jurisdictions deal with the remaining four criteria in general data
protection statutes to know in what ways non-EHR specific statutes may be deficient in
protecting personal health information.
ii) Consent to Collection & Limited Use:
Prince Edward Island’s and Nova Scotia’s FIPPAs and the Northwest Territories,
the Yukon and Nunavut’s AIPPAs require consent in the context of use and disclosure of
personal information, but do not directly address consent in the context of collection, and
certainly not specifically in respect of EHRs.
Similar to consent to collection, Prince Edward Island’s and Nova Scotia’s
FIPPAs and the Northwest Territories, the Yukon and Nunavut’s AIPPAs limit use of
personal information, but do not directly address limited use in the context of collection,
and certainly not specifically in respect of EHRs.
What this means for Joe:
Like some of the other model 1 and 2 provinces, consent to collection and limited
use are not addressed directly within model 3 jurisdiction’s legislation. Patients like Joe
will perhaps experience the greatest difference between model 3 and other models’
jurisdictions in respect of consent to collection and limited use because there are no
provisions in model 3 jurisdictions’ legislation requiring, for example, lock boxes for
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personal health information contained in EHRs. Consequently, there are certain
protections built into the model 1 and 2 jurisdictions’ legislation that simply do not exist
in model 3 jurisdictions that will make patients like Joe feel more confident about the
way their digitized personal health information is dealt.
iii) Security Safeguards:
Each of the model 3 jurisdictions require some type of security safeguard for
personal information covered by their general personal data protection acts.505 For
instance, Nova Scotia’s FIPPA states in section 24(3) that “[t]he head of the public body
shall protect personal information by making reasonable security arrangements against
such risks as unauthorized access, collection, use, disclosure or disposal.” In almost
identical language, Prince Edward Island’s FIPPA also requires personal information be
protected in section 35: “[t]he head of a public body shall protect personal information by
making reasonable security arrangements against such risks as unauthorized access,
collection, use, disclosure, disposal or destruction.”
What this means for Joe:
Joe can be sure that in each of the model 3 jurisdictions, statutes require that the
personal health information he provides as part of his EHR will be protected under
general personal data protection legislation. Patients like Joe may be uncertain as to
whether adequate protections are being put in place to ensure electronic information is
properly secured. However, most of the other model 1 and 2 jurisdictions also do not
specify what is done to protect digitized health information, merely that it is required that
505
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it receive protections. It has previously been discussed that industry standards guide what
protections are put in place, so legislation stays non-specific. Consequently, patients like
Joe may rightly feel there may not be a great difference between the protections used in
each of the models jurisdictions, regardless of what is stated in respect of EHRs in the
model 1 and 2 jurisdictions.
iv) Patient Participation:
Prince Edward Island’s and Nova Scotia’s FIPPAs and the Northwest Territories,
the Yukon and Nunavut’s AIPPAs each afford individuals the right to correct information
held by public entities and receive a response to such a request in 30 days.506 One of the
model 3 jurisdictions, Prince Edward Island, also gives public bodies the right to refuse
corrections if the information constitutes “a professional or expert opinion”, which is a
similar requirement to that imposed by some of the model 2 jurisdictions.507
What this means for Joe:
At least at face value, the right to request corrections contained in general
personal data protection differs very little from that same right in health-specific and
EHR-specific personal data protection legislation. Therefore, patients like Joe will most
likely have quite similar experiences between each of the Canadian jurisdictions in
respect of correcting their health information. Perhaps the only difference may be that
model 3 provinces do not appear to require the request to be in writing, whereas a number
of the model 2 provinces have such a requirement.
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b) Summary of Patients’ Interactions with Model 3
As the discussion of model 3 jurisdictions is considerably shorter than those of the
model 1 and 2 provinces, it is not necessary to reiterate the general patient experience
trends amongst the model 3 provinces. Suffice it to say, however, the patient experience
between each of these jurisdictions will be quite similar as many of the statutory
provisions are almost virtually identical between jurisdictions. Even though the sections
do not directly pertain to EHRs a similar patient experience will likely result.

TABLE 3: OVERVIEW OF LEGISLATIVE TREATMENT OF PERSONAL
HEALTH INFORMATION IN EHRS IN MODEL 3
Study
Criteria:

EHR
Definition

Consent to
Collection

Limited Use

Security
Safeguards

Patient
Participation

Models &
their
Jurisdictions:
Model 3:
NS
PEI
NU
YK
NWT

No
No
No
No
No

No
No
No
No
No

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
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CHAPTER 5: WHAT THE PATIENT EXPERIENCE TELLS US ABOUT
LEGISLATIVE HARMONIZATION & CONCLUSION
1) THE MODELS, PATIENTS AND HARMONIZATION
In recent years, scholars have frequently asserted that harmonization of personal
data protection laws pertaining to EHRs would “facilitate an interoperable EHR”.508 The
goal of this study was to test scholars’ assertion that harmonization is required against the
way a patient would currently experience personal data protection in each Canadian
jurisdiction if required to interact with the health care system and provide information to
each jurisdictions’ EHR.509 Five criteria were used to assess the patient experience with
each jurisdiction’s legislation, four of which were based upon the OECD Guidelines. The
four based on the OECD Guidelines concern 1) consent to collection, 2) use limitation, 3)
security safeguards and 4) patient participation. The fifth criterion is whether EHR is
defined in the legislation and, if so, how.
First and foremost, this study established that the personal data protection
legislation about EHRs can be categorized into three models. Next, the study established
into which of the three models each of the provinces and territories falls.510 Two of the
provinces, British Columbia and Quebec, have enacted separate EHR-specific personal
data protection legislation and comprise those whose legislation falls within model 1. Six
provinces, including Ontario, Alberta, Saskatchewan, New Brunswick, Newfoundland
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As was previously discussed in Chapter 3, this study drew the assumption that each jurisdiction’s EHR
system is fully operational and intended to be integrated with other jurisdictions EHRs as is predicted and
described in the literature.
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See Figure 1.
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and Labrador and Manitoba, amended existing health-specific personal data protection
statutes to deal with the specific issues associated with EHRs and, therefore, comprise
those whose legislation falls within model 2. Two provinces, Prince Edward Island and
Nova Scotia, and each of the territories, the Yukon, the Northwest Territories and
Nunavut, have not enacted any EHR- or health-specific personal data protection
legislation, but instead simply have general data protection legislation, and these
provinces and territories populate model 3.
However, despite these three different approaches, the important findings from
this paper show that statutory harmonization may not be as imperative to the delivery of
health care as originally espoused by academics. As particularly evident in Table 4,
despite the three distinct legislative approaches to addressing EHRs, when impact on
patient experience is examined on a number of measures, there are not as many
differences across models in the care experience. Indeed, what differences exist are not
aligned with differences between the legislative models but with individual policy
choices by provincial and territorial governments.
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TABLE 4: OVERVIEW OF LEGISLATIVE TREATMENT OF PERSONAL
HEALTH INFORMATION IN EHRS IN EACH JURISDICTION BASED ON
CRITERIA EVALUATED IN THIS STUDY

Study
Criteria:

EHR
Definition

Consent to
Collection511

Limited Use512

Security
Safeguards513

Patient
Participation

Models &
their
Jurisdictions:
Model 1:
BC
QC
Model 2:
ON
AB
NB
MB
NL
SK
Model 3:
NS
PEI
NU
YK
NWT

No
No

No
No

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes514
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No

No
No
No
No
No
No

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

No
No
No
No
No

No
No
No
No
No

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

First, as shown in Table 4, the foregoing analysis shows that a patient’s
experience with legislative security safeguards in place in each jurisdiction should not
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Consent to collection in all situations is not required in any of these jurisdictions.
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Only Model 1 provinces, British Columbia and Quebec, address limited use directly in the EHR context.
Each of the other Canadian jurisdictions addresses limited use of either personal health information (in
Model 2 provinces) or personal information (in Model 3 provinces).
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Only general security safeguards are described in British Columbia’s FIPPA, as is the case with each of
the other Model 2 and Model 3 jurisdictions. There are no security safeguards described in the E-Health
Act. Quebec’s Conditions describe security safeguards specifically related to EHRs.
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Patient participation is addressed in British Columbia’s FIPPA rather than in the E-Health Act (at least
until s. 17 of the E-Health Act is declared in force, which was not yet true at the time of writing).
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differ to any great extent across Canada. Even provinces that contain EHR-specific
provisions or have EHR-specific statutes do not specifically address those technical
safety concerns raised by EHRs. The Saskatchewan government explained this was the
case because technology industry standards, rather than statutory provisions, must dictate
what protections are put in place. In either case, it seems harmonization of these
provisions is not truly necessary.515
Second, Table 4 reveals that every Canadian jurisdiction contained a statutory
provision that limited the use by health care providers of personal health information,
even if the provision was not EHR-specific. However, further harmonization of these
provisions does not appear to be imperative because the statutes afforded health care
providers a wide purview of discretion over when the use limitation is not applicable to
their needs. Indeed, when the provisions were specific to personal health information, a
choice to provide health care providers with discretion respecting limiting use shows that
provincial and territorial governments do not wish to impede system-wide health care
delivery, but rather enhance its efficiency and comprehensive nature, thus, limiting
individual ability to create inefficiencies by withholding personal health information.
Last, it is evident in Table 4 that each of Canada’s jurisdictions permits patients to
access their records and request corrections be made to their personal health information,
whether or not it is contained in an EHR. In fact, some of the time limits and other
statutory requirements appeared already harmonized across Canada because they were
identical in most jurisdictions and across the models as well. One of the only differences
within a model is that only two of the model 2 provinces, New Brunswick and Manitoba,
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indicate in their health-specific personal data protection legislation that patients can
request corrections be made to their personal health information contained in their EHR
and appear to permit corrections to be made to opinion-based comments in patients’
medical records. Ontario, Alberta, Newfoundland and Labrador and Saskatchewan, on
the other hand, do not allow patients to request corrections to be made to opinion-based
comments. One of the model 3 jurisdictions, namely Prince Edward Island, also does not
allow opinion-based corrections. With respect to the model 1 provinces, Quebec’s
Conditions and British Columbia’s E-Health Act and FIPPA are silent on whether
opinion-based corrections are or are not permitted.
Despite the fact that there are differences between models over whether
corrections can be made to opinion-based comments, all Canadian jurisdictions that have
a time limit pertaining to response to corrections indicate that patients must receive a
response in 30 days. Nonetheless, despite these minor differences between individual
provinces even within models, analytically, one can conclude that each of the models and
jurisdictions is consistent with the others because at least one statute in each jurisdiction
permits access as well as a right to request corrections.
In summary, on the whole, patients like Joe, who travel between several Canadian
jurisdictions and receive care in those different jurisdictions, will experience some
differences between certain specific jurisdictions, but no notable differences between the
models themselves. With respect to security safeguards, use limitations and patients’
ability to request corrections, practically speaking, it appears from this study that patients
will experience a uniformity across Canada, because each Canadian jurisdiction requires
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security safeguards, limits use and allows patients to access their records and request
corrections be made to the personal health information contained in their EHRs.
This study examined each Canadian jurisdictions’ legislation to determine what
the patient experience would be. Let us recap the fictional patient scenario and Joe’s
travels to discuss Joe’s expected experience as he travels across Canada. Applying the
jurisdictional analysis to Joe’s travels further emphasizes the finding in this study that
harmonization is not as important as it is currently discussed to be in the literature. To
prevent redundancy, since Joe’s experiences have been discussed in detail earlier in this
paper, the following section will review his experiences generally and comment upon
trends.
Joe516 lives in a small town located on the provincial border between Alberta and
Saskatchewan. So, he frequently receives health care in both provinces, as urban centres
containing health care providers are located approximately equal distances from his
home. Each time he visits a healthcare professional in each of these provinces, that
professional accesses and updates Joe’s EHR. Joe developed a rare form of cancer
requiring treatment before it progresses further. Joe chooses to pursue the treatment that
is only available in British Columbia. Joe’s British Columbia physician updates Joe’s
EHR so healthcare professionals who care for Joe in Alberta and Saskatchewan can
access his most up to date cancer treatment information. Joe also attends his daughter’s
wedding in Prince Edward Island. While there, Joe trips and attends at an emergency
room to be sure he did not break bones during his fall. His emergency room physician
pulls up Joe’s EHR to ensure that he has a full medical history and medication list to
properly treat Joe.
While at home, no matter whether Joe is in Alberta or Saskatchewan, Joe will
have a similar sense of what constitutes his EHR because although only Alberta directly
defines it, Saskatchewan makes clear what comprises an EHR through a combination of
the statutory definition of comprehensive health record and the HIPA guide. In most
cases in Alberta, consent to collection is not the way that Joe will control his personal
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health information, as collection can occur without patient consent. Similarly, in
Saskatchewan, consent to collection appears to be required in certain but not all
situations. Further, use by health care providers of this personal health information is
limited in some ways in both Alberta and Saskatchewan, although some prescribed uses
are permitted. So, in both provinces, use will often come down to individual discretion of
health care providers in some cases. Both these model 2 provinces also discuss security
safeguards for records containing personal health information, although Alberta’s
provision addresses EHRs directly, and both provinces permit Joe to request corrections
be made to his EHR.
Upon travelling to British Columbia, Joe may be unclear about whether his EHR
is governed by the E-Health Act, as it must be contained within an HIB for that to be the
case. So, interestingly, Joe will be less clear about what constitutes an EHR in British
Columbia, which is an EHR-specific model 1 jurisdiction, than he is at home travelling
between model 2 jurisdictions that simply amended their legislation to address EHRs.
However, consent to collection under British Columbia’s E-Health Act appears similar to
the cases in Alberta and Saskatchewan, because consent to collection is not expressly
mentioned in respect of EHRs. The use limitation on health care providers regarding
personal health information contained in HIBs in British Columbia is similar to those in
Alberta and Saskatchewan because the British Columbia E-Health Act requires that use is
limited subject to certain purposes, which again affords health care providers discretion.
Security safeguards are not prescribed in the British Columbia E-Health Act, so Joe may
not be as confident about the safety of his personal health information contained in his
EHR when he is receiving care in British Columbia. However, British Columbia’s FIPPA
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has been said to apply where there is silence in the E-Health Act, and FIPPA does offer
security protections, although not those which are EHR-specific. In terms of patient
participation, the British Columbia E-Health Act does not yet afford Joe the right to
request corrections or access his record, but does offer disclosure directives, as discussed
earlier in this paper. Comparing British Columbia with Alberta and Saskatchewan, Joe
will actually find the British Columbia E-Health Act less in line with the five criteria
examined in this study than the legislation in his home jurisdictions, Alberta and
Saskatchewan, even though British Columbia is the jurisdiction, of the three, that has
enacted EHR-specific legislation. Ultimately, though, the continued operation of British
Columbia’s FIPPA may mean that Joe’s experience in British Columbia does not differ
as much from his experiences in the other provinces as one would have expected from
examining British Columbia’s E-Health Act.
Because British Columbia’s FIPPA applies to protection of personal health
information contained in EHRs when the E-Health Act does not, Joe’s experience in
British Columbia, Alberta and Saskatchewan will not differ greatly from his experience
in Prince Edward Island. As a model 3 jurisdiction, without specific legislation dealing
with health, let alone EHRs, the concept of an EHR is not defined in PEI. As in the other
provinces Joe to which travelled, consent to collection is not directly addressed, use by
health care providers is limited but only to a certain extent, safeguards are required but
they are not technology specific and access by Joe to his records is permitted and requests
by Joe to make corrections to his record are permitted.
Ultimately, it seems Joe will really not be drastically disadvantaged in any of the
provinces to which he travels, under any one of the three models, although he will
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encounter some idiosyncrasies in the legislation of given jurisdictions, particularly in
British Columbia. Perhaps the main difference Joe will experience between any one
jurisdiction and the others, which is also the most unique requirement pertaining to
EHRs, is Joe’s right to disclosure directives contained in British Columbia’s E-Health
Act. Such directives appear to afford patients a certain level of autonomy by promoting
decision-making and enhanced participation in health care. However, even disclosure
directives can be overruled by health care providers, in favour of promoting efficiency or
in the event of emergency, and so the patient experience, without an effective directive
will not differ between British Columbia and the other jurisdictions.
Nevertheless, it is certainly the case that the legislation currently in place in most
of the jurisdictions is quite general and does not address specific EHR-related concerns.
This is the case even in jurisdictions where an act has been created or amended as a result
of EHRs’ arrival.517 Nonetheless, the gaps and generalities do not appear to have the
result that any jurisdiction is entirely deficient in offering Joe an experience consistent
with experiences in other jurisdictions, if Joe is forced to travel between jurisdictions. So,
while harmonization may be a laudable goal that would necessarily promote consistency
across Canada, Joe’s experience with each of the jurisdictions examined demonstrates
that harmonization is not nearly as important as currently espoused by its proponents
because there is already a great deal of consistency in terms of the patient experience
between jurisdictions. True harmonization of the legislation is not required.
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2) CONTRIBUTION
This study contributes to current literature on EHRs in Canada because it is
current, patient-centred and truly national in scope.
The research presented in this thesis is unique because it is pan-Canadian. One
author, Gordon, previously categorized relevant legislation but, due to the scope of her
research, did not mention all of the provinces and territories. Gordon grouped provincial
approaches to legislating on EHRs in her discussion about reform of Ontario’s EHRrelated laws. Gordon’s thesis did not delve into territorial or Quebec laws. Further,
Gordon’s categorization of EHR regulation arises out of an entirely different
phenomenon (Ontario legislative reform) than is dealt with in this thesis (harmonization).
Consequently, Gordon’s thesis did not present a national survey of Canadian legislation.
Moreover, the PIPEDA Report, which did canvas all Canadian jurisdictions, including
Quebec and the territories, is not up-to-date. Therefore, this study fills this gap in the
current literature.
This study is also unique because it is patient-centred, though not empirical in that
sense. Only a few authors have addressed the patient experience to any degree. Most
authors generally and simply state that digitization threatens protection of personal health
information contained within medical records. For instance, Gordon’s analysis does not
cover how the patient experience will differ across Canada as a result of transjurisdictional flows of personal health information in EHRs. Scott also describes the
effect of the E-Health Act on the patient in addition to discussing its effect on
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institutions.518 However, only British Columbia is the focus of Scott’s article, and she
does not present a national perspective of the patient experience.
One issue this study did not explore was the university research context in which
EHRs will be present. This study was premised upon the fictional patient receiving active
treatment and not receiving care or treatment as part of a research study or any other
study. However, the patient experience with health care in Canada cannot be fully
explored if the research context is ignored. Personal health information contained in
EHRs may also be implicated in the research context as it is often the case that patients
interacting with EHRs may also be undergoing experimental treatment as part of a
university research study. It would be useful to compare the way in which jurisdictions
deal with personal data protection related to EHRs as identified in this study and in
contexts where the treatment is part of a research context. A future study could build on
and update both this study and the work performed by Perry and Wilkinson.519
3) CONCLUSION
The issues discussed in this thesis are important because maintaining the public’s
trust is a “critical” goal “in the health sector.”520 This trust is critical because of the value
placed upon personal health information by many members of society. Again, using Joe
as an example, Joe probably values the personal health information he provides to his
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health care providers and which is contained in his521 EHR because it is about him and
comprises the most intimate details about his life. Joe’s health care providers value the
information contained within Joe’s EHR because it comprises Joe’s comprehensive
medical history of which they can avail themselves to ensure they have the most
complete knowledge about Joe’s health. Such enhanced knowledge is valuable to health
workers because it means they are able to provide the most appropriate health
information to Joe and treat him properly. This allows Joe’s health care providers to
maintain their reputations as health care providers, to avoid harming Joe, and to avoid
liability.
The differing value placed upon personal health information by different
stakeholders requires legislators and policy makers to resolve issues that threaten to erode
trust. In addition to good legislation, “[n]o matter how much care and attention is devoted
to the technology behind the EHR…it will never be enough if the policies, procedures,
practices, and training needed for its proper and secure operation are neglected”.522
Scholars have previously asserted that current laws and policies relating to EHRs are
deficient, and have been neglected, because, in their views, Canadian patients are not
well-served by the current “piecemeal” legislative scheme pertaining to EHRs. Indeed, a
“piecemeal” approach to personal health information protection, it is asserted, could
diminish patients’ trust in the health care system if protections are not adequate and are
inconsistent. In the absence of harmonization, it has been suggested that “perhaps,
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healthcare organizations involved in data transfers may wish to consider adopting the
highest standard in place in order to facilitate such transfers and ensure compliance in all
jurisdictions.”523 Indeed, this approach has been used already within the European Union,
which stipulates the conditions under which data transfers could take place between EU
and non-EU states.524
With all of this in mind, this study has shown that it is important to critically
assess what is currently in place in Canadian jurisdictions to ensure we are not
overstating problems associated with the protection of personal health information
contained in EHRs. This study has established that Canadian jurisdictions use one of
three separate modes of incorporating EHR-specific rules into legislation; however, the
outcome of this variation in approach is not entirely disparate, in terms of (a) the way that
EHRs are defined, and (b) the ways in which (i) consent to collection, (ii) limited use,
(iii) security safeguards and (iv) patient participation are addressed. Patients like Joe can
be assured they will not experience widely differing legal environments that regulate the
ways in which the personal health information in their EHR is governed as they move
throughout Canada.
This study is not intended to diminish the importance of examining data
protection issues and problems arising as a result of EHR use. Certainly, privacy breaches
are a real and significant phenomenon, and can seriously affect all of those involved.
However, the aim of this study was to perform an up-to-date, high-level comparison of
Canadian jurisdictions’ EHR related statutes to tackle fears that legislation in the different

523

Information Governance, supra note 178 at 33.

524

Ibid.

189
jurisdictions that make up the Canadian federation is leading unsuspecting patients down
widely differing personal data protection-paths. The results of this study should assuage
those fears.
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